Page 128 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
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What Do We Know about the World?
discussion, shifting onto the other party the burden of disproving a con-
troversial (and unacceptable, in this case) meaning.
6. Conclusion
Definitions are not simply descriptions of meaning. They are not
only equivalences between a word and a phrase. They are rhetorical in-
struments that can lead the interlocutor to a specific decision. They are
acts that have different purposes and conditions. They are dialogical
tools for altering and manipulating the hearers’ commitments. The con-
cept of persuasive definition underscores the rhetorical dimension of the
definitions of specific words, called “emotive”. By modifying their mean-
ing or the values that they are associated with, the speaker can redirect
the interlocutor’s attitudes towards a situation. A war can become an act
of peace, and thus it can be justified and praised; a felony can be present-
ed as an act of loyalty, and thus it can be positively regarded. The mean-
ing of a word can be described in different fashions, and be the content
of different types of speech acts. The speaker can use a definition to stip-
ulate a new meaning, or remind the audience of the shared one. Howev-
er, he can perform definitional acts also by omitting definitions, or tak-
ing them for granted. These silent acts are the most dangerous and po-
tentially mischievous ones, as they can be used to manipulate what the
interlocutors are dialogically bound to, altering the burden of proof. The
implicit redefinition represents the most powerful tactic for committing
the interlocutor to a meaning that he has not agreed upon, nor that he
can accept. The speaker thereby eludes the burden of proving an oth-
erwise unacceptable proposition and shifts the burden of disproving it
onto the interlocutor.
References
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1998). Practical Inference. Hursthouse, R., G.
Lawrence, and W. Quinn (eds.). Virtues and Reasons. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1–34.
Aqvist, L. (1974). A New Approach to the Logical Theory of Actions
and Causality. Stenlund, S. (ed). Logical Theory and Semantics.
Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 73–91.
Aristotle (1991). Topics. Barnes, J. (ed.). The Complete Works of Aristot-
le, Vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Aristotle (1995). Nicomachean Ethics. Barnes J. (ed.). The Complete
Works of Aristotle, Vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
discussion, shifting onto the other party the burden of disproving a con-
troversial (and unacceptable, in this case) meaning.
6. Conclusion
Definitions are not simply descriptions of meaning. They are not
only equivalences between a word and a phrase. They are rhetorical in-
struments that can lead the interlocutor to a specific decision. They are
acts that have different purposes and conditions. They are dialogical
tools for altering and manipulating the hearers’ commitments. The con-
cept of persuasive definition underscores the rhetorical dimension of the
definitions of specific words, called “emotive”. By modifying their mean-
ing or the values that they are associated with, the speaker can redirect
the interlocutor’s attitudes towards a situation. A war can become an act
of peace, and thus it can be justified and praised; a felony can be present-
ed as an act of loyalty, and thus it can be positively regarded. The mean-
ing of a word can be described in different fashions, and be the content
of different types of speech acts. The speaker can use a definition to stip-
ulate a new meaning, or remind the audience of the shared one. Howev-
er, he can perform definitional acts also by omitting definitions, or tak-
ing them for granted. These silent acts are the most dangerous and po-
tentially mischievous ones, as they can be used to manipulate what the
interlocutors are dialogically bound to, altering the burden of proof. The
implicit redefinition represents the most powerful tactic for committing
the interlocutor to a meaning that he has not agreed upon, nor that he
can accept. The speaker thereby eludes the burden of proving an oth-
erwise unacceptable proposition and shifts the burden of disproving it
onto the interlocutor.
References
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1998). Practical Inference. Hursthouse, R., G.
Lawrence, and W. Quinn (eds.). Virtues and Reasons. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1–34.
Aqvist, L. (1974). A New Approach to the Logical Theory of Actions
and Causality. Stenlund, S. (ed). Logical Theory and Semantics.
Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 73–91.
Aristotle (1991). Topics. Barnes, J. (ed.). The Complete Works of Aristot-
le, Vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Aristotle (1995). Nicomachean Ethics. Barnes J. (ed.). The Complete
Works of Aristotle, Vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
