Page 132 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 132
What Do We Know about the World?
is likely to result from introducing the rhetorical device of the zero tol-
erance fallacy into our conversations about public policy.1
When an activity meets with widespread public disapproval and
politicians or administrators feel the need to react, they often adopt the
rhetoric of “zero tolerance”. The implicit (and sometimes explicit) mes-
sage is that, by adopting a zero tolerance policy towards an activity, one
is doing all that one can – at least all that one can qua policy adoption
– to reduce or eliminate the activity in question. Yet which policy or
policies should be adopted to reduce or eliminate an unwanted behav-
iour is always an empirical question, the answer to which will vary with
the particular circumstances. And in many circumstances (indeed, in
most circumstances), adopting a zero tolerance policy (whether alone or
in concert with other policies and actions) is not the best way to combat
unwanted behaviours. Thus, those who adopt a zero tolerance policy to-
wards some behaviour without first investigating and finding that they
are in a set of circumstances where that policy is the most cost-effective
way of reducing or eliminating the undesirable behaviour are commit-
ting the zero tolerance fallacy. Or so I will argue.
I begin with a quick overview of the nature of fallacies, and I argue,
in this case at least, for a fairly narrow conception of what sorts of argu-
ments should even be considered as candidates to become named falla-
cies. I then say a few things about when we should name a fallacious ar-
gument. I then characterize the zero tolerance fallacy and argue that it is
sufficiently common and sufficiently dangerous to warrant being includ-
ed among those fallacies we name (and I argue for the name “zero toler-
ance fallacy”). I follow this with a few remarks concerning why people
commit this fallacy (and in the course of doing so seek to justify the first
word in my title – “intolerance”). I then turn to various objections and
problems. I close with a summary of the benefits that would accrue were
the term “zero tolerance fallacy” to become widely adopted.
2. The Nature of Fallacies
There is a long tradition among those who study rhetoric and critical
thinking to find and name particular fallacies. Aristotle observed that
“some reasonings are genuine while others seem to be so but are not,”
and he used the term “fallacies” for those instances of reasoning that ap-
1 I recognize that not all accounts of rhetoric (or all rhetoraticians) accept Quine’s view that the disci-
pline holds persuasion above truth. Though I note that Aristotle, the founder of the discipline, held
this view.
is likely to result from introducing the rhetorical device of the zero tol-
erance fallacy into our conversations about public policy.1
When an activity meets with widespread public disapproval and
politicians or administrators feel the need to react, they often adopt the
rhetoric of “zero tolerance”. The implicit (and sometimes explicit) mes-
sage is that, by adopting a zero tolerance policy towards an activity, one
is doing all that one can – at least all that one can qua policy adoption
– to reduce or eliminate the activity in question. Yet which policy or
policies should be adopted to reduce or eliminate an unwanted behav-
iour is always an empirical question, the answer to which will vary with
the particular circumstances. And in many circumstances (indeed, in
most circumstances), adopting a zero tolerance policy (whether alone or
in concert with other policies and actions) is not the best way to combat
unwanted behaviours. Thus, those who adopt a zero tolerance policy to-
wards some behaviour without first investigating and finding that they
are in a set of circumstances where that policy is the most cost-effective
way of reducing or eliminating the undesirable behaviour are commit-
ting the zero tolerance fallacy. Or so I will argue.
I begin with a quick overview of the nature of fallacies, and I argue,
in this case at least, for a fairly narrow conception of what sorts of argu-
ments should even be considered as candidates to become named falla-
cies. I then say a few things about when we should name a fallacious ar-
gument. I then characterize the zero tolerance fallacy and argue that it is
sufficiently common and sufficiently dangerous to warrant being includ-
ed among those fallacies we name (and I argue for the name “zero toler-
ance fallacy”). I follow this with a few remarks concerning why people
commit this fallacy (and in the course of doing so seek to justify the first
word in my title – “intolerance”). I then turn to various objections and
problems. I close with a summary of the benefits that would accrue were
the term “zero tolerance fallacy” to become widely adopted.
2. The Nature of Fallacies
There is a long tradition among those who study rhetoric and critical
thinking to find and name particular fallacies. Aristotle observed that
“some reasonings are genuine while others seem to be so but are not,”
and he used the term “fallacies” for those instances of reasoning that ap-
1 I recognize that not all accounts of rhetoric (or all rhetoraticians) accept Quine’s view that the disci-
pline holds persuasion above truth. Though I note that Aristotle, the founder of the discipline, held
this view.
