Page 52 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 52
What Do We Know about the World?
doesn’t mean, of course, that there could not be a country where they
build monuments for every poet they have).
This criterion is crucial for explaining and understanding the dif-
ferent argumentative orientation of utterances (7) and (8). Utterance (7)
could be analyzed into:
p: the quantity of Janez’s work is small
pp: Janez worked
and the utterance (8) into:
p: Janez worked
pp: the quantity of Janez’s work is small.
By doing that, we retain the informative component of both utter-
ances (the quantity of Janez’s work is small), and explain their different
argumentative orientations (and conclusions that follow from them),
but the problem of informativeness returns through the back door. How
and why?
It should be understandable by now that little is argumentatively
oriented in the same direction as nothing, not at all, and that a little is
argumentatively oriented in the same direction as a lot. To the effect that
both Janez worked a little and Janez worked a lot could be put forward
as arguments toward a conclusion He may pass the exam. And, mutatis
mutandis, we could say the same for Janez worked little and Janez didn’t
work at all, which could be put forward as arguments toward a conclu-
sion He may not pass the exam. The difference is only in the force of the
arguments, so that we can easily paraphrase and reinforce the argument
Janez worked little by Janez worked little, even not at all, and the argu-
ment Janez worked a little by Janez worked a little, even a lot.
But by doing that, we re-establish the discrepancy on the “factual”,
informative level: little is nevertheless something and not nothing, and
a little is only a little and not a lot. It was that very problem that forced
Ducrot into constructing his “weak version” of the theory of argumen-
tation in language.
5. Argumentative Scales
An important distinction that Ducrot introduces in this phase is
the distinction between a sentence (phrase) and an utterance (énoncé) on
the one hand, and meaning (signification) and sense (sens) on the other.
Ducrot regards a sentence as a schematic, abstract construction, and
thus as a matter of language (la langue) (in the Saussurean sense), and
the utterance as its respective realization, i.e. a matter of speech (la par-
ole). This means that every utterance of the same sentence is unique and
doesn’t mean, of course, that there could not be a country where they
build monuments for every poet they have).
This criterion is crucial for explaining and understanding the dif-
ferent argumentative orientation of utterances (7) and (8). Utterance (7)
could be analyzed into:
p: the quantity of Janez’s work is small
pp: Janez worked
and the utterance (8) into:
p: Janez worked
pp: the quantity of Janez’s work is small.
By doing that, we retain the informative component of both utter-
ances (the quantity of Janez’s work is small), and explain their different
argumentative orientations (and conclusions that follow from them),
but the problem of informativeness returns through the back door. How
and why?
It should be understandable by now that little is argumentatively
oriented in the same direction as nothing, not at all, and that a little is
argumentatively oriented in the same direction as a lot. To the effect that
both Janez worked a little and Janez worked a lot could be put forward
as arguments toward a conclusion He may pass the exam. And, mutatis
mutandis, we could say the same for Janez worked little and Janez didn’t
work at all, which could be put forward as arguments toward a conclu-
sion He may not pass the exam. The difference is only in the force of the
arguments, so that we can easily paraphrase and reinforce the argument
Janez worked little by Janez worked little, even not at all, and the argu-
ment Janez worked a little by Janez worked a little, even a lot.
But by doing that, we re-establish the discrepancy on the “factual”,
informative level: little is nevertheless something and not nothing, and
a little is only a little and not a lot. It was that very problem that forced
Ducrot into constructing his “weak version” of the theory of argumen-
tation in language.
5. Argumentative Scales
An important distinction that Ducrot introduces in this phase is
the distinction between a sentence (phrase) and an utterance (énoncé) on
the one hand, and meaning (signification) and sense (sens) on the other.
Ducrot regards a sentence as a schematic, abstract construction, and
thus as a matter of language (la langue) (in the Saussurean sense), and
the utterance as its respective realization, i.e. a matter of speech (la par-
ole). This means that every utterance of the same sentence is unique and
