Page 33 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 33
the elements of argument: six steps to a thick theory 33
In the evolution of argumentation theory, the pragma-dialectical ac-
count of critical discussions is a game-changing move because it recog-
nizes dialogical frames as a previously neglected element of argument.
The significance of this move is even more evident in subsequent discus-
sions in argumentation theory, which identify other kinds of dialogue
which are characterized by different frames – and the different goals,
structures, and rules of engagement they incorporate. In his work, Wal-
ton has proposed seven different kinds of dialogue which have as their
purpose: persuasion, inquiry, discovery, negotiation, information, delib-
eration and eristic exchange (see 2007). The distinction between these
different kinds of dialogue has significant implications for the analysis
of specific instances of argument, as each is characterized by a distinct
frame which implies unique procedural rules and unique standards for
success.
In an inquiry dialogue, arguments are exchanged to establish what
is true. The dialogue is characterized by strict standards that determine
what counts as evidence and counter-evidence for a particular conclu-
sion. In contrast, a negotiation dialogue does not attempt to establish
truth, but to bargain in a way that reconciles the competing interests of
the parties who negotiate. In the case of collective bargaining, one spe-
cies of negotiation dialogue, arguing is unacceptable it is “bargaining in
bad faith” – by, for example, bargaining directly with the members of
the union or the executive of the corporation rather than the team that
represents them. This procedural rule has no obvious analogue in an in-
quiry dialogue. Neither do the standards for good argument. Threats
have, for example, no legitimate role to play in inquiry dialogue (where
they can be rejected as instances of the fallacy ad baculum), but play an
essential place in collective bargaining, which is ultimately founded on
the threat of a strike or a lock out.
Within argumentation, there are many instances in which dialogi-
cal frames are themselves matters of dispute and argument. Strategic ar-
guers may move to ensure that the arguments they present occur with-
in the frame in which they are most likely to be successful. The stand-
ards of evidence in tort law are, for example, looser than those that ap-
ply in criminal law. In view of this, the parents of O.J. Simpson’s appar-
ent victims sued him in civil court after he was found not guilty at his
famous criminal trial. By moving the arguments to this new frame they
were successful in securing substantial damages. In other situations, me-
diation would introduce yet another frame of reference.
In the evolution of argumentation theory, the pragma-dialectical ac-
count of critical discussions is a game-changing move because it recog-
nizes dialogical frames as a previously neglected element of argument.
The significance of this move is even more evident in subsequent discus-
sions in argumentation theory, which identify other kinds of dialogue
which are characterized by different frames – and the different goals,
structures, and rules of engagement they incorporate. In his work, Wal-
ton has proposed seven different kinds of dialogue which have as their
purpose: persuasion, inquiry, discovery, negotiation, information, delib-
eration and eristic exchange (see 2007). The distinction between these
different kinds of dialogue has significant implications for the analysis
of specific instances of argument, as each is characterized by a distinct
frame which implies unique procedural rules and unique standards for
success.
In an inquiry dialogue, arguments are exchanged to establish what
is true. The dialogue is characterized by strict standards that determine
what counts as evidence and counter-evidence for a particular conclu-
sion. In contrast, a negotiation dialogue does not attempt to establish
truth, but to bargain in a way that reconciles the competing interests of
the parties who negotiate. In the case of collective bargaining, one spe-
cies of negotiation dialogue, arguing is unacceptable it is “bargaining in
bad faith” – by, for example, bargaining directly with the members of
the union or the executive of the corporation rather than the team that
represents them. This procedural rule has no obvious analogue in an in-
quiry dialogue. Neither do the standards for good argument. Threats
have, for example, no legitimate role to play in inquiry dialogue (where
they can be rejected as instances of the fallacy ad baculum), but play an
essential place in collective bargaining, which is ultimately founded on
the threat of a strike or a lock out.
Within argumentation, there are many instances in which dialogi-
cal frames are themselves matters of dispute and argument. Strategic ar-
guers may move to ensure that the arguments they present occur with-
in the frame in which they are most likely to be successful. The stand-
ards of evidence in tort law are, for example, looser than those that ap-
ply in criminal law. In view of this, the parents of O.J. Simpson’s appar-
ent victims sued him in civil court after he was found not guilty at his
famous criminal trial. By moving the arguments to this new frame they
were successful in securing substantial damages. In other situations, me-
diation would introduce yet another frame of reference.
