Page 44 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 1-2: The Language of Neoliberal Education, ed. Mitja Sardoč
P. 44
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 1–2
the Revolution of 1917, the model of state capitalism (capitalisme de parti)
which was based on the attempts by a single political party to manage the
operations of the economy through the direct transmission of orders from
the center, including the establishment of centralized socialist trusts, in-
volving the direct control of recruitment, production schedules and wages
met with severe problems of the sort Hayek describes. Beyond this, how-
ever, it can be claimed that the problem is not so much with planning, but
with the broader political model in operation.
That Hayek extends his objections from a concern with Soviet-styled
central planning to forms of state planning in western societies, and spe-
cifically against those forms of general planning being developed in coun-
tries like Britain at the onset of the welfare state constitutes a major prob-
lem. For what can be claimed is that there is no objection to planning as
such, nor even to central planning, but only against types of planning that
are ad hoc and arbitrary, and not subject to democratic controls of audit-
ing, accountability, contestation, debate and revision. Planning, in fact, is
amenable to the same types of assessment as Hayek conducts for the rule
of law, and like the rule of law, it should comprise codified procedures
which are formal, systematic, a priori (written in advance) and general or
impartial. Planning also must be democratically accountable. Planning,
in this sense is compatible with open economies, individual initiative, lo-
cal autonomy in decision-making and decentralization.7
One important issue that Hayek never considers is whether mar-
kets and planning could (or should) co-exist? That is, whether there is not
some middle ground position between the ‘serfdom’ associated with state
planning, and the ‘freedom’ associated with markets. As Jim Tomlinson
(1990: 49 fn. 3) notes:
[I]n his 1945 article, [‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’] Hayek typical-
ly dismisses any mid-way point between centralised and decentralised
planning except ‘the delegation of planning to organised industries, or,
in other words, monopoly’ (p. 521). Plainly this does not exhaust the pos-
sibilities of levels of planning, nor does it provide a helpful starting point
for discussing mechanisms of planning.8
7 There is no evidence that the development of the welfare state, either in Britain from 1945,
or New Zealand from 1933, resulted in an erosion of democracy, or human rights under
the law, which, if corroborated, would offer an empirical refutation of Hayek’s thesis in The
Road to Serfdom (1944).
8 Hayek, F. (1945) ‘The use of knowledge in society’, American Economic Review, 35(4): pp.
519–530.
42
the Revolution of 1917, the model of state capitalism (capitalisme de parti)
which was based on the attempts by a single political party to manage the
operations of the economy through the direct transmission of orders from
the center, including the establishment of centralized socialist trusts, in-
volving the direct control of recruitment, production schedules and wages
met with severe problems of the sort Hayek describes. Beyond this, how-
ever, it can be claimed that the problem is not so much with planning, but
with the broader political model in operation.
That Hayek extends his objections from a concern with Soviet-styled
central planning to forms of state planning in western societies, and spe-
cifically against those forms of general planning being developed in coun-
tries like Britain at the onset of the welfare state constitutes a major prob-
lem. For what can be claimed is that there is no objection to planning as
such, nor even to central planning, but only against types of planning that
are ad hoc and arbitrary, and not subject to democratic controls of audit-
ing, accountability, contestation, debate and revision. Planning, in fact, is
amenable to the same types of assessment as Hayek conducts for the rule
of law, and like the rule of law, it should comprise codified procedures
which are formal, systematic, a priori (written in advance) and general or
impartial. Planning also must be democratically accountable. Planning,
in this sense is compatible with open economies, individual initiative, lo-
cal autonomy in decision-making and decentralization.7
One important issue that Hayek never considers is whether mar-
kets and planning could (or should) co-exist? That is, whether there is not
some middle ground position between the ‘serfdom’ associated with state
planning, and the ‘freedom’ associated with markets. As Jim Tomlinson
(1990: 49 fn. 3) notes:
[I]n his 1945 article, [‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’] Hayek typical-
ly dismisses any mid-way point between centralised and decentralised
planning except ‘the delegation of planning to organised industries, or,
in other words, monopoly’ (p. 521). Plainly this does not exhaust the pos-
sibilities of levels of planning, nor does it provide a helpful starting point
for discussing mechanisms of planning.8
7 There is no evidence that the development of the welfare state, either in Britain from 1945,
or New Zealand from 1933, resulted in an erosion of democracy, or human rights under
the law, which, if corroborated, would offer an empirical refutation of Hayek’s thesis in The
Road to Serfdom (1944).
8 Hayek, F. (1945) ‘The use of knowledge in society’, American Economic Review, 35(4): pp.
519–530.
42
