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What Do We Know about the World?
es in their justification in cases7. At the same time, I assume that a clear
cognition of rhetoric in legal reasoning could enable (serious) lawyers to
argue in a more effective way in trials, that is to say, in a way that is more
persuasive for the audience and more logically suitable for the judge.
References
Aarnio, A. (1987). The Rational as Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal Justi-
fication, Dordrecht: Reidel.
Aarnio, A. (1983). Argumentation Theory – and Beyond. Some Re-
marks on the Rationality of Legal Argumentation. Rechtstheorie,
14/4, 385–400.
Aarnio, A., R. Alexy, A. Peczenik, W. Rabinowicz, and J. Wolenski
(1998). On Coherence Theory of Law, Lund: Juristfoerlage.
Agazzi, E., and N. Vassallo (eds.) (1998). George Boole. Filosofia, Logica,
Matematica, Milano: Franco Angeli.
Alexy, R. (1978). Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Die Theorie des
rationalen Diskurses als Theorie der juristischen Begründung, Frank-
furt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
Beccaria, C. (1764/1982). Dei delitti e delle pene, Milano: Mursia.
Bernal, C. (2013). Legal Argumentation and the Normativity of Legal
Norms. Dahlman, C. and E. T. Feteris (eds.). Legal Argumentation
Theories: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives. Dordrecht, Heidelberg,
New York, London: Springer, 103–112.
Berto, F., and L. V. Tarca (2006). Logica da zero a Gödel, Milano: Bru-
no Mondadori.
Blanché, R., and J. Dubucs (1996). La logique et son histoire, Paris: Co-
lin.
Cavalla, F. (1992). Topica giuridica. Enciclopedia del diritto, 44. Mila-
no: Giuffrè, 720–739.
Cavalla, F. (2007). Retorica processo verità. Principi di filosofia forense,
Milano: Franco Angeli.
Eemeren, van F.H., R. Grootendorst, J. Benthem, and F. Veltman (eds.)
(1996). Logic and Argumentation, Amsterdam: North Holland.
Eemeren, van F.H. (2012). In Reasonableness, Amsterdam: Rozenberg/
Sic Sat.
Endicott, T. (2000). Vagueness in Law, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
7 My scheme of argumentation is especially focused on the jurisdiction of “legitimacy” (higher
Courts), but it could obviously be applied in jurisdiction “on the merits” too (lower Courts), in order
to avoid dismissal.
es in their justification in cases7. At the same time, I assume that a clear
cognition of rhetoric in legal reasoning could enable (serious) lawyers to
argue in a more effective way in trials, that is to say, in a way that is more
persuasive for the audience and more logically suitable for the judge.
References
Aarnio, A. (1987). The Rational as Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal Justi-
fication, Dordrecht: Reidel.
Aarnio, A. (1983). Argumentation Theory – and Beyond. Some Re-
marks on the Rationality of Legal Argumentation. Rechtstheorie,
14/4, 385–400.
Aarnio, A., R. Alexy, A. Peczenik, W. Rabinowicz, and J. Wolenski
(1998). On Coherence Theory of Law, Lund: Juristfoerlage.
Agazzi, E., and N. Vassallo (eds.) (1998). George Boole. Filosofia, Logica,
Matematica, Milano: Franco Angeli.
Alexy, R. (1978). Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Die Theorie des
rationalen Diskurses als Theorie der juristischen Begründung, Frank-
furt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
Beccaria, C. (1764/1982). Dei delitti e delle pene, Milano: Mursia.
Bernal, C. (2013). Legal Argumentation and the Normativity of Legal
Norms. Dahlman, C. and E. T. Feteris (eds.). Legal Argumentation
Theories: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives. Dordrecht, Heidelberg,
New York, London: Springer, 103–112.
Berto, F., and L. V. Tarca (2006). Logica da zero a Gödel, Milano: Bru-
no Mondadori.
Blanché, R., and J. Dubucs (1996). La logique et son histoire, Paris: Co-
lin.
Cavalla, F. (1992). Topica giuridica. Enciclopedia del diritto, 44. Mila-
no: Giuffrè, 720–739.
Cavalla, F. (2007). Retorica processo verità. Principi di filosofia forense,
Milano: Franco Angeli.
Eemeren, van F.H., R. Grootendorst, J. Benthem, and F. Veltman (eds.)
(1996). Logic and Argumentation, Amsterdam: North Holland.
Eemeren, van F.H. (2012). In Reasonableness, Amsterdam: Rozenberg/
Sic Sat.
Endicott, T. (2000). Vagueness in Law, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
7 My scheme of argumentation is especially focused on the jurisdiction of “legitimacy” (higher
Courts), but it could obviously be applied in jurisdiction “on the merits” too (lower Courts), in order
to avoid dismissal.
