Page 102 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 102
What Do We Know about the World?
one of the main points of Grice’s theory is the idea that violation of that
maxim is not incompatible with respecting the general rational principle
of conversational cooperation. Thus, if a participant in the communica-
tion adheres to the principle of cooperation but still openly and deliber-
ately violates the maxim of quality, he or she, in fact, communicates an
implicit message which, in the case of figures of style like irony and, mu-
tatis mutandis, sarcasm and parody, is precisely the opposite from the ex-
plicit content of the utterance (or of a larger discursive unit). In fact the
phenomena of what is called implicature or “pragmatic consequence” are
based on the functioning of the above-described mechanism, the steps
of which allow for a more or less precise rational reconstruction.
Bearing this in mind, I adhere to the view that parody is neither ir-
rational nor deceptive in itself and that the general exclusion of its argu-
mentative use would be too restrictive. The structure of a paradigmat-
ic parody includes, indeed, a deviation from the principle of sincerity
and truthfulness. However, the main intention of the author of a parody
is that this deviation be recognised and identified as such by the audi-
ence. Indeed, the recognition of this intention is what makes the parody
successful, because it gives the audience the indicators that its content
should be interpreted in the “opposite” way, i.e. that the implicit mes-
sage the author wants to communicate by parodying a piece of discourse
contradicts the explicit meaning of his/her words when interpreted in a
standard way.
Of course, the issue of the (ir)rational and deceptive character of
parody and the legitimacy of its argumentative use is far more compli-
cated than is possible to present here. In this particular context of an-
alysis of the Sokal example, I will confine myself only to advancing the
thesis that what prevents the assimilation of parody and deception in
one and the same category is the essential difference in their conditions
of success. Namely, a parody is successful when the intention of its au-
thor, i.e. the clue for interpreting his/her work in a critical – not in a
standard – way, has been rightly recognised and understood by the audi-
ence. Conversely, a deception is successful when the real intention of its
author stays hidden from the audience, i.e., when his/her discourse is
not interpreted as it is really intended (which is, in fact, the essence of
lying). This fundamental difference in conditions of success lends an in-
itial plausibility to the use of parody in a broader context of rational dis-
course, although the plausibility of the final result of this use will de-
one of the main points of Grice’s theory is the idea that violation of that
maxim is not incompatible with respecting the general rational principle
of conversational cooperation. Thus, if a participant in the communica-
tion adheres to the principle of cooperation but still openly and deliber-
ately violates the maxim of quality, he or she, in fact, communicates an
implicit message which, in the case of figures of style like irony and, mu-
tatis mutandis, sarcasm and parody, is precisely the opposite from the ex-
plicit content of the utterance (or of a larger discursive unit). In fact the
phenomena of what is called implicature or “pragmatic consequence” are
based on the functioning of the above-described mechanism, the steps
of which allow for a more or less precise rational reconstruction.
Bearing this in mind, I adhere to the view that parody is neither ir-
rational nor deceptive in itself and that the general exclusion of its argu-
mentative use would be too restrictive. The structure of a paradigmat-
ic parody includes, indeed, a deviation from the principle of sincerity
and truthfulness. However, the main intention of the author of a parody
is that this deviation be recognised and identified as such by the audi-
ence. Indeed, the recognition of this intention is what makes the parody
successful, because it gives the audience the indicators that its content
should be interpreted in the “opposite” way, i.e. that the implicit mes-
sage the author wants to communicate by parodying a piece of discourse
contradicts the explicit meaning of his/her words when interpreted in a
standard way.
Of course, the issue of the (ir)rational and deceptive character of
parody and the legitimacy of its argumentative use is far more compli-
cated than is possible to present here. In this particular context of an-
alysis of the Sokal example, I will confine myself only to advancing the
thesis that what prevents the assimilation of parody and deception in
one and the same category is the essential difference in their conditions
of success. Namely, a parody is successful when the intention of its au-
thor, i.e. the clue for interpreting his/her work in a critical – not in a
standard – way, has been rightly recognised and understood by the audi-
ence. Conversely, a deception is successful when the real intention of its
author stays hidden from the audience, i.e., when his/her discourse is
not interpreted as it is really intended (which is, in fact, the essence of
lying). This fundamental difference in conditions of success lends an in-
itial plausibility to the use of parody in a broader context of rational dis-
course, although the plausibility of the final result of this use will de-
