Page 116 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 116
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 5–6
and stance, as well as a style of social positioning” (Krüger, 2006: p.
888).
- Political factor: this means the choice of the mode of action in all
those cases and circumstances that involve making the decision that
something needs to be changed. Of course, the answers to the ques-
tion of how this should be done can be different, although not en-
tirely arbitrary. They are possible on the dimension between two ex-
treme poles, where one pole presents the minimum correction in
terms of reformism, and the opposing pole presents the maximum,
that is, radical change (with taking into account that being radi-
cal within this dimension is not the same as radicalism in a wider
sense).17
- Existential factor: this defines the direction of action, including two
opposing directions that are usually combined, and sometimes can
be one-sidedly intensified. One possibility is to direct the action in-
wards, involving only a change in the psychological world of the in-
dividual or social networks within a community. The opposite is
the outward action, where changing the world is the condition for
change at the micro level. The most evident consequences of both
choices are segregation in the case of acting inwards, and proselyt-
ism in the case of acting outwards.
- Temporal factor: this involves the perception of time in the acaus-
al sense, where “time is not a line, but a network of intentionalities”
(Merleau-Ponty 2006: p. 423). We usually imagine time superficial-
ly as a chronological sequence of “presents”, classified in three more
general categories, the past, present and future. More adequate is the
intentional qualification of temporality, where this phenomenon
both in terms of contents and attitude to them depends on the po-
sition of the observer. Intentionality opens up many different and
17 This radicalness in the mode of action needs to be separated from the wider phenomenon of
radicalisation, presented in Figure 1, for the following reasons: the first case involves radicalness
in the narrow sense of a conscious choice of action (within the dimension), while the second
involves radicalisation in the wider sense of the effect of all four dimensions (Figure 1) that
coincide in the extremes. The difference is important, because radicalism in the narrow sense
is easier to change, as it still involves a conscious decision, where – in Weber’s terminology –
the actor carries out either purposive-rational or value-rational action (Brunkhorst, 1998: pp.
2–3), while it is no longer possible to easily exit radicalism in its wider sense: it already acts as a
“cage”, because action is no longer only dependent on the actor, but mainly on the context in
which it takes place.
For the needs of this article let it be enough to define radicalism in the narrow sense as the
action of those individuals, groups or organisation that carry out “positive or negative
influence on more mainstream movement organizations by pushing for more action than
on-radical actors are willing to commit” (Cross & Snow, 2011: p. 117).
114
and stance, as well as a style of social positioning” (Krüger, 2006: p.
888).
- Political factor: this means the choice of the mode of action in all
those cases and circumstances that involve making the decision that
something needs to be changed. Of course, the answers to the ques-
tion of how this should be done can be different, although not en-
tirely arbitrary. They are possible on the dimension between two ex-
treme poles, where one pole presents the minimum correction in
terms of reformism, and the opposing pole presents the maximum,
that is, radical change (with taking into account that being radi-
cal within this dimension is not the same as radicalism in a wider
sense).17
- Existential factor: this defines the direction of action, including two
opposing directions that are usually combined, and sometimes can
be one-sidedly intensified. One possibility is to direct the action in-
wards, involving only a change in the psychological world of the in-
dividual or social networks within a community. The opposite is
the outward action, where changing the world is the condition for
change at the micro level. The most evident consequences of both
choices are segregation in the case of acting inwards, and proselyt-
ism in the case of acting outwards.
- Temporal factor: this involves the perception of time in the acaus-
al sense, where “time is not a line, but a network of intentionalities”
(Merleau-Ponty 2006: p. 423). We usually imagine time superficial-
ly as a chronological sequence of “presents”, classified in three more
general categories, the past, present and future. More adequate is the
intentional qualification of temporality, where this phenomenon
both in terms of contents and attitude to them depends on the po-
sition of the observer. Intentionality opens up many different and
17 This radicalness in the mode of action needs to be separated from the wider phenomenon of
radicalisation, presented in Figure 1, for the following reasons: the first case involves radicalness
in the narrow sense of a conscious choice of action (within the dimension), while the second
involves radicalisation in the wider sense of the effect of all four dimensions (Figure 1) that
coincide in the extremes. The difference is important, because radicalism in the narrow sense
is easier to change, as it still involves a conscious decision, where – in Weber’s terminology –
the actor carries out either purposive-rational or value-rational action (Brunkhorst, 1998: pp.
2–3), while it is no longer possible to easily exit radicalism in its wider sense: it already acts as a
“cage”, because action is no longer only dependent on the actor, but mainly on the context in
which it takes place.
For the needs of this article let it be enough to define radicalism in the narrow sense as the
action of those individuals, groups or organisation that carry out “positive or negative
influence on more mainstream movement organizations by pushing for more action than
on-radical actors are willing to commit” (Cross & Snow, 2011: p. 117).
114
