Page 46 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 1-2: The Language of Neoliberal Education, ed. Mitja Sardoč
P. 46
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 1–2
Various distinctions could be made which Hayek also does not make,
between ‘normal’ versus ‘exceptional’ operations of markets, between the
‘macro’, ‘meso’, or ‘micro’ levels of the economy, or the distinction made
above, concerning the context effectively regulated by supply and demand
and the price mechanism (where a rough equilibrium may persist for a
certain time) versus the context of coordination (requiring macro-man-
agement, planning, agenda setting, and steering). While it may well be
so that local knowledge and the fragility of the price mechanism means
that normal day-to-day operations of markets should be relatively autono-
mous from the arbitrary interference of the state, there will be exception-
al circumstances where ‘communicating knowledge to a board’ for urgent
or non-urgent action is highly appropriate. Within normal markets, be-
havior which signals exceptional development (‘a run on the pound’); or
behavior which signals unusual development (‘a contaminated product’;
‘a suspicious behavior’) are cases in point. Just as the doctor-patient re-
lation for the most part is a private contract, evidence of certain types of
symptoms must be immediately reported. In addition, there will be rou-
tine situations where guiding the economy within established limits re-
quire specific actions in line with established policies. Introducing poli-
cies to counter economic inequalities in capital accumulation, or to assist
in creating fair opportunities, also constitute legitimate activities that can
be planned for. Hence, there are different sorts of functions which require
different types of coordination, and different types of knowledge.
“In a democratic society”, wrote Karl Mannheim, “state sovereign-
ty can be boundlessly strengthened by plenary [planning] powers with-
out renouncing democratic control” (1940: p. 340). Yet, Hayek maintains
that democratic assemblies have problems producing a plan. Either they
cannot manage the whole view, or obtain adequate knowledge, or, if del-
egated, they cannot integrate it. (Hayek, 1944: pp. 82–84). Such a claim
is highly dubious, especially given the sophisticated planning instruments
and communication technologies available today. But regardless of that,
government has responsibility to oversee and steer the whole. The dele-
gation of particular powers to separate boards and authorities is a part of
that responsibility. Yet the parliamentary system renders the state as dem-
ocratically accountable, and is as necessary to the formal legitimacy of the
rule of law as it is to the formal legitimacy of planning.
Amongst existing democratic mechanisms, parliament is one mech-
anism of accountability; the official opposition are charged with discus-
sion and debate, and with highlighting abuses, identifying shortcomings,
as well as criticizing delegated or contracted groups whose performance is
not up to the mark. In addition, the free mass media, as well as institutions
44
Various distinctions could be made which Hayek also does not make,
between ‘normal’ versus ‘exceptional’ operations of markets, between the
‘macro’, ‘meso’, or ‘micro’ levels of the economy, or the distinction made
above, concerning the context effectively regulated by supply and demand
and the price mechanism (where a rough equilibrium may persist for a
certain time) versus the context of coordination (requiring macro-man-
agement, planning, agenda setting, and steering). While it may well be
so that local knowledge and the fragility of the price mechanism means
that normal day-to-day operations of markets should be relatively autono-
mous from the arbitrary interference of the state, there will be exception-
al circumstances where ‘communicating knowledge to a board’ for urgent
or non-urgent action is highly appropriate. Within normal markets, be-
havior which signals exceptional development (‘a run on the pound’); or
behavior which signals unusual development (‘a contaminated product’;
‘a suspicious behavior’) are cases in point. Just as the doctor-patient re-
lation for the most part is a private contract, evidence of certain types of
symptoms must be immediately reported. In addition, there will be rou-
tine situations where guiding the economy within established limits re-
quire specific actions in line with established policies. Introducing poli-
cies to counter economic inequalities in capital accumulation, or to assist
in creating fair opportunities, also constitute legitimate activities that can
be planned for. Hence, there are different sorts of functions which require
different types of coordination, and different types of knowledge.
“In a democratic society”, wrote Karl Mannheim, “state sovereign-
ty can be boundlessly strengthened by plenary [planning] powers with-
out renouncing democratic control” (1940: p. 340). Yet, Hayek maintains
that democratic assemblies have problems producing a plan. Either they
cannot manage the whole view, or obtain adequate knowledge, or, if del-
egated, they cannot integrate it. (Hayek, 1944: pp. 82–84). Such a claim
is highly dubious, especially given the sophisticated planning instruments
and communication technologies available today. But regardless of that,
government has responsibility to oversee and steer the whole. The dele-
gation of particular powers to separate boards and authorities is a part of
that responsibility. Yet the parliamentary system renders the state as dem-
ocratically accountable, and is as necessary to the formal legitimacy of the
rule of law as it is to the formal legitimacy of planning.
Amongst existing democratic mechanisms, parliament is one mech-
anism of accountability; the official opposition are charged with discus-
sion and debate, and with highlighting abuses, identifying shortcomings,
as well as criticizing delegated or contracted groups whose performance is
not up to the mark. In addition, the free mass media, as well as institutions
44
