Page 125 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 125
the acts and strategies of defining 125
The omission of the definition of “torture” clearly differs from the
non-definition of “hostility” and “belligerent”. In the first case the
speaker’s commitment to the speech act of defining (or refusing to do
it) results from an explicit act (request). In other cases, the commitment
can derive from an institutional (legal) or a communicative rule, “avoid
ambiguity.” In both cases, the speaker is aware of the requirement (or
expectation) and deliberately refuses to comply with it, knowing its ef-
fects. The omission of a definition leads to a specific effect: the possibil-
ity of implicitly redefining the definiendum, or rather using it with new
unshared meanings. This latter move can be considered as a distinct act
of a kind, the act of implicitly defining.
5.2. Implicit Definitions
The omissions of definitions are strategic moves as they do not pre-
vent vagueness or ambiguity; on the contrary, they can introduce them.
The absence of a definition leaves open the possibility of defining or re-
defining a concept. More importantly, the lack of an explicit descrip-
tion of a word meaning allows the speaker to stipulate it implicitly. The
speaker can take advantage of a controversial concept, not explicitly de-
fined, and use it with a new, unshared definition. In this fashion he sim-
ply takes its definition for granted; and treats it as it were already part of
the community’s common knowledge.
One of the most famous cases is the implicit redefinition of “hostili-
ty” used by Obama to classify the American intervention in Libya. In or-
der to avoid requesting the Congress’ authorization to continue the hos-
tilities (War Powers Resolution, sec. 5b, Public Law 93–148), the Presi-
dent needed to exclude the bombings in Libya from the boundaries of
the concept of “hostilities.” He took advantage of the absence of its defi-
nition in the War Powers Resolution Act (US Code 1541). The vagueness
of the boundaries of “hostilities” allowed Obama to redefine it to ex-
clude the American strikes in Libya. He did not advance or impose any
new meaning. He simply used the term claiming that it could only refer
to ground troop intervention, sustained fighting and exchanges of fire.
He presupposed a tacit definition from which air strikes were excluded,
let alone when carried out by unmanned aircraft (Obama Administra-
tion letter to Congress justifying Libya engagement, June 15th, 2011, 25)6:
(28–29). (Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR46/004/1997/en on 21
September 2011)
6 Retrieved from http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/204673/united-states-activities-in-lib-
ya-6-15-11.pdf on 25 August 2012.
The omission of the definition of “torture” clearly differs from the
non-definition of “hostility” and “belligerent”. In the first case the
speaker’s commitment to the speech act of defining (or refusing to do
it) results from an explicit act (request). In other cases, the commitment
can derive from an institutional (legal) or a communicative rule, “avoid
ambiguity.” In both cases, the speaker is aware of the requirement (or
expectation) and deliberately refuses to comply with it, knowing its ef-
fects. The omission of a definition leads to a specific effect: the possibil-
ity of implicitly redefining the definiendum, or rather using it with new
unshared meanings. This latter move can be considered as a distinct act
of a kind, the act of implicitly defining.
5.2. Implicit Definitions
The omissions of definitions are strategic moves as they do not pre-
vent vagueness or ambiguity; on the contrary, they can introduce them.
The absence of a definition leaves open the possibility of defining or re-
defining a concept. More importantly, the lack of an explicit descrip-
tion of a word meaning allows the speaker to stipulate it implicitly. The
speaker can take advantage of a controversial concept, not explicitly de-
fined, and use it with a new, unshared definition. In this fashion he sim-
ply takes its definition for granted; and treats it as it were already part of
the community’s common knowledge.
One of the most famous cases is the implicit redefinition of “hostili-
ty” used by Obama to classify the American intervention in Libya. In or-
der to avoid requesting the Congress’ authorization to continue the hos-
tilities (War Powers Resolution, sec. 5b, Public Law 93–148), the Presi-
dent needed to exclude the bombings in Libya from the boundaries of
the concept of “hostilities.” He took advantage of the absence of its defi-
nition in the War Powers Resolution Act (US Code 1541). The vagueness
of the boundaries of “hostilities” allowed Obama to redefine it to ex-
clude the American strikes in Libya. He did not advance or impose any
new meaning. He simply used the term claiming that it could only refer
to ground troop intervention, sustained fighting and exchanges of fire.
He presupposed a tacit definition from which air strikes were excluded,
let alone when carried out by unmanned aircraft (Obama Administra-
tion letter to Congress justifying Libya engagement, June 15th, 2011, 25)6:
(28–29). (Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR46/004/1997/en on 21
September 2011)
6 Retrieved from http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/204673/united-states-activities-in-lib-
ya-6-15-11.pdf on 25 August 2012.
