Page 101 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 101
the sokal affair and beyond: on the strategic
use of parody in the »science wars« 101
points of Sokal’s paper is to show that the demand for authorial sinceri-
ty, in the sense of an author’s believing in their own arguments, must be
subordinated to the demand for logical and evidential support for the
theses advanced. This is especially important to bear in mind in situa-
tions when the professed general theoretical attitude of the author “flat-
ters the ideological preconceptions” (ibid.) of the readers and could eas-
ily lead them astray into neglecting their intellectual duties by loosen-
ing the standards of argument evaluation, as was the case with the edi-
tors of Social Text.
4.4.4. Using Non-Rational Means for Argumentative Purposes
A particularly important objection related to the deceptive aspect
of Sokal’s strategy concerns the legitimacy or lack of legitimacy of us-
ing parody and satire in the context of rational discourse. This objection
boils down to the claim that nonsense, deception and the communica-
tive phenomena dependent on them are contrary to the very nature of
rational discourse and cannot be a part of it, let alone be used as a means
of restoring the rational mood of argumentation. As Johnson and del
Rio remark: “Satire and argument are a dangerous mix. What makes
satire pleasurable is often how it differs from more rational argument.
Satirical texts exaggerate and distort for comic effect resulting in some-
times little more than an ad hominem attack. Satire asks us to laugh first
and think second.” (Johnson and del Rio, 2011: 890)13
In the formulation of this kind of objection, deception and paro-
dy are apparently treated in a similar way as being assimilated within
the category of non-rational communicative devices. However, it seems
that the soundness of this categorisation could be questioned by recall-
ing Grice’s theory of conversational implicature (cf. Grice, 1975/1989).
Following the basic tenets of this theory, it could be admitted that the
mechanism of ironic and parodic discourse14 is indeed based on viola-
tion of one of the fundamental conversational maxims – that of quali-
ty, i.e., the “rule” that says “Do not say what you believe to be false”. Yet
13 On this point, an even more radical opinion is advanced by Lee D. Carlson: commenting on the
negative aspects of the Sokal affair, Carlson advocates the excluding of parody and related phenom-
ena from the area of rational discourse: “Deception, sarcasm, parodies, and ridicule have no place in
rational discourse, even though they may sometimes have an amusing quality to them.” (Carlson,
2008)
14 The inclusion of parody in this perspective represents an extension of Grice’s original position,
which mentions irony, metaphor, meiosis and hyperbole as examples of flouting the maxim of qual-
ity. However, it seems that this extension is faithful at least to the spirit of Grice’s theory, if not to its
letter.
use of parody in the »science wars« 101
points of Sokal’s paper is to show that the demand for authorial sinceri-
ty, in the sense of an author’s believing in their own arguments, must be
subordinated to the demand for logical and evidential support for the
theses advanced. This is especially important to bear in mind in situa-
tions when the professed general theoretical attitude of the author “flat-
ters the ideological preconceptions” (ibid.) of the readers and could eas-
ily lead them astray into neglecting their intellectual duties by loosen-
ing the standards of argument evaluation, as was the case with the edi-
tors of Social Text.
4.4.4. Using Non-Rational Means for Argumentative Purposes
A particularly important objection related to the deceptive aspect
of Sokal’s strategy concerns the legitimacy or lack of legitimacy of us-
ing parody and satire in the context of rational discourse. This objection
boils down to the claim that nonsense, deception and the communica-
tive phenomena dependent on them are contrary to the very nature of
rational discourse and cannot be a part of it, let alone be used as a means
of restoring the rational mood of argumentation. As Johnson and del
Rio remark: “Satire and argument are a dangerous mix. What makes
satire pleasurable is often how it differs from more rational argument.
Satirical texts exaggerate and distort for comic effect resulting in some-
times little more than an ad hominem attack. Satire asks us to laugh first
and think second.” (Johnson and del Rio, 2011: 890)13
In the formulation of this kind of objection, deception and paro-
dy are apparently treated in a similar way as being assimilated within
the category of non-rational communicative devices. However, it seems
that the soundness of this categorisation could be questioned by recall-
ing Grice’s theory of conversational implicature (cf. Grice, 1975/1989).
Following the basic tenets of this theory, it could be admitted that the
mechanism of ironic and parodic discourse14 is indeed based on viola-
tion of one of the fundamental conversational maxims – that of quali-
ty, i.e., the “rule” that says “Do not say what you believe to be false”. Yet
13 On this point, an even more radical opinion is advanced by Lee D. Carlson: commenting on the
negative aspects of the Sokal affair, Carlson advocates the excluding of parody and related phenom-
ena from the area of rational discourse: “Deception, sarcasm, parodies, and ridicule have no place in
rational discourse, even though they may sometimes have an amusing quality to them.” (Carlson,
2008)
14 The inclusion of parody in this perspective represents an extension of Grice’s original position,
which mentions irony, metaphor, meiosis and hyperbole as examples of flouting the maxim of qual-
ity. However, it seems that this extension is faithful at least to the spirit of Grice’s theory, if not to its
letter.
