Page 136 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 136
What Do We Know about the World?
rists can hope for in pointing out a certain form of reasoning as falla-
cious is a modest decline in the use of that type of reasoning. Conse-
quently, I will not worry that, by filling our critical thinking and argu-
mentation texts with warnings against using the zero tolerance fallacy,
instances of that fallacy will become so rare that the fallacy is not one
worth bringing to people’s attention.
Despite the foregoing standard for something becoming a named
fallacy, I will use an even narrower standard. I will hold that we should
add an argument form to our list of recognized fallacies if, and only if,
the argument is invalid, distinctive, plausible (in Aristotle’s sense of one
that could easily be mistaken for a good argument), frequently used (or
would be frequently used), and, finally, if its use frequently has signifi-
cant harmful consequences. By the last condition I am suggesting harm
that goes beyond just that of having people participate in erroneous rea-
soning. We already have a lot of named fallacies, and there is little rea-
son for adding to our list if the form of fallacious reasoning causes lit-
tle or no social harm. But use of common fallacious reasoning – falla-
cious in that it meets the first three conditions discussed above – that
does cause serious social harm warrants being given a name. We need to
be able to briefly identify instances of reasoning which are not just sub-
standard but which also lead to significant social harms when people are
taken in by them. My claim is that arguments of the type I am suggest-
ing we call zero tolerance fallacies do meet all five of these individual-
ly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for warranting becoming a
new named fallacy.
To review, my conditions for adding a new fallacy to our collection
of named fallacies are:
- the argument type is invalid
- it is a distinctive type of argument
- arguments of this type are often plausible (or seem to be valid)
- the argument type is frequently used
- the argument type is one whose use causes significant harm.
The above constitutes a rigorous standard for adding a new named
fallacy to our collection. I will now characterize the fallacy I think we
should name, showing that it meets the first three conditions above. I
will not, in this paper, defend the position that arguments that I think
should be called instances of the zero tolerance fallacy meet the last two
conditions. I take the facts here to be sufficiently obvious for the reader
to discern this for herself.
rists can hope for in pointing out a certain form of reasoning as falla-
cious is a modest decline in the use of that type of reasoning. Conse-
quently, I will not worry that, by filling our critical thinking and argu-
mentation texts with warnings against using the zero tolerance fallacy,
instances of that fallacy will become so rare that the fallacy is not one
worth bringing to people’s attention.
Despite the foregoing standard for something becoming a named
fallacy, I will use an even narrower standard. I will hold that we should
add an argument form to our list of recognized fallacies if, and only if,
the argument is invalid, distinctive, plausible (in Aristotle’s sense of one
that could easily be mistaken for a good argument), frequently used (or
would be frequently used), and, finally, if its use frequently has signifi-
cant harmful consequences. By the last condition I am suggesting harm
that goes beyond just that of having people participate in erroneous rea-
soning. We already have a lot of named fallacies, and there is little rea-
son for adding to our list if the form of fallacious reasoning causes lit-
tle or no social harm. But use of common fallacious reasoning – falla-
cious in that it meets the first three conditions discussed above – that
does cause serious social harm warrants being given a name. We need to
be able to briefly identify instances of reasoning which are not just sub-
standard but which also lead to significant social harms when people are
taken in by them. My claim is that arguments of the type I am suggest-
ing we call zero tolerance fallacies do meet all five of these individual-
ly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for warranting becoming a
new named fallacy.
To review, my conditions for adding a new fallacy to our collection
of named fallacies are:
- the argument type is invalid
- it is a distinctive type of argument
- arguments of this type are often plausible (or seem to be valid)
- the argument type is frequently used
- the argument type is one whose use causes significant harm.
The above constitutes a rigorous standard for adding a new named
fallacy to our collection. I will now characterize the fallacy I think we
should name, showing that it meets the first three conditions above. I
will not, in this paper, defend the position that arguments that I think
should be called instances of the zero tolerance fallacy meet the last two
conditions. I take the facts here to be sufficiently obvious for the reader
to discern this for herself.
