Page 49 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 49
argumentation as poliphony: one speaker, several voices 49
3. Argumentative Orientation
An argumentative relation (i.e., a relation between an utter-
ance-argument and an utterance-conclusion) is thus completely differ-
ent from a logical (deductive) relation (between premises and conclu-
sion). A claim that is clearly supported by the “fact” that some conclu-
sions, discursively completely acceptable, logically make no sense at all.
Let us consider the following conversational fragment (which I bor-
rowed from Moeschler (1985: 14)):
(6) A: Is dinner ready by now?
B: Yes, almost
In terms of (classical) logic, this dialogue makes no sense. Dinner
can be either ready by now, or not ready yet. It can be almost ready, but
this, logically taken, means that it is not ready yet. Therefore, Yes, almost,
is in no way a logically acceptable answer to the question Is dinner ready
by now? because it would represent a contradictory utterance, namely:
Yes, dinner is not yet ready.
By contrast, this dialogue is discursively, pragmatically completely
acceptable, and it owes this acceptability – paradoxically as it may seem
– exactly to the (problematical) particle almost. The (utterance) Dinner
is almost ready could be represented as an argument in favour of some
implicit conclusion, such as, Hurry up! Such a conclusion is also sup-
ported by the (logically “purer”) argument Dinner is ready (by now), the
argument Dinner is ready (by now) being stronger (in view of the con-
clusion Hurry up!) than Dinner is almost ready – but still with the same
argumentative orientation. In other words, this means that on the argu-
mentative scale of the “dinner’s readiness” (if we constructed one)
/dinner’s readiness/
ready
almost ready
ready soon
3. Argumentative Orientation
An argumentative relation (i.e., a relation between an utter-
ance-argument and an utterance-conclusion) is thus completely differ-
ent from a logical (deductive) relation (between premises and conclu-
sion). A claim that is clearly supported by the “fact” that some conclu-
sions, discursively completely acceptable, logically make no sense at all.
Let us consider the following conversational fragment (which I bor-
rowed from Moeschler (1985: 14)):
(6) A: Is dinner ready by now?
B: Yes, almost
In terms of (classical) logic, this dialogue makes no sense. Dinner
can be either ready by now, or not ready yet. It can be almost ready, but
this, logically taken, means that it is not ready yet. Therefore, Yes, almost,
is in no way a logically acceptable answer to the question Is dinner ready
by now? because it would represent a contradictory utterance, namely:
Yes, dinner is not yet ready.
By contrast, this dialogue is discursively, pragmatically completely
acceptable, and it owes this acceptability – paradoxically as it may seem
– exactly to the (problematical) particle almost. The (utterance) Dinner
is almost ready could be represented as an argument in favour of some
implicit conclusion, such as, Hurry up! Such a conclusion is also sup-
ported by the (logically “purer”) argument Dinner is ready (by now), the
argument Dinner is ready (by now) being stronger (in view of the con-
clusion Hurry up!) than Dinner is almost ready – but still with the same
argumentative orientation. In other words, this means that on the argu-
mentative scale of the “dinner’s readiness” (if we constructed one)
/dinner’s readiness/
ready
almost ready
ready soon
