Page 50 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 1-2: The Language of Neoliberal Education, ed. Mitja Sardoč
P. 50
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 1–2
your theme rather differently. I should say that what we want is not no
planning, or even less planning, indeed I should say that we almost cer-
tainly want more.
Lars Cornelissen on Hayek and Democracy
One question remains for Hayek is how, if the state can intervene only in
the legal structures of society, through formal processes, is Hayek able to
protect free market economics from the possibility of democratic rejec-
tion. This is, after all, why Eücken and Röpke wanted state intervention to
establish the ‘conditions’ of an enterprise culture in a much broader sense;
not only legal, but political, cultural, and educational as well. This is an
important question for Hayek especially given his own doubts about the
efficacy of laissez-faire. The answer is, as Cornelissen argues, Hayek has a
vastly attenuated conception of democracy which:
must give way to a form of constitutionalism that explicitly seeks to elim-
inate popular sovereignty. This … does not entail a principled rejection of
democracy. Rather, it comprises a far reaching restriction of the demo-
cratic mechanism, such that democratic citizens may exert an influence
on the governmental apparatus but are simultaneously prevented from
changing the overarching legal framework. (2017: p. 222)
Hence, Cornelissen argues that “the primary aim of Hayek’s demo-
cratic theory is to banish popular sovereignty from political thought” (p.
223).
Noting that Hayek’s democratic theory constitutes the “privileged
object of analysis for a critical account of the place occupied by democra-
cy in neoliberal thought” (p. 226), Cornelissen start’s by noting Hayek’s
“ambivalence towards democracy” (p. 244), and his decision to limit it
to “describe a method of government – namely majority rule” (p. 244).
Democracy then constitutes a “method of deciding but emphatically not
‘an authority for what the decision ought to be’” (p. 244). In general terms
Hayek claims to support democracy as the best method of change; as the
best mechanism compatible with liberty, and as the best method for edu-
cating the majority, because it has better results overall. At the same time,
Hayek makes frequent negative comments about democracy, or aspects of
democracy. Cornelissen notes Hayek’s antipathy to what he refers to as
“the doctrinaire democrat” (cited from Cornelissen: p. 245). In a previous
article of my own I also noted Hayek’s disparaging reference to forms of
“plebiscitarian dictatorship” (1944: p. 86), which may suggest a rather dis-
respectful slur on citizens in general. Various negative comments can be
48
your theme rather differently. I should say that what we want is not no
planning, or even less planning, indeed I should say that we almost cer-
tainly want more.
Lars Cornelissen on Hayek and Democracy
One question remains for Hayek is how, if the state can intervene only in
the legal structures of society, through formal processes, is Hayek able to
protect free market economics from the possibility of democratic rejec-
tion. This is, after all, why Eücken and Röpke wanted state intervention to
establish the ‘conditions’ of an enterprise culture in a much broader sense;
not only legal, but political, cultural, and educational as well. This is an
important question for Hayek especially given his own doubts about the
efficacy of laissez-faire. The answer is, as Cornelissen argues, Hayek has a
vastly attenuated conception of democracy which:
must give way to a form of constitutionalism that explicitly seeks to elim-
inate popular sovereignty. This … does not entail a principled rejection of
democracy. Rather, it comprises a far reaching restriction of the demo-
cratic mechanism, such that democratic citizens may exert an influence
on the governmental apparatus but are simultaneously prevented from
changing the overarching legal framework. (2017: p. 222)
Hence, Cornelissen argues that “the primary aim of Hayek’s demo-
cratic theory is to banish popular sovereignty from political thought” (p.
223).
Noting that Hayek’s democratic theory constitutes the “privileged
object of analysis for a critical account of the place occupied by democra-
cy in neoliberal thought” (p. 226), Cornelissen start’s by noting Hayek’s
“ambivalence towards democracy” (p. 244), and his decision to limit it
to “describe a method of government – namely majority rule” (p. 244).
Democracy then constitutes a “method of deciding but emphatically not
‘an authority for what the decision ought to be’” (p. 244). In general terms
Hayek claims to support democracy as the best method of change; as the
best mechanism compatible with liberty, and as the best method for edu-
cating the majority, because it has better results overall. At the same time,
Hayek makes frequent negative comments about democracy, or aspects of
democracy. Cornelissen notes Hayek’s antipathy to what he refers to as
“the doctrinaire democrat” (cited from Cornelissen: p. 245). In a previous
article of my own I also noted Hayek’s disparaging reference to forms of
“plebiscitarian dictatorship” (1944: p. 86), which may suggest a rather dis-
respectful slur on citizens in general. Various negative comments can be
48
