Page 117 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 117
s. dragoš ■ factors of radicalization
TIME
MODE OF ACTION RADICALISM
REFORMISM OFDOIAURCETTICWOTAINRODN INWARD
RELATIVISM FUNDAMENTALISM
ATTITUDE TO REALITY
Figure 1: Four dimensions (of the cage) of radicalisation:
subjectively possible combinations, because – “I do not pass through
a series of instances of now, the images of which I preserve and
which, placed end to end, make a line. With the arrival of every mo-
ment, its predecessor undergoes a change /…/ beginning to outline
itself against, or project itself upon, my present, whereas a moment
ago it was my present. When a third moment arrives, the second un-
dergoes a new modification;” and so on (ibid.).18
This approach to understanding time is three times more adequate
than the conventional one. First, it deters us from reducing time, as we
18 This is why Merleau-Ponty points out that instead of reducing temporality (to a mere sequence
of factual events A → B → C) we always have to deal with the “network of intentionalities” that
is not composed only of A, B and C, but also of A’, B’, A’’, B’’, etc. For a schematic illustration
of this network, taken from Husserl, see Merleau-Ponty, 2006: p. 423; for an explanation
see ibid.: pp. 416-439. The aforementioned events, marked by the capital letters and one or
two apostrophes, also include memory which cannot be reduced only to present or to past.
Memory is the intersection of both, which means that the same object of memory can involve
several different intersections, depending on the viewpoint. In this regard, Davie’s revealing
classification of memory related to the reproduction of religious tradition in Europe lists
eight different types of memory (Davie, 2003: p. 273).
115
TIME
MODE OF ACTION RADICALISM
REFORMISM OFDOIAURCETTICWOTAINRODN INWARD
RELATIVISM FUNDAMENTALISM
ATTITUDE TO REALITY
Figure 1: Four dimensions (of the cage) of radicalisation:
subjectively possible combinations, because – “I do not pass through
a series of instances of now, the images of which I preserve and
which, placed end to end, make a line. With the arrival of every mo-
ment, its predecessor undergoes a change /…/ beginning to outline
itself against, or project itself upon, my present, whereas a moment
ago it was my present. When a third moment arrives, the second un-
dergoes a new modification;” and so on (ibid.).18
This approach to understanding time is three times more adequate
than the conventional one. First, it deters us from reducing time, as we
18 This is why Merleau-Ponty points out that instead of reducing temporality (to a mere sequence
of factual events A → B → C) we always have to deal with the “network of intentionalities” that
is not composed only of A, B and C, but also of A’, B’, A’’, B’’, etc. For a schematic illustration
of this network, taken from Husserl, see Merleau-Ponty, 2006: p. 423; for an explanation
see ibid.: pp. 416-439. The aforementioned events, marked by the capital letters and one or
two apostrophes, also include memory which cannot be reduced only to present or to past.
Memory is the intersection of both, which means that the same object of memory can involve
several different intersections, depending on the viewpoint. In this regard, Davie’s revealing
classification of memory related to the reproduction of religious tradition in Europe lists
eight different types of memory (Davie, 2003: p. 273).
115
