Page 40 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 40
What Do We Know about the World?
ments. Literally, the word pathos means “feeling” or “affection”, mak-
ing the attempt to speak to an audience’s pathē an attempt to appeal, not
merely to what they believe, but to their feelings and their emotional at-
tachments. In constructing arguments this means that we need to con-
sider the emotional as well as the cognitive commitments of our audi-
ence.
In contemporary argumentation theory, the most direct call for a
recognition of emotional argument is found in Gilbert (1997; 2004). He
expands the standard account of argument so that it includes an “emo-
tional mode” which may employ emotion as a reason for a conclusion or
an expression of emotion as a means of conveying an argument. On this
account, a lover’s outpouring of emotion may function as a good reason
for accepting an entreaty to do what they desire. According to Gilbert,
the strength of an emotional argument depends upon “such elements as
degree of commitment, depth, and the extent of feeling, sincerity and
the degree of resistance” (1997, 83–84; Carozza, 2009, further develops
this account). One way to incorporate this into a theory of argument is
by broadening the notion of premise and conclusion acceptability one
employs so that it incorporates some notion of emotional acceptability.
Whichever way one goes, recognizing emotion as a legitimate compo-
nent of argument thickens one’s account of argument dramatically, tak-
ing us one step further in the development of a thick theory.
8. Conclusion: The Elements of Argument
In this essay, I have tried to sketch the outlines of a thick theory of
argument. We might summarize the theory I have suggested by saying
that it recognizes seven elements of argument which need to be consid-
ered in a comprehensive theory of argument. We might describe these el-
ements as: premises, conclusions, audience, dialectical exchange, dialog-
ical frames, multi-modal discourse, and emotional content. While this
list significantly thickens traditional accounts of argument, I do not of-
fer it as definitive. Argumentation theory is, in a number of ways, en-
gaged in working out a comprehensive list. In the final analysis, there
may be other elements of argument that it should recognize. Hample
(1985) has, for example, suggested a notion of argument defined in terms
of its cognitive dimensions (the mental processes by which argument oc-
tcourasnwotithheirndiinmdeivnisdiounaloafrgaurgeursm) tehnattthheatcanlelesdasrgtuombeencto0.nTsihdiesrmeda.yIpleoainvet
a discussion of this and other possibilities for elsewhere, though it bears
ments. Literally, the word pathos means “feeling” or “affection”, mak-
ing the attempt to speak to an audience’s pathē an attempt to appeal, not
merely to what they believe, but to their feelings and their emotional at-
tachments. In constructing arguments this means that we need to con-
sider the emotional as well as the cognitive commitments of our audi-
ence.
In contemporary argumentation theory, the most direct call for a
recognition of emotional argument is found in Gilbert (1997; 2004). He
expands the standard account of argument so that it includes an “emo-
tional mode” which may employ emotion as a reason for a conclusion or
an expression of emotion as a means of conveying an argument. On this
account, a lover’s outpouring of emotion may function as a good reason
for accepting an entreaty to do what they desire. According to Gilbert,
the strength of an emotional argument depends upon “such elements as
degree of commitment, depth, and the extent of feeling, sincerity and
the degree of resistance” (1997, 83–84; Carozza, 2009, further develops
this account). One way to incorporate this into a theory of argument is
by broadening the notion of premise and conclusion acceptability one
employs so that it incorporates some notion of emotional acceptability.
Whichever way one goes, recognizing emotion as a legitimate compo-
nent of argument thickens one’s account of argument dramatically, tak-
ing us one step further in the development of a thick theory.
8. Conclusion: The Elements of Argument
In this essay, I have tried to sketch the outlines of a thick theory of
argument. We might summarize the theory I have suggested by saying
that it recognizes seven elements of argument which need to be consid-
ered in a comprehensive theory of argument. We might describe these el-
ements as: premises, conclusions, audience, dialectical exchange, dialog-
ical frames, multi-modal discourse, and emotional content. While this
list significantly thickens traditional accounts of argument, I do not of-
fer it as definitive. Argumentation theory is, in a number of ways, en-
gaged in working out a comprehensive list. In the final analysis, there
may be other elements of argument that it should recognize. Hample
(1985) has, for example, suggested a notion of argument defined in terms
of its cognitive dimensions (the mental processes by which argument oc-
tcourasnwotithheirndiinmdeivnisdiounaloafrgaurgeursm) tehnattthheatcanlelesdasrgtuombeencto0.nTsihdiesrmeda.yIpleoainvet
a discussion of this and other possibilities for elsewhere, though it bears
