Page 17 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 17
j. richards ■ a conceptual exploration of radicalisation
2004: p. 1). In the Kitscheltian argument, populist, identity-based poli-
tics may capitalise on the “times of uncertainty” to offer an intersubjective
identity politics to those looking for answers (Monroe et al., 2000: p. 438).
In some cases, new political movements are emerging to compete in
the traditional political sphere and are gaining traction, notably in south-
ern Europe where the likes of Syriza in Greece and Movimento Cinque
Stelle (M5S) in Italy are starting to gain power. In other cases, “freedom
parties” on the far right-wing of politics, such as Geert Wilders’ PVV in
the Netherlands or Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, are
also shaking the traditional political establishment. Many of these parties
and their sister movements and groups on the fringes of politics would be
considered radical at best and extreme at worst by many in the political
mainstream.
In this context, several constituencies who may be drawn towards
this more disruptive politics are significant. First are what some have
described as the “left behinds” of postindustrial society (Speed and
Mannian, 2017: p. 249), namely those with low levels of skills and edu-
cation, who find themselves poorly equipped to find jobs in the new in-
formation economy, or indeed competing for manual jobs with incoming
migrants or with overseas producers operating at lower costs. This constit-
uency feels the cold winds of globalisation more than most, against which
populist politicians may offer a redemptive narrative, such as a promise
to “Make America Great Again” that rings in the ears of embittered Rust
Belt workers. Similarly, such processes may be reminiscent of political de-
velopments in earlier periods of history, and notably the rise of Fascist, na-
tional-socialist movements in Europe during the severe economic depres-
sion of the 1930s.
A related key constituency is the so-called “precariat” of workers in
the new “gig economy” (Standing, 2014), whose sharply reduced job and
income security compared to some of their forebears can lead to feelings
of anxiety and a desire to change the fundamental economic structure.
For such members of society, technological advances such as the increas-
ing penetration of the economy by automation and artificial intelligence
(AI) offer a growing anxiety about the future as much as of the present.
Political analysis looks closely at such structural shifts in the econo-
my and society and considers how they feed into shifts in voting towards
more “extreme” parties away from the traditional mainstream. While a
shift towards an unorthodox political party is not necessarily cause for
major alarm, recruitment into more extreme and violent groups by ide-
ologues protesting a more revolutionary and anti-democratic narrative
most certainly is. Thus, in December 2016, the UK government placed on
15
2004: p. 1). In the Kitscheltian argument, populist, identity-based poli-
tics may capitalise on the “times of uncertainty” to offer an intersubjective
identity politics to those looking for answers (Monroe et al., 2000: p. 438).
In some cases, new political movements are emerging to compete in
the traditional political sphere and are gaining traction, notably in south-
ern Europe where the likes of Syriza in Greece and Movimento Cinque
Stelle (M5S) in Italy are starting to gain power. In other cases, “freedom
parties” on the far right-wing of politics, such as Geert Wilders’ PVV in
the Netherlands or Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, are
also shaking the traditional political establishment. Many of these parties
and their sister movements and groups on the fringes of politics would be
considered radical at best and extreme at worst by many in the political
mainstream.
In this context, several constituencies who may be drawn towards
this more disruptive politics are significant. First are what some have
described as the “left behinds” of postindustrial society (Speed and
Mannian, 2017: p. 249), namely those with low levels of skills and edu-
cation, who find themselves poorly equipped to find jobs in the new in-
formation economy, or indeed competing for manual jobs with incoming
migrants or with overseas producers operating at lower costs. This constit-
uency feels the cold winds of globalisation more than most, against which
populist politicians may offer a redemptive narrative, such as a promise
to “Make America Great Again” that rings in the ears of embittered Rust
Belt workers. Similarly, such processes may be reminiscent of political de-
velopments in earlier periods of history, and notably the rise of Fascist, na-
tional-socialist movements in Europe during the severe economic depres-
sion of the 1930s.
A related key constituency is the so-called “precariat” of workers in
the new “gig economy” (Standing, 2014), whose sharply reduced job and
income security compared to some of their forebears can lead to feelings
of anxiety and a desire to change the fundamental economic structure.
For such members of society, technological advances such as the increas-
ing penetration of the economy by automation and artificial intelligence
(AI) offer a growing anxiety about the future as much as of the present.
Political analysis looks closely at such structural shifts in the econo-
my and society and considers how they feed into shifts in voting towards
more “extreme” parties away from the traditional mainstream. While a
shift towards an unorthodox political party is not necessarily cause for
major alarm, recruitment into more extreme and violent groups by ide-
ologues protesting a more revolutionary and anti-democratic narrative
most certainly is. Thus, in December 2016, the UK government placed on
15
