Page 39 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
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the elements of argument: six steps to a thick theory 39
arching account of argument that is applicable in a broad range of con-
texts. Such a theory must, in particular, be able to provide an account of
argument that can analyze and assess arguments in a variety of contexts
which are inherently emotional: in political, moral, social and aesthetic
debate; in interpersonal exchange; in mediation and conflict resolution;
in bargaining; and so on. In the realm of evaluation, this means that a
thick theory must be able to distinguish between legitimate and illegit-
imate (and more and less legitimate) emotional appeals. For though it is
clear that emotion can play a legitimate role in such contexts, it is equal-
ly clear that arguers may treat them as opportunities to manipulate emo-
tions and illegitimately establish their conclusions. Arguments in sales
and advertising, with their very consciously designed appeals to our de-
sires and hopes and fears (about sex, health, material possessions, etc.)
are notorious for such appeals.
This is not the place for the development of a detailed account of
how to analyze and assess emotion in arguments, but it behoves us to
say something in this regard. To begin with, it may be said that there are
important ancient precedents for recognizing the extent to which emo-
tions influence argument (and vice-versa). In sharp contrast to the cog-
nitive approach to argument, they view emotion’s association with ar-
gument as an opportunity that adept arguers should explore, cultivate
and exploit.
Such an attitude is an essential component of ancient sophism and
ancient rhetoric, which are key instances of argumentation theory (for
a recent attempt to rehabilitate the sophists as theorists, see Tindale,
2010). Gorgias, famous for his ability to argue anything, unabashedly
champions the ability of argumentative discourse to provoke emotion,
claiming that it accomplishes “miraculous works; for it can stop fear
and assuage pain and produce joy and make mercy abound,” producing
“fearful shuddering and tearful pity and sorrowful longing” (1999: 9).
Emphasizing the emotional power of words, he compares them to drugs,
“[f]or just as different drugs draw off different humours from the body,
and some put an end to disease and others to life, so too of discourses:
some give pain, others delight, others terrify, others rouse the hearers to
courage, and yet others by a certain vile persuasion drug and trick the
soul” (1999, 14).
Aristotle is impatient with Gorgias and the sophists, but the rhetor-
ical tradition he initiates also recognizes emotion as a key component
of argument, emphasizing the role that pathos plays in persuasive argu-
arching account of argument that is applicable in a broad range of con-
texts. Such a theory must, in particular, be able to provide an account of
argument that can analyze and assess arguments in a variety of contexts
which are inherently emotional: in political, moral, social and aesthetic
debate; in interpersonal exchange; in mediation and conflict resolution;
in bargaining; and so on. In the realm of evaluation, this means that a
thick theory must be able to distinguish between legitimate and illegit-
imate (and more and less legitimate) emotional appeals. For though it is
clear that emotion can play a legitimate role in such contexts, it is equal-
ly clear that arguers may treat them as opportunities to manipulate emo-
tions and illegitimately establish their conclusions. Arguments in sales
and advertising, with their very consciously designed appeals to our de-
sires and hopes and fears (about sex, health, material possessions, etc.)
are notorious for such appeals.
This is not the place for the development of a detailed account of
how to analyze and assess emotion in arguments, but it behoves us to
say something in this regard. To begin with, it may be said that there are
important ancient precedents for recognizing the extent to which emo-
tions influence argument (and vice-versa). In sharp contrast to the cog-
nitive approach to argument, they view emotion’s association with ar-
gument as an opportunity that adept arguers should explore, cultivate
and exploit.
Such an attitude is an essential component of ancient sophism and
ancient rhetoric, which are key instances of argumentation theory (for
a recent attempt to rehabilitate the sophists as theorists, see Tindale,
2010). Gorgias, famous for his ability to argue anything, unabashedly
champions the ability of argumentative discourse to provoke emotion,
claiming that it accomplishes “miraculous works; for it can stop fear
and assuage pain and produce joy and make mercy abound,” producing
“fearful shuddering and tearful pity and sorrowful longing” (1999: 9).
Emphasizing the emotional power of words, he compares them to drugs,
“[f]or just as different drugs draw off different humours from the body,
and some put an end to disease and others to life, so too of discourses:
some give pain, others delight, others terrify, others rouse the hearers to
courage, and yet others by a certain vile persuasion drug and trick the
soul” (1999, 14).
Aristotle is impatient with Gorgias and the sophists, but the rhetor-
ical tradition he initiates also recognizes emotion as a key component
of argument, emphasizing the role that pathos plays in persuasive argu-
