Page 139 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
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intolerance and the zero tolerance fallacy 139
In the case imagined above, if expulsion from the school is the penalty
attached to violation of the new rule and a child is discovered to have ac-
cidentally violated the policy, teachers or playground supervisors might
just look the other way. Or they might enforce the rule differentially,
based on some prejudice they have. Either way, their actions (or lack
thereof) may serve to undermine the very purpose or aim for which the
zero tolerance policy was originally adopted. Things become much more
complicated if children seize the opportunity to report on other chil-
dren as a way of settling playground quarrels.

5. Problems

I now turn to several problems that arise from the idea that we should
have a new named fallacy, the zero tolerance fallacy. First, and most obvi-
ously, the fallacy in a zero tolerance argument is often hard to identify be-
cause the fallacious argument is implicit. Most arguments (at least as they
are first presented) include implicit assumptions or hidden premises. In-
deed, fallacious arguments are less likely to be explicit than fully devel-
oped arguments are, for the simple reason that, once an argument is made
explicit, it is often easier to determine whether it is fallacious (and, typi-
cally at least, those who employ fallacious arguments either do not real-
ize they are doing so or, when they are aware of this, they certainly do not
want their audience to know it). The typical argument for a zero toler-
ance policy is an enthymeme – an argument with a missing or suppressed
premise. And it is typically this premise that lacks adequate support.

We might break this problem down as follows:
1. Fallacies are arguments, and rarely is a full argument provided for

adopting a zero tolerance policy.
2. Such arguments as are provided for adopting a zero tolerance policy

are almost always enthymemes.
3. Enthymemes pose increased difficulties in interpretation.
4. There are cases where there are valid – indeed sound – arguments

for zero tolerance policies. (And these have the same logical form as
the fallacious arguments.)
5. Sometimes we want policies or rules that are (in some sense) over-
ly strict, and these cases are sometimes difficult to distinguish from
others.
But we should note the following considerations that collectively
weaken the objection. (The numbers below respond to each of the num-
bered points above.)
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