Page 119 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 119
s. dragoš ■ factors of radicalization
idea was first set out by Roger Williams (1603–1683), an English theolo-
gist and reformed Baptist, who aimed, in his words, to safeguard the re-
ligious gardens against the secular desert, and protect the church against
the harmful influence of the secular authorities. Williams’ solution was
adopted a hundred years later by the third president of the USA, Thomas
Jefferson, although this time with the opposite aim: to keep conflictual
religious tendencies away from the federal authorities, and to protect the
secular government against any religious influence (Weber, 1998; Dragoš,
2001). Although in Williams’ case we speak about religious fundamen-
talism and radical political demands, we cannot consider this radicalisa-
tion (as a “cage”),20 as Williams’ endeavours were not directed outward,
but rather inward (isolation against a secular exterior, rather than diffu-
sion of religion outwards). Numerous other cases of radicalism can be seen
as neutral; that is, neither detrimental nor beneficial to society. For exam-
ple, a vegan lifestyle or the separation of dental floss in plastic waste – ly-
ing within the fields of dietary practices and environmental concerns, re-
spectively – could both be considered radical, maybe even fundamental,
actions (if they involve the belief that they help change the world). But as
long as such gestures are directed only to the actor that performs them,
they do not have any detrimental effects in terms of Figure 1.
A different case is the recent European trend of promulgate sanc-
tions on wearing headgear in public that partly or entirely cover the
face (as in France, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, and, to some extent, the
Netherlands). In terms of the mode of action this is a radical measure, be-
cause it violates both religious and human rights. At the same time it is
directed outwards, as it implies the formal imposition of new habits that
are to be observed by all members of society, while in practice this can ac-
tually be seen as a measure against Muslim women that wear a niqab or
burqa. In terms of the third dimension (Figure 1) involving the attitude
to reality, these measures could be strongly suspected as indicating a shift
towards fundamentalism, which, in this case, is even supported by the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. How could we under-
stand in any other way the explanation that this prohibition is “necessary
in a democratic society”, as the judges’ explanation reads, because it aims
to “ensure the conditions for a common life as an element for the pro-
tection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Prepoved, 2017)? How can
200 women from the social margins, who cover their mouths and noses in
Denmark population of 5.7 million, shake democracy along with the con-
ditions for a common life, and endanger the freedom of others? It is those
20 See footnote 17.
117
idea was first set out by Roger Williams (1603–1683), an English theolo-
gist and reformed Baptist, who aimed, in his words, to safeguard the re-
ligious gardens against the secular desert, and protect the church against
the harmful influence of the secular authorities. Williams’ solution was
adopted a hundred years later by the third president of the USA, Thomas
Jefferson, although this time with the opposite aim: to keep conflictual
religious tendencies away from the federal authorities, and to protect the
secular government against any religious influence (Weber, 1998; Dragoš,
2001). Although in Williams’ case we speak about religious fundamen-
talism and radical political demands, we cannot consider this radicalisa-
tion (as a “cage”),20 as Williams’ endeavours were not directed outward,
but rather inward (isolation against a secular exterior, rather than diffu-
sion of religion outwards). Numerous other cases of radicalism can be seen
as neutral; that is, neither detrimental nor beneficial to society. For exam-
ple, a vegan lifestyle or the separation of dental floss in plastic waste – ly-
ing within the fields of dietary practices and environmental concerns, re-
spectively – could both be considered radical, maybe even fundamental,
actions (if they involve the belief that they help change the world). But as
long as such gestures are directed only to the actor that performs them,
they do not have any detrimental effects in terms of Figure 1.
A different case is the recent European trend of promulgate sanc-
tions on wearing headgear in public that partly or entirely cover the
face (as in France, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, and, to some extent, the
Netherlands). In terms of the mode of action this is a radical measure, be-
cause it violates both religious and human rights. At the same time it is
directed outwards, as it implies the formal imposition of new habits that
are to be observed by all members of society, while in practice this can ac-
tually be seen as a measure against Muslim women that wear a niqab or
burqa. In terms of the third dimension (Figure 1) involving the attitude
to reality, these measures could be strongly suspected as indicating a shift
towards fundamentalism, which, in this case, is even supported by the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. How could we under-
stand in any other way the explanation that this prohibition is “necessary
in a democratic society”, as the judges’ explanation reads, because it aims
to “ensure the conditions for a common life as an element for the pro-
tection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Prepoved, 2017)? How can
200 women from the social margins, who cover their mouths and noses in
Denmark population of 5.7 million, shake democracy along with the con-
ditions for a common life, and endanger the freedom of others? It is those
20 See footnote 17.
117
