Page 47 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 1-2: The Language of Neoliberal Education, ed. Mitja Sardoč
P. 47
m. olssen ■ neoliberalism and laissez-faire: the retreat from naturalism
of judicial review, make existing democratic assemblies and procedures
crucial underwriters to both the formality and generality of policy, wheth-
er through law, or planning, and they legitimate both law and planning.
It is the democratic assemblies which both enable and legitimate the for-
mality of the rule of law, and are accountable for good as opposed to bad
legislation.11 What Hayek doesn’t seem to realize is that they are similar-
ly able to perform this function in relation to planning. Through various
codified and formal rules of procedure and process, planning can be legit-
imate or illegitimate. Hence, I would reject Hayek’s thesis that “planning
leads to dictatorship” (p. 88) or that “dictatorship is essential if planning
on a large scale is to be possible” (p. 88), just as I would reject the thesis
that planning is necessarily arbitrary.
Another factor makes planning important here. At the start of the
twenty-first century, collective action and sophisticated planning opera-
tions have become increasingly necessary on all manner of issues rang-
ing from matters relating to general security and the response to crisis and
urgency, to arranging social insurance, and the provision of opportuni-
ties, structures, and capabilities. on a fair and equitable basis. Increased
pressures associated with global population growth, climate change, eco-
logical degradation, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, or economic or po-
litical collapse, create a situation in which not planning is simply not an
option. Believing that laissez-faire will deliver security and stability for all
on a global basis simply constitutes the naïve faith of classical economic
liberalism.
While Hayek’s opposition to all forms of state planning might be
seen as viable if he can argue that the economic system is naturally self-reg-
ulating, should this later thesis founder, so the former will also be in dif-
ficult straights. Yet, just as we found for Simons, Buchanen, Eücken and
Röpke, Hayek’s views on the self-regulating capacity of the system, im-
plying laissez-faire, do not inspire confidence. Although he had substitut-
ed his ‘empirical conception’ (of laissez-faire) for what he considered to
be the inadequate neoclassical conception, his ‘knowledge papers’ of the
1930s and 1940s revealed increasing doubts about both its theoretical and
practical viability. In his paper ‘Economics and Knowledge,’ first present-
ed in 1937, he notes that although traditional experience has more or less
11 Hayek of course sees legislation as emerging in the spontaneous order of society and
formed solely out of natural rights. His faltering commitment to laissez-faire and natu-
ralism would make this assumption problematic even on his own terms. But that negative
and positive liberty, or state action on such a ground, could be used to justify law vis-a-vis
planning is disingenuous. The law even it is claimed only to codify natural rights needs
interpreting and being acted upon, and these functions imply a positive dimension to all state
action, whether law or planning.
45
of judicial review, make existing democratic assemblies and procedures
crucial underwriters to both the formality and generality of policy, wheth-
er through law, or planning, and they legitimate both law and planning.
It is the democratic assemblies which both enable and legitimate the for-
mality of the rule of law, and are accountable for good as opposed to bad
legislation.11 What Hayek doesn’t seem to realize is that they are similar-
ly able to perform this function in relation to planning. Through various
codified and formal rules of procedure and process, planning can be legit-
imate or illegitimate. Hence, I would reject Hayek’s thesis that “planning
leads to dictatorship” (p. 88) or that “dictatorship is essential if planning
on a large scale is to be possible” (p. 88), just as I would reject the thesis
that planning is necessarily arbitrary.
Another factor makes planning important here. At the start of the
twenty-first century, collective action and sophisticated planning opera-
tions have become increasingly necessary on all manner of issues rang-
ing from matters relating to general security and the response to crisis and
urgency, to arranging social insurance, and the provision of opportuni-
ties, structures, and capabilities. on a fair and equitable basis. Increased
pressures associated with global population growth, climate change, eco-
logical degradation, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, or economic or po-
litical collapse, create a situation in which not planning is simply not an
option. Believing that laissez-faire will deliver security and stability for all
on a global basis simply constitutes the naïve faith of classical economic
liberalism.
While Hayek’s opposition to all forms of state planning might be
seen as viable if he can argue that the economic system is naturally self-reg-
ulating, should this later thesis founder, so the former will also be in dif-
ficult straights. Yet, just as we found for Simons, Buchanen, Eücken and
Röpke, Hayek’s views on the self-regulating capacity of the system, im-
plying laissez-faire, do not inspire confidence. Although he had substitut-
ed his ‘empirical conception’ (of laissez-faire) for what he considered to
be the inadequate neoclassical conception, his ‘knowledge papers’ of the
1930s and 1940s revealed increasing doubts about both its theoretical and
practical viability. In his paper ‘Economics and Knowledge,’ first present-
ed in 1937, he notes that although traditional experience has more or less
11 Hayek of course sees legislation as emerging in the spontaneous order of society and
formed solely out of natural rights. His faltering commitment to laissez-faire and natu-
ralism would make this assumption problematic even on his own terms. But that negative
and positive liberty, or state action on such a ground, could be used to justify law vis-a-vis
planning is disingenuous. The law even it is claimed only to codify natural rights needs
interpreting and being acted upon, and these functions imply a positive dimension to all state
action, whether law or planning.
45
