Page 124 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 124
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 5–6
nations. If we compare this significant shift towards a greater inequality in
Slovenia with the left side of the table, which shows the public attitude to-
ward the issue of wealth redistributions, it becomes clear where the dissat-
isfaction comes from. The figures show that the percentage of Slovenians
who strongly agree that inequality should be reduced and that it is the re-
sponsibility of the government to achieve this is above the European av-
erage, as well as that seen in the Nordic and former socialist countries.
Similarly, in Slovenia the growth in this percentage between the years
2002 and 2014 – while also increasing in the rest of Europe – is above the
European average.
The next factor that makes Slovenia consistently stand out from
the rest of Europe is the political one (= dimension: “mode of action”
in Figure 1). Typically, it shows the simultaneous presence of a marked-
ly leftist orientation of public opinion and the continued rule of neolib-
eral governments (cohibentency). Slovenia has one of the “leanest” states,
and is rather stingy towards its citizens considering the size of its GDP.
Slovenian expenditure on social protection (as a percentage of GDP) is
well under the European average, and has been decreasing over the past
decade, while in other EU countries this figure has been increasing. The
same applies to expenditure on pensions (as a percentage of GDP), while
the Slovenian health sector is on the verge of collapse, due to both a lack
of finances and staff. According to this criterion it is completely uncom-
parable with the European average. There are similar stories in the public
resources available for science, as well as for the housing sector that is one
of the most privatised in Slovenia and among the worst in Europe. There
is also a very high level of precarious employment, a high level of dissatis-
faction regarding trust in company managers and directors, and Slovenia
also has one of the highest levels of state involvement in the economy24
(Eurostat, 2017; OECD, 2017; Dragoš & Leskošek, 2016). As shown in
Table 2, public opinion is very critical of the Slovenian state, while the po-
litical consequences of this can be seen in Table 3.
In its political preferences, it is Slovenian society that is most ori-
ented to the left in Europe. In Slovenia in all the years examined the aver-
age value on the ten-degree (self-evaluated) scale is well under 5, while the
European average is above this mean value, which also applies to the for-
mer socialist countries that are most comparable with Slovenia, and even
more for the Nordic group. For reasons of comparison Table 3 also in-
cludes two more countries (participating in the ESS 2002-2016 survey)
24 This indicator of central government spending by function is measured as a percentage of
total expenditures: the OECD average is 12 %, and data for Slovenia show 17 %; the opposite is
shown for social protection: Slovenia 25.4 %, OECD average 26.4 % (OECD, 2017).
122
nations. If we compare this significant shift towards a greater inequality in
Slovenia with the left side of the table, which shows the public attitude to-
ward the issue of wealth redistributions, it becomes clear where the dissat-
isfaction comes from. The figures show that the percentage of Slovenians
who strongly agree that inequality should be reduced and that it is the re-
sponsibility of the government to achieve this is above the European av-
erage, as well as that seen in the Nordic and former socialist countries.
Similarly, in Slovenia the growth in this percentage between the years
2002 and 2014 – while also increasing in the rest of Europe – is above the
European average.
The next factor that makes Slovenia consistently stand out from
the rest of Europe is the political one (= dimension: “mode of action”
in Figure 1). Typically, it shows the simultaneous presence of a marked-
ly leftist orientation of public opinion and the continued rule of neolib-
eral governments (cohibentency). Slovenia has one of the “leanest” states,
and is rather stingy towards its citizens considering the size of its GDP.
Slovenian expenditure on social protection (as a percentage of GDP) is
well under the European average, and has been decreasing over the past
decade, while in other EU countries this figure has been increasing. The
same applies to expenditure on pensions (as a percentage of GDP), while
the Slovenian health sector is on the verge of collapse, due to both a lack
of finances and staff. According to this criterion it is completely uncom-
parable with the European average. There are similar stories in the public
resources available for science, as well as for the housing sector that is one
of the most privatised in Slovenia and among the worst in Europe. There
is also a very high level of precarious employment, a high level of dissatis-
faction regarding trust in company managers and directors, and Slovenia
also has one of the highest levels of state involvement in the economy24
(Eurostat, 2017; OECD, 2017; Dragoš & Leskošek, 2016). As shown in
Table 2, public opinion is very critical of the Slovenian state, while the po-
litical consequences of this can be seen in Table 3.
In its political preferences, it is Slovenian society that is most ori-
ented to the left in Europe. In Slovenia in all the years examined the aver-
age value on the ten-degree (self-evaluated) scale is well under 5, while the
European average is above this mean value, which also applies to the for-
mer socialist countries that are most comparable with Slovenia, and even
more for the Nordic group. For reasons of comparison Table 3 also in-
cludes two more countries (participating in the ESS 2002-2016 survey)
24 This indicator of central government spending by function is measured as a percentage of
total expenditures: the OECD average is 12 %, and data for Slovenia show 17 %; the opposite is
shown for social protection: Slovenia 25.4 %, OECD average 26.4 % (OECD, 2017).
122
