Page 118 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 118
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 5–6
usually do, to a series of superficial events, by introducing an addition-
al logic of connections that are not only causal; second, it considers these
connections – or better associations – of objective events as depending on
the observer. And third, the intentional concept avoids the reduction of
temporality on factuality that can be objectively measured, such as with
a clock, since time is a relational phenomenon (“network”) to which we
only have access through conscious understanding. This means that one
and the same object of temporal events (A, B, C) triggers different phe-
nomena. Because these are defined by the position of the actor that sub-
jectivates objectivity (in A’, A’’…), the phenomenological approach to
temporality is particularly important in confronting radicalism. It calls
attention, for example, to the fact that a literal reading of holy books or
historical chronologies is as equally possible as any other, and that it is im-
possible to ignore this (typically fundamentalist) feature by assuming a
binary logic (actual / fictional, permitted / prohibited, adequate / inad-
equate), where only one possibility would be the right one and the other
stigmatised as unreal.
The arrow in Figure 1 illustrates the radicalisation of an individu-
al actor. Only when the fundamentalist attitude to reality is combined
(from the temporal perspective) with the radical mode of outward action
do we have radicalisation as a social phenomenon. If all four dimensions
do not appear simultaneously, then radicalness is not dangerous, because
it remains within the individual dimensions. The same can be said for in-
stitutions as the tools of power, as was pointed out over half a century ago
by Robert K. Merton, the critic of classical functionalism, in the debate
on simultaneous functionality and disfunctionality of an actor (Merton,
1979).19 The same applies to radicalism – which at times can even be con-
sidered beneficial.
Examples
A typical example of one of the benefits of radicalism is the demand for
the separation of church and state from the religious sphere. This mod-
ernist solution – which Slovenia has even written into its Constitution
(Article 7) – started with the demand for the establishment of a “wall of
separation” between the church and the state. This innovative and radical
19 “In every concrete example a certain phenomenon can have functional as well as dysfunctional
consequences”, says Merton (1979; p. 115). From this he derives two conclusions in regard
with social analysis: “To the extent that functional analysis focuses wholly on functional
consequences, it leans toward an ultraconservative ideology; to the extent that it focuses
wholly on dysfunctional consequences, it leans toward an ultra-radical utopia” (ibid., p. 103).
Social Theory and Social Structure, The Free Press, New York, 1968, p. 94.
116
usually do, to a series of superficial events, by introducing an addition-
al logic of connections that are not only causal; second, it considers these
connections – or better associations – of objective events as depending on
the observer. And third, the intentional concept avoids the reduction of
temporality on factuality that can be objectively measured, such as with
a clock, since time is a relational phenomenon (“network”) to which we
only have access through conscious understanding. This means that one
and the same object of temporal events (A, B, C) triggers different phe-
nomena. Because these are defined by the position of the actor that sub-
jectivates objectivity (in A’, A’’…), the phenomenological approach to
temporality is particularly important in confronting radicalism. It calls
attention, for example, to the fact that a literal reading of holy books or
historical chronologies is as equally possible as any other, and that it is im-
possible to ignore this (typically fundamentalist) feature by assuming a
binary logic (actual / fictional, permitted / prohibited, adequate / inad-
equate), where only one possibility would be the right one and the other
stigmatised as unreal.
The arrow in Figure 1 illustrates the radicalisation of an individu-
al actor. Only when the fundamentalist attitude to reality is combined
(from the temporal perspective) with the radical mode of outward action
do we have radicalisation as a social phenomenon. If all four dimensions
do not appear simultaneously, then radicalness is not dangerous, because
it remains within the individual dimensions. The same can be said for in-
stitutions as the tools of power, as was pointed out over half a century ago
by Robert K. Merton, the critic of classical functionalism, in the debate
on simultaneous functionality and disfunctionality of an actor (Merton,
1979).19 The same applies to radicalism – which at times can even be con-
sidered beneficial.
Examples
A typical example of one of the benefits of radicalism is the demand for
the separation of church and state from the religious sphere. This mod-
ernist solution – which Slovenia has even written into its Constitution
(Article 7) – started with the demand for the establishment of a “wall of
separation” between the church and the state. This innovative and radical
19 “In every concrete example a certain phenomenon can have functional as well as dysfunctional
consequences”, says Merton (1979; p. 115). From this he derives two conclusions in regard
with social analysis: “To the extent that functional analysis focuses wholly on functional
consequences, it leans toward an ultraconservative ideology; to the extent that it focuses
wholly on dysfunctional consequences, it leans toward an ultra-radical utopia” (ibid., p. 103).
Social Theory and Social Structure, The Free Press, New York, 1968, p. 94.
116
