Page 266 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 266
What Do We Know about the World?
artificial, compared to the nature of argumentative dialogue, which is
unconventional and linguistically vague, but no other difference could
be found. Both demonstrative and rhetorical truths are truth because
and to the extent that they are undeniable (i.e. a logical alternative does
not exist). If you have accepted their premises and if the inference is
correct, you can never deny their conclusion without being contradict-
ed. When ruled by coherence, rhetorical argumentation is definitely
not a “weaker” kind of reasoning than scientific demonstration, but
only a type, which is especially suited to unformalized, and controver-
sial contexts.
Of course, in scientific demonstration (monological) truth remains
undisputed as long as convention is maintained, while in rhetorical ar-
gumentation (dialogical) it must be defended every time it is attacked
by the interlocutors. But such a difference has nothing to do with the
strength of the truth– it has to do, if anything, with its duration. In ab-
stract and very general contexts (such as for instance, in mathematics)
premises and methods usually last a long time before meeting criticism;
in concrete and particular ones (such as for instance, in public contexts
like law or politics) it is not unusual to encounter objections at every
step. So what follows? Do we really think (as Montesquieu and Beccar-
ia did) that the absolute reduction of concrete to abstract – of practice to
theory – would be the best way of reasoning in law? I believe that histo-
ry itself has already reached a judgment about that.
11. Some Conclusions
Having offered (although very briefly) a short account of argumen-
tative logic and legal truth,6 I shall try now to answer the questions I
posed at the beginning of my article. My essential aim was to point out
how logic could help the (serious) judge decide on the case, knowing that
his/her commitment to logical consistency is also provided for under
statute law (see in Italy arts. 360.1.5 CPC and 606.1.e CPP).
I would like to emphasize once again that if logic can help legal deci-
sions (avoiding the reduction of trial to a mere act of legitimate power) it
can do so only by building and connecting the argumentative premises
in iure et in facto, not by formalizing the legal reasoning into a “subsump-
tion”. Hence logic in law implies, from the judge’s perspective, a process
of selection from the parties’ discourses and a final multiple checks in
the sense clarified by the diagram at the end of Section 8.
6 For an accurate survey of theories on legal argumentation, see Feteris (1999).
artificial, compared to the nature of argumentative dialogue, which is
unconventional and linguistically vague, but no other difference could
be found. Both demonstrative and rhetorical truths are truth because
and to the extent that they are undeniable (i.e. a logical alternative does
not exist). If you have accepted their premises and if the inference is
correct, you can never deny their conclusion without being contradict-
ed. When ruled by coherence, rhetorical argumentation is definitely
not a “weaker” kind of reasoning than scientific demonstration, but
only a type, which is especially suited to unformalized, and controver-
sial contexts.
Of course, in scientific demonstration (monological) truth remains
undisputed as long as convention is maintained, while in rhetorical ar-
gumentation (dialogical) it must be defended every time it is attacked
by the interlocutors. But such a difference has nothing to do with the
strength of the truth– it has to do, if anything, with its duration. In ab-
stract and very general contexts (such as for instance, in mathematics)
premises and methods usually last a long time before meeting criticism;
in concrete and particular ones (such as for instance, in public contexts
like law or politics) it is not unusual to encounter objections at every
step. So what follows? Do we really think (as Montesquieu and Beccar-
ia did) that the absolute reduction of concrete to abstract – of practice to
theory – would be the best way of reasoning in law? I believe that histo-
ry itself has already reached a judgment about that.
11. Some Conclusions
Having offered (although very briefly) a short account of argumen-
tative logic and legal truth,6 I shall try now to answer the questions I
posed at the beginning of my article. My essential aim was to point out
how logic could help the (serious) judge decide on the case, knowing that
his/her commitment to logical consistency is also provided for under
statute law (see in Italy arts. 360.1.5 CPC and 606.1.e CPP).
I would like to emphasize once again that if logic can help legal deci-
sions (avoiding the reduction of trial to a mere act of legitimate power) it
can do so only by building and connecting the argumentative premises
in iure et in facto, not by formalizing the legal reasoning into a “subsump-
tion”. Hence logic in law implies, from the judge’s perspective, a process
of selection from the parties’ discourses and a final multiple checks in
the sense clarified by the diagram at the end of Section 8.
6 For an accurate survey of theories on legal argumentation, see Feteris (1999).
