Page 37 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 37
the elements of argument: six steps to a thick theory 37
7. Step Six: Argument and Emotion
The last step I propose to take in developing a thick theory may be
the most controversial. In some ways it is anticipated by Hample, who
has criticized “the absence of emotions in argumentation theory,” re-
marking that “our culture has inherited a persistent and bad idea, name-
ly that rationality and emotionality are opposites. Arguing is identified
with reason, which is held to be the opponent and discipline to passion.”
(2005, 126–127) The split between reason and emotion this refers to is
especially common in logic and philosophy. It is tied to an influential
view of argument that can be called “the cognitive account.” This ac-
count sees argument as an attempt to judge truth and establish knowl-
edge in a manner that eschews the emotions and the passions.
One might maintain the plausibility of the cognitive account in
some contexts – e.g., mathematics and science. In other contexts which
are highly charged with emotion, it may usefully explain what goes
wrong in arguing. In judging who is right and who is wrong in conten-
tious divorce proceedings, the cognitive account tells us that the ideal
arguer proceeds by dispassionately marshalling evidence for and against
particular conclusions. This implies an unemotional approach to argu-
ment that is not unduly influenced by loyalty, sympathy or antipathy to-
ward one of the principals in question, or by hopes and desires about the
outcome. In this and other contexts which naturally engage the emo-
tions, the tendency to draw conclusions on the basis of emotional reac-
tions rather than evidence may be prevalent and pronounced.
In such cases, the cognitive account usefully points out that emo-
tion interferes with cogent reasoning. But we should not make too
much of this. Concluding that emotions have no place in the realm
of argument is like concluding that appeals to authority have no place
in argument because they often go amiss. In a great many situations,
emotions have a legitimate role to play in our decision to accept or re-
ject particular conclusions: because these conclusions resonate with
our ideals, our dislike of particular actions, our affection for our loved
ones, and so on. Compassion for the victims of an earthquake or tsu-
nami is appropriate, not inappropriate, when deciding whether one
should contribute to a charity that aims to support them. Loving or
fearing someone may give one strong reasons to conclude that they
should be treated or viewed in certain ways. A prevalent lack of empa-
thy is not a positive trait in thinking, but a defining feature of psychop-
athy, which is a mental disorder.
7. Step Six: Argument and Emotion
The last step I propose to take in developing a thick theory may be
the most controversial. In some ways it is anticipated by Hample, who
has criticized “the absence of emotions in argumentation theory,” re-
marking that “our culture has inherited a persistent and bad idea, name-
ly that rationality and emotionality are opposites. Arguing is identified
with reason, which is held to be the opponent and discipline to passion.”
(2005, 126–127) The split between reason and emotion this refers to is
especially common in logic and philosophy. It is tied to an influential
view of argument that can be called “the cognitive account.” This ac-
count sees argument as an attempt to judge truth and establish knowl-
edge in a manner that eschews the emotions and the passions.
One might maintain the plausibility of the cognitive account in
some contexts – e.g., mathematics and science. In other contexts which
are highly charged with emotion, it may usefully explain what goes
wrong in arguing. In judging who is right and who is wrong in conten-
tious divorce proceedings, the cognitive account tells us that the ideal
arguer proceeds by dispassionately marshalling evidence for and against
particular conclusions. This implies an unemotional approach to argu-
ment that is not unduly influenced by loyalty, sympathy or antipathy to-
ward one of the principals in question, or by hopes and desires about the
outcome. In this and other contexts which naturally engage the emo-
tions, the tendency to draw conclusions on the basis of emotional reac-
tions rather than evidence may be prevalent and pronounced.
In such cases, the cognitive account usefully points out that emo-
tion interferes with cogent reasoning. But we should not make too
much of this. Concluding that emotions have no place in the realm
of argument is like concluding that appeals to authority have no place
in argument because they often go amiss. In a great many situations,
emotions have a legitimate role to play in our decision to accept or re-
ject particular conclusions: because these conclusions resonate with
our ideals, our dislike of particular actions, our affection for our loved
ones, and so on. Compassion for the victims of an earthquake or tsu-
nami is appropriate, not inappropriate, when deciding whether one
should contribute to a charity that aims to support them. Loving or
fearing someone may give one strong reasons to conclude that they
should be treated or viewed in certain ways. A prevalent lack of empa-
thy is not a positive trait in thinking, but a defining feature of psychop-
athy, which is a mental disorder.
