Page 141 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 141
intolerance and the zero tolerance fallacy 141
the circumstances under which one is likely to claim that someone else
has committed the zero tolerance fallacy (or to worry that one is com-
mitting it oneself). It is quite likely that someone will have either pro-
posed or already have put in place a zero tolerance policy about some ac-
tivity or behaviour. The opponent of this policy may object for roughly
two types of reasons. First, of course, she may think that the behaviour
in question does not need to be restricted, that there is nothing wrong
with the behaviour in itself and that it will not lead to negative conse-
quences (or, at least, not consequences that are serious enough to war-
rant restricting someone’s liberty). Second, she may agree that the be-
haviour in question ought to be reduced and simply think either that
having a zero tolerance policy is likely to be ineffective or that it is over-
ly harsh (most likely because, in practice, it is almost certain to result in
punishing too many of those who, for one reason or another, ought not
to be punished).
If the objection is really of the first type, the challenge is easily re-
sponded to simply by pointing out that the objector disagrees with the
end the policy seeks to reach, not with the means to that end. Advocates
and opponents of the end in question can then get on with the matter of
debating that issue. If the objection is of the second type, the defender
of the policy has several options. She can offer data supporting the idea
that, in this case, a zero tolerance policy is more likely to work than oth-
er policies. This need not include sophisticated statistical analysis, for
such may not be available. Something as simple as “We have looked at
[or have tried] other options and none of them seem to work as well as
zero tolerance” is sometimes all one needs to defend against the charge
that one has committed the zero tolerance fallacy. But if the defender
cannot offer such data or a compelling reason for thinking that in this
sort of case the data is unlikely to be available, she and her supporters
will doubtless be prompted to look for such data. If, on the other hand,
she does have such data, then she has not committed the fallacy. Finally,
in those cases where someone has adopted a zero tolerance policy with-
out having supporting data that such a policy is more effective than oth-
er alternatives but she is able to quickly find such data – so that the fal-
lacy has been committed – then the finding and reporting of such data
in response to the challenge that she committed the fallacy shows that,
in this case, committing the fallacy itself did little harm. Furthermore,
the charge that the fallacy had been committed will have had the virtue
of bringing to light relevant data about what modifies behaviour in this
type of situation.
the circumstances under which one is likely to claim that someone else
has committed the zero tolerance fallacy (or to worry that one is com-
mitting it oneself). It is quite likely that someone will have either pro-
posed or already have put in place a zero tolerance policy about some ac-
tivity or behaviour. The opponent of this policy may object for roughly
two types of reasons. First, of course, she may think that the behaviour
in question does not need to be restricted, that there is nothing wrong
with the behaviour in itself and that it will not lead to negative conse-
quences (or, at least, not consequences that are serious enough to war-
rant restricting someone’s liberty). Second, she may agree that the be-
haviour in question ought to be reduced and simply think either that
having a zero tolerance policy is likely to be ineffective or that it is over-
ly harsh (most likely because, in practice, it is almost certain to result in
punishing too many of those who, for one reason or another, ought not
to be punished).
If the objection is really of the first type, the challenge is easily re-
sponded to simply by pointing out that the objector disagrees with the
end the policy seeks to reach, not with the means to that end. Advocates
and opponents of the end in question can then get on with the matter of
debating that issue. If the objection is of the second type, the defender
of the policy has several options. She can offer data supporting the idea
that, in this case, a zero tolerance policy is more likely to work than oth-
er policies. This need not include sophisticated statistical analysis, for
such may not be available. Something as simple as “We have looked at
[or have tried] other options and none of them seem to work as well as
zero tolerance” is sometimes all one needs to defend against the charge
that one has committed the zero tolerance fallacy. But if the defender
cannot offer such data or a compelling reason for thinking that in this
sort of case the data is unlikely to be available, she and her supporters
will doubtless be prompted to look for such data. If, on the other hand,
she does have such data, then she has not committed the fallacy. Finally,
in those cases where someone has adopted a zero tolerance policy with-
out having supporting data that such a policy is more effective than oth-
er alternatives but she is able to quickly find such data – so that the fal-
lacy has been committed – then the finding and reporting of such data
in response to the challenge that she committed the fallacy shows that,
in this case, committing the fallacy itself did little harm. Furthermore,
the charge that the fallacy had been committed will have had the virtue
of bringing to light relevant data about what modifies behaviour in this
type of situation.
