Page 140 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 140
What Do We Know about the World?
1. This is a standard problem with social rules – rarely is a full justifi-
cation offered. (This is so even in so-called hard cases of law where,
typically, experts go to great lengths to justify their favoured inter-
pretation of a social policy or principle.8)
2. The enthymeme is almost always filled in along the following lines:
(i) we have this unwanted behaviour; (ii) having zero tolerance for
the behaviour is the best way to reduce/eliminate the behaviour;
(iii) we have adopted (and put into place) a zero tolerance policy re-
garding the behaviour; (iv) therefore we are doing the best we can to
eliminate/reduce the behaviour.
3. Premise (ii) (or something like it) is almost always the one in need of
evidential support. And it is almost always the one that lacks such
support.
4. Sometimes people have support for premise (ii) (or such support is
easily available), and in those cases the fallacy has not been commit-
ted (or the charge that it has been can easily be countered). Simply
pointing out the existence of such evidence to those who object to
the zero tolerance policy is generally a social good.
5. In circumstances where we want simple absolutist rules, we also
want flexibility in enforcing those rules – precisely those circum-
stances where we do not want zero tolerance policies.
It is, of course, an empirical matter how often there is a more effec-
tive approach available to us to rid ourselves of a social ill than the adop-
tion of a zero tolerance policy. At present we often lack good empiri-
cal data regarding how frequently this occurs.9 Indeed, we do not even
know roughly what percentage of times zero tolerance policies are more
or less effective than other options in even a limited area. (The articles
by Wilson and Kelling (1982) and by Marshall (1999) are good places to
start in reviewing the available data.) But this fact should not be seen to
be an undue hindrance to adopting the language I propose. For consider
8 Ronald Dworkin (1978: Chapter 4) distinguishes hard cases from clear ones operationally. A legal
case is a hard case when reasonable people knowing all the relevant facts, including all the facts of in-
stitutional history, disagree on the proper disposition of the case.
9 Marshall (1999) contains a good discussion. Lacking solid data forces us to rely on the wisdom col-
lected by others. Perhaps most relevant here is Montaigne’s observations about having zero toler-
ance for ending a marriage. He observes that, “We have thought to tie the knot of our marriages
more firmly by taking away all means of dissolving them; but the knot of will and affection has be-
come loosened and undone as much as that of constraint has tightened. And on the contrary, what
kept marriages in Rome so long in honour and security was everyone’s freedom to break them off at
will. They loved their wives the better because they might lose them; and, with full liberty of divorce,
five hundred years and more passed before anyone took advantage of it” (1580, Chapter XV: 320).
1. This is a standard problem with social rules – rarely is a full justifi-
cation offered. (This is so even in so-called hard cases of law where,
typically, experts go to great lengths to justify their favoured inter-
pretation of a social policy or principle.8)
2. The enthymeme is almost always filled in along the following lines:
(i) we have this unwanted behaviour; (ii) having zero tolerance for
the behaviour is the best way to reduce/eliminate the behaviour;
(iii) we have adopted (and put into place) a zero tolerance policy re-
garding the behaviour; (iv) therefore we are doing the best we can to
eliminate/reduce the behaviour.
3. Premise (ii) (or something like it) is almost always the one in need of
evidential support. And it is almost always the one that lacks such
support.
4. Sometimes people have support for premise (ii) (or such support is
easily available), and in those cases the fallacy has not been commit-
ted (or the charge that it has been can easily be countered). Simply
pointing out the existence of such evidence to those who object to
the zero tolerance policy is generally a social good.
5. In circumstances where we want simple absolutist rules, we also
want flexibility in enforcing those rules – precisely those circum-
stances where we do not want zero tolerance policies.
It is, of course, an empirical matter how often there is a more effec-
tive approach available to us to rid ourselves of a social ill than the adop-
tion of a zero tolerance policy. At present we often lack good empiri-
cal data regarding how frequently this occurs.9 Indeed, we do not even
know roughly what percentage of times zero tolerance policies are more
or less effective than other options in even a limited area. (The articles
by Wilson and Kelling (1982) and by Marshall (1999) are good places to
start in reviewing the available data.) But this fact should not be seen to
be an undue hindrance to adopting the language I propose. For consider
8 Ronald Dworkin (1978: Chapter 4) distinguishes hard cases from clear ones operationally. A legal
case is a hard case when reasonable people knowing all the relevant facts, including all the facts of in-
stitutional history, disagree on the proper disposition of the case.
9 Marshall (1999) contains a good discussion. Lacking solid data forces us to rely on the wisdom col-
lected by others. Perhaps most relevant here is Montaigne’s observations about having zero toler-
ance for ending a marriage. He observes that, “We have thought to tie the knot of our marriages
more firmly by taking away all means of dissolving them; but the knot of will and affection has be-
come loosened and undone as much as that of constraint has tightened. And on the contrary, what
kept marriages in Rome so long in honour and security was everyone’s freedom to break them off at
will. They loved their wives the better because they might lose them; and, with full liberty of divorce,
five hundred years and more passed before anyone took advantage of it” (1580, Chapter XV: 320).
