Page 51 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 1-2: The Language of Neoliberal Education, ed. Mitja Sardoč
P. 51
m. olssen ■ neoliberalism and laissez-faire: the retreat from naturalism
found, such as in The Constitution of Liberty (1960) where Hayek says: “[t]
hose who profess that democracy is all-competent and support all that the
majority wants at any given moment are working for its fall” (1960: p. 183).
Cornelissen concedes however that as he aged, Hayek became inclined to
mount a principled defense of democratic government” (p. 245). Where
he falters, in Cornelissen’s view, is in the model democratic constitution
he develops in volume 3 of Law, Legislation and Liberty. Here, Hayek fa-
vours the establishment of both a representative government as well as an
upper house legislature, the latter which would “completely be insulated
from popular control” (p. 253). As Cornelissen continues:
In Hayek’s model constitution, then, the average citizen can exert some
influence on the direction of government, thus modestly guiding the
allocation of public resources, but has virtually no control over the law,
which is articulated by a council, consisting of ‘wise and fair’ legislators,
that can neither be recalled nor corrected by the people. In Hayekian
democracy, concisely put, each individual citizen is equal before the law
over which they can exert no significant control. (pp. 253–54).
It is perhaps unfair to suggest that Hayek’s model constitution in-
vokes ‘echoes’ of Plato’s Guardian Rulers.13 Yet, Cornelissen notes that
Pierre Rosanvallon also observes that Hayek has “‘abandoned’ the ‘dem-
ocratic idea,’ in “radically severing the concept of democracy from leg-
islation” and thereby in insulating legislation from popular sovereignty
(Cornelissen: p. 254, citing Rosanvallon: p. 153).14
Education
For Foucault, the fear of power does not in his case give rise to an unbri-
dled love of markets. Foucault makes it clear in ‘The Risks of Security’
that the he is no supporter of those who denigrate the state:
13 Unfair, of course, in that Plato was not a democrat, and opposed democracy. Yet, many
of the details of Hayek’s constitution seem to be excessively protective of the legislators
with respect to immunizing them from economic hardship once they have served their
time. He specifies, for instance, elaborate conditions and ‘safeguards’ such as that mem-
bers of the legislature should be elected for reasonably long periods, of fifteen years so that
they would not be subject to insecurity. Only people “who have proved themselves in the
ordinary business of life” should be eligible for election; they should only be removable for
“gross misconduct”; after serving their term “they should not be re-eligible nor forced to
return to earning a living in the market but be assured of continual public employment.”
See Volume III of Law, Legislation and Liberty, pp. 95–96, 448–50.
14 Cornelissen argues that the separation of legislation from democracy became increasingly
pronounced in Hayek’s thought over time, reaching its ultimate status as part of the spon-
taneous order of society in Volume 3 of Law, Legislation and Liberty. There is, it seems more
scope for further study of Hayek’s conception of democracy.
49
found, such as in The Constitution of Liberty (1960) where Hayek says: “[t]
hose who profess that democracy is all-competent and support all that the
majority wants at any given moment are working for its fall” (1960: p. 183).
Cornelissen concedes however that as he aged, Hayek became inclined to
mount a principled defense of democratic government” (p. 245). Where
he falters, in Cornelissen’s view, is in the model democratic constitution
he develops in volume 3 of Law, Legislation and Liberty. Here, Hayek fa-
vours the establishment of both a representative government as well as an
upper house legislature, the latter which would “completely be insulated
from popular control” (p. 253). As Cornelissen continues:
In Hayek’s model constitution, then, the average citizen can exert some
influence on the direction of government, thus modestly guiding the
allocation of public resources, but has virtually no control over the law,
which is articulated by a council, consisting of ‘wise and fair’ legislators,
that can neither be recalled nor corrected by the people. In Hayekian
democracy, concisely put, each individual citizen is equal before the law
over which they can exert no significant control. (pp. 253–54).
It is perhaps unfair to suggest that Hayek’s model constitution in-
vokes ‘echoes’ of Plato’s Guardian Rulers.13 Yet, Cornelissen notes that
Pierre Rosanvallon also observes that Hayek has “‘abandoned’ the ‘dem-
ocratic idea,’ in “radically severing the concept of democracy from leg-
islation” and thereby in insulating legislation from popular sovereignty
(Cornelissen: p. 254, citing Rosanvallon: p. 153).14
Education
For Foucault, the fear of power does not in his case give rise to an unbri-
dled love of markets. Foucault makes it clear in ‘The Risks of Security’
that the he is no supporter of those who denigrate the state:
13 Unfair, of course, in that Plato was not a democrat, and opposed democracy. Yet, many
of the details of Hayek’s constitution seem to be excessively protective of the legislators
with respect to immunizing them from economic hardship once they have served their
time. He specifies, for instance, elaborate conditions and ‘safeguards’ such as that mem-
bers of the legislature should be elected for reasonably long periods, of fifteen years so that
they would not be subject to insecurity. Only people “who have proved themselves in the
ordinary business of life” should be eligible for election; they should only be removable for
“gross misconduct”; after serving their term “they should not be re-eligible nor forced to
return to earning a living in the market but be assured of continual public employment.”
See Volume III of Law, Legislation and Liberty, pp. 95–96, 448–50.
14 Cornelissen argues that the separation of legislation from democracy became increasingly
pronounced in Hayek’s thought over time, reaching its ultimate status as part of the spon-
taneous order of society in Volume 3 of Law, Legislation and Liberty. There is, it seems more
scope for further study of Hayek’s conception of democracy.
49
