Page 348 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 348
What Do We Know about the World?
ing the intentionally produced figures (since only striking or “deviant”
features of discourse are those which have stylistic “value”); the classical
rhetorician, on the other hand, would be interested in analyzing which
figures (regardless of their origin) had (or could have) the strongest ef-
fect on the target audience. All of those researchers could concentrate
on one figure only, or they could analyze a whole group of figures.
The authors of this paper are rhetoricians and their research concen-
trated on one figure (more precisely, a trope) in one type of discourse.
The trope is that of antonomasia which was tested on the “battlefield”
of sports discourse. Aware of the specific problems of their “favorite”,
the authors tried to avail themselves of linguistics (especially onomastics
and cognitive linguistics), stylistics as well as cultural theory.
1.1. Between Metaphor and Metonymy
Antonomasia is a trope which has two functions. The first one is a
substitution of a proper name by an appellative, epithet or periphrasis
(e.g. the Philosopher for Aristotle, Our Beautiful for Croatia or the Queen
of Pop for Madonna). This type is called classical or proper antonomasia
because it was defined in this sense in the classical handbooks of rheto-
ric (see Anderson, 2000; Quintilian, 1959). The second function is a sub-
stitution of a certain trait by a proper name which has become synony-
mous with a specific trait (Schumacher for “a fast driver”, Penelope for “a
faithful wife” or Mozart for “an exceptional one, a virtuoso”). This type
is called Vossian antonomasia, after Gerardus Johannis Vossius, 17th cen-
tury Dutch rhetorician who first described the second function (Laus-
berg, 1990).1
Defined in the broader sense, antonomasia can be regarded as a
trope that relies on the processes of appellativization and deappellativi-
zation, both common in everyday language (Van Langendonck, 2007).
In the classical type of antonomasia, appellative words are treated as
proper ones: they are usually written in capital letters and they are nev-
er used alongside the name which they substitute. In stark contrast to
this, Vossian antonomasia treats proper names as if they were common
nouns. This is the reason why sometimes the figurative use of a proper
name becomes necessary in naming a certain object or process (e.g. the
word “boycott” originates from the English Captain Charles Boycott,
who was socially ostracized by his local community in Ireland; the word
“pasteurization” is derived from the inventor of this chemical process,
1 For those interested in more detailed discussion on different definitions of antonomasia and the dis-
tinction between two types, look in Grgić and Nikolić, 2011a; 2011b.
ing the intentionally produced figures (since only striking or “deviant”
features of discourse are those which have stylistic “value”); the classical
rhetorician, on the other hand, would be interested in analyzing which
figures (regardless of their origin) had (or could have) the strongest ef-
fect on the target audience. All of those researchers could concentrate
on one figure only, or they could analyze a whole group of figures.
The authors of this paper are rhetoricians and their research concen-
trated on one figure (more precisely, a trope) in one type of discourse.
The trope is that of antonomasia which was tested on the “battlefield”
of sports discourse. Aware of the specific problems of their “favorite”,
the authors tried to avail themselves of linguistics (especially onomastics
and cognitive linguistics), stylistics as well as cultural theory.
1.1. Between Metaphor and Metonymy
Antonomasia is a trope which has two functions. The first one is a
substitution of a proper name by an appellative, epithet or periphrasis
(e.g. the Philosopher for Aristotle, Our Beautiful for Croatia or the Queen
of Pop for Madonna). This type is called classical or proper antonomasia
because it was defined in this sense in the classical handbooks of rheto-
ric (see Anderson, 2000; Quintilian, 1959). The second function is a sub-
stitution of a certain trait by a proper name which has become synony-
mous with a specific trait (Schumacher for “a fast driver”, Penelope for “a
faithful wife” or Mozart for “an exceptional one, a virtuoso”). This type
is called Vossian antonomasia, after Gerardus Johannis Vossius, 17th cen-
tury Dutch rhetorician who first described the second function (Laus-
berg, 1990).1
Defined in the broader sense, antonomasia can be regarded as a
trope that relies on the processes of appellativization and deappellativi-
zation, both common in everyday language (Van Langendonck, 2007).
In the classical type of antonomasia, appellative words are treated as
proper ones: they are usually written in capital letters and they are nev-
er used alongside the name which they substitute. In stark contrast to
this, Vossian antonomasia treats proper names as if they were common
nouns. This is the reason why sometimes the figurative use of a proper
name becomes necessary in naming a certain object or process (e.g. the
word “boycott” originates from the English Captain Charles Boycott,
who was socially ostracized by his local community in Ireland; the word
“pasteurization” is derived from the inventor of this chemical process,
1 For those interested in more detailed discussion on different definitions of antonomasia and the dis-
tinction between two types, look in Grgić and Nikolić, 2011a; 2011b.
