Page 264 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 264
What Do We Know about the World?
ation of deduction or induction and never put in doubt during the oper-
ation itself). Legal argumentation, on the contrary, works with language
that is vague and constantly under question. For this reason Perelman
argued that argumentative conclusions were probable and not certain,
maintaining that a demonstration, proceeding from undisputed premis-
es, finishes with an indisputable conclusion, while an argumentation, pro-
ceeding from disputable premises, ends with a disputable conclusion. Basi-
cally, Perelman believed that the conclusion of a syllogism had the same
status as its premises: true, probable, wrong, etc. But let us consider the
conclusions of a syllogism such as all men are mortal, Socrates is a man,
then Socrates is mortal. Is it a demonstration or an argumentation? Ac-
cording to Perelman and many others, it depends on the nature of the
premises. In medical sciences, for instance, the mortality of all human
beings is established from the outset and no longer in dispute, so the syl-
logism would be right. But in human sciences the mortality of a man/
woman can be related to the memory of his/her behaviour, depending
on the agreement about it; in this case the syllogism could be wrong if,
for instance, Socrates was thought to be immortal as a philosopher since
his thinking is still alive.
In conclusion: certainty on one side (that of formal and empirical
science), plausibility on the other (that of the humanities) – “the two
cultures” of modern Western thought (Snow, 1959). But is it really so?
From the logical point of view, the syllogism in my example is always
valid if the conclusion is coherent to its premises. By this I mean, if you
have accepted a certain definition of “mortality”, “Socrates”, “man” etc.,
and as far as such definitions are not disputed, then the conclusion it-
self, if correctly inferred (in this case by modus ponens), cannot be refut-
ed because it simply has no incontrovertible alternatives. In other terms,
it is true. Truth is therefore a matter of the impossibility of contradic-
tion, regardless of the nature of the premises (either formalized or un-
formalized), and a proposition of law is true insofar as no reasonable ar-
gument can deny the selected topoi and the logical connection between
them (Manzin, 2011; 2012c).
(b) The second issue has metaphysical implications, dealing with
the question of “Being and time”. According to an underlying Carte-
sianism, scholars of legal sciences and practical jurists often distinguish
a so-called factual (or historical or material) truth from the legal one ob-
tained at the end of the trial. Some of them skeptically maintain that the
former is inaccessible; some others consider the latter as a sort of gradual
ation of deduction or induction and never put in doubt during the oper-
ation itself). Legal argumentation, on the contrary, works with language
that is vague and constantly under question. For this reason Perelman
argued that argumentative conclusions were probable and not certain,
maintaining that a demonstration, proceeding from undisputed premis-
es, finishes with an indisputable conclusion, while an argumentation, pro-
ceeding from disputable premises, ends with a disputable conclusion. Basi-
cally, Perelman believed that the conclusion of a syllogism had the same
status as its premises: true, probable, wrong, etc. But let us consider the
conclusions of a syllogism such as all men are mortal, Socrates is a man,
then Socrates is mortal. Is it a demonstration or an argumentation? Ac-
cording to Perelman and many others, it depends on the nature of the
premises. In medical sciences, for instance, the mortality of all human
beings is established from the outset and no longer in dispute, so the syl-
logism would be right. But in human sciences the mortality of a man/
woman can be related to the memory of his/her behaviour, depending
on the agreement about it; in this case the syllogism could be wrong if,
for instance, Socrates was thought to be immortal as a philosopher since
his thinking is still alive.
In conclusion: certainty on one side (that of formal and empirical
science), plausibility on the other (that of the humanities) – “the two
cultures” of modern Western thought (Snow, 1959). But is it really so?
From the logical point of view, the syllogism in my example is always
valid if the conclusion is coherent to its premises. By this I mean, if you
have accepted a certain definition of “mortality”, “Socrates”, “man” etc.,
and as far as such definitions are not disputed, then the conclusion it-
self, if correctly inferred (in this case by modus ponens), cannot be refut-
ed because it simply has no incontrovertible alternatives. In other terms,
it is true. Truth is therefore a matter of the impossibility of contradic-
tion, regardless of the nature of the premises (either formalized or un-
formalized), and a proposition of law is true insofar as no reasonable ar-
gument can deny the selected topoi and the logical connection between
them (Manzin, 2011; 2012c).
(b) The second issue has metaphysical implications, dealing with
the question of “Being and time”. According to an underlying Carte-
sianism, scholars of legal sciences and practical jurists often distinguish
a so-called factual (or historical or material) truth from the legal one ob-
tained at the end of the trial. Some of them skeptically maintain that the
former is inaccessible; some others consider the latter as a sort of gradual
