Page 46 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 46
What Do We Know about the World?
and its analytical scope, and try to point at some possible problems at the
same time. My main point of interest will be the concept of polyphony,
therefore I shall have neither time (n)or space to discuss all the problems
and transformations Ducrot’s theory is currently undergoing (e.g. theo-
ry of semantic blocks). Also, because of its general character, this over-
view will have to be more or less schematic.
In the second part of the eighties1, Ducrot used to distinguish four
phases in the development of his theory of argumentation:
- the strong informativistic version
- the weak informativistic version
- the weak version of argumentation in language, and
- the strong version of argumentation in language.
The latter is (still) in a critical stage of formation and transforma-
tion.
1. Informativeness and Argumentativeness
The basic supposition of the first, i.e. “strong informativistic” ver-
sion – which Ducrot never really advocated, but used as a (presupposed)
theory in opposition to which he constructed his own theory instead
– is the postulate that every conclusion or, more accurately, every in-
stance of putting forward an argument towards a conclusion, is based
solely on “facts” conveyed (represented) by an utterance-argument. If it
is possible to draw a C(onclusion) from an A(rgument), this is the case
because the utterance A “factually” supports the utterance C: by quot-
ing or presenting or referring to some “facts” that speak in favour of the
utterance C. A different kind of support (if only subsidiary), for example
a structural linguistic support (i.e. making use of special language par-
ticles, argumentative connectives or argumentative indicators), is not
considered as a serious theoretical option.
Therefore, if the utterance
(1) Janez studied for only an hour or so
can be used as an argument or can serve as an argument supporting the
conclusion
(2) He won’t pass the exam
then – in accordance with the “strong informativistic” thesis – this can
be done only on the basis of the “fact(s)” that Janez (in fact) studied for
only an hour or so, and that an hour of studying is (usually, i.e. according
to “average” experience) not enough to pass an exam. Within the frame-
1 Lectures at Ecole des Hautes Etudes in Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1986–1989.
and its analytical scope, and try to point at some possible problems at the
same time. My main point of interest will be the concept of polyphony,
therefore I shall have neither time (n)or space to discuss all the problems
and transformations Ducrot’s theory is currently undergoing (e.g. theo-
ry of semantic blocks). Also, because of its general character, this over-
view will have to be more or less schematic.
In the second part of the eighties1, Ducrot used to distinguish four
phases in the development of his theory of argumentation:
- the strong informativistic version
- the weak informativistic version
- the weak version of argumentation in language, and
- the strong version of argumentation in language.
The latter is (still) in a critical stage of formation and transforma-
tion.
1. Informativeness and Argumentativeness
The basic supposition of the first, i.e. “strong informativistic” ver-
sion – which Ducrot never really advocated, but used as a (presupposed)
theory in opposition to which he constructed his own theory instead
– is the postulate that every conclusion or, more accurately, every in-
stance of putting forward an argument towards a conclusion, is based
solely on “facts” conveyed (represented) by an utterance-argument. If it
is possible to draw a C(onclusion) from an A(rgument), this is the case
because the utterance A “factually” supports the utterance C: by quot-
ing or presenting or referring to some “facts” that speak in favour of the
utterance C. A different kind of support (if only subsidiary), for example
a structural linguistic support (i.e. making use of special language par-
ticles, argumentative connectives or argumentative indicators), is not
considered as a serious theoretical option.
Therefore, if the utterance
(1) Janez studied for only an hour or so
can be used as an argument or can serve as an argument supporting the
conclusion
(2) He won’t pass the exam
then – in accordance with the “strong informativistic” thesis – this can
be done only on the basis of the “fact(s)” that Janez (in fact) studied for
only an hour or so, and that an hour of studying is (usually, i.e. according
to “average” experience) not enough to pass an exam. Within the frame-
1 Lectures at Ecole des Hautes Etudes in Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1986–1989.
