Page 54 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 54
What Do We Know about the World?
argumentative instruction:
some conclusion C has to be found, which can also be supported by the
utterance Dinner is ready by now, e.g. Hurry up!
Our examples with little (7) and a little (8) could thus be interpreted
as follows:
(7) Janez worked little. > He may not succeed (in passing the exam).
informative instruction:
some quantity of work µ has to be defined or agreed upon, which can be
regarded or can still be regarded as small. Utterance (7) is true if Janez
has not exceeded this quantity s(of work).
argumentative instruction:
some conclusion C has to be found, which would also be supported by
the (stronger) utterance Janez did not work (at all), e.g. He may not suc-
ceed (in passing the exam).
Utterances (8) and (7) would thus share the informative, but not the
argumentative instruction:
(8) Janez worked a little. > He may succeed (in passing the exam).
informative instruction:
some quantity of work µ has to be defined or agreed upon, which can be
regarded or can still be regarded as small. Utterance (8) is true if Janez
has not exceeded this quantity (of work).
argumentative instruction:
some conclusion C has to be found, which could also be supported by the
argument Janez worked a lot, e.g. He may succeed (in passing the exam).
With this conceptual innovation Ducrot still bases argumentation
on the informative and the “factual,” but at the same time he enables
the regulation of the informative with what is completely argumenta-
tive in language. The expression “argumentation in the language-sys-
tem” points precisely to this, i.e. to the “fact” that the argumentative
orientation is inherent to the language as a system (language as an ab-
stract structure, as defined by de Saussure), and that it is not (only) the
result of the working of the context (on the contrary, it even creates/pre-
supposes its own basic context). Despite this compromising solution two
things immediately become obvious:
1. Descriptive, informative instructions are not really important for
the course of argumentation itself, i.e. for the transition from an ar-
gument to a conclusion. In other words, the “factuality” or the truth
of an utterance-argument (its congruence with the state of the so
called “objective reality”) is not decisive for the orientation of an ar-
argumentative instruction:
some conclusion C has to be found, which can also be supported by the
utterance Dinner is ready by now, e.g. Hurry up!
Our examples with little (7) and a little (8) could thus be interpreted
as follows:
(7) Janez worked little. > He may not succeed (in passing the exam).
informative instruction:
some quantity of work µ has to be defined or agreed upon, which can be
regarded or can still be regarded as small. Utterance (7) is true if Janez
has not exceeded this quantity s(of work).
argumentative instruction:
some conclusion C has to be found, which would also be supported by
the (stronger) utterance Janez did not work (at all), e.g. He may not suc-
ceed (in passing the exam).
Utterances (8) and (7) would thus share the informative, but not the
argumentative instruction:
(8) Janez worked a little. > He may succeed (in passing the exam).
informative instruction:
some quantity of work µ has to be defined or agreed upon, which can be
regarded or can still be regarded as small. Utterance (8) is true if Janez
has not exceeded this quantity (of work).
argumentative instruction:
some conclusion C has to be found, which could also be supported by the
argument Janez worked a lot, e.g. He may succeed (in passing the exam).
With this conceptual innovation Ducrot still bases argumentation
on the informative and the “factual,” but at the same time he enables
the regulation of the informative with what is completely argumenta-
tive in language. The expression “argumentation in the language-sys-
tem” points precisely to this, i.e. to the “fact” that the argumentative
orientation is inherent to the language as a system (language as an ab-
stract structure, as defined by de Saussure), and that it is not (only) the
result of the working of the context (on the contrary, it even creates/pre-
supposes its own basic context). Despite this compromising solution two
things immediately become obvious:
1. Descriptive, informative instructions are not really important for
the course of argumentation itself, i.e. for the transition from an ar-
gument to a conclusion. In other words, the “factuality” or the truth
of an utterance-argument (its congruence with the state of the so
called “objective reality”) is not decisive for the orientation of an ar-
