Page 18 - Šolsko polje, XXXI, 2020, 5-6: Teaching Feminism, ed. Valerija Vendramin
P. 18
šolsko polje, letnik xxxi, številka 5–6
2002, p. 19).4 Yet, although they evoke uneasiness, all of these differenc-
es/discrepancies/divergences/splits and conflicts prove the field’s virility
– as long as the field keeps the basic feature and goals of feminist episte-
mology and the feminist movement, e.g. challenging the assumptions of
neutrality of knowledge and scientific objectivity (i.e. the assumption of
knowledge unmarked by power relations, and demands for gender equi-
ty). This is exactly what is threatened by the changing power relations in
the Academy in neoliberal times, when the governing neoliberal ideology
is making deals with (extreme) right-wing political movements.
Teaching and learning about feminism can be difficult for all of
these reasons. First, feminist theory claims, as Stopford (2020) notes, of-
ten challenge familiar norms, the very foundations of students’ under-
standing of themselves, and the world around them. Namely, as Stopford
analyses, feminist theory operates with critical norms that destabilise not
only common-sense knowledge, but also the norms that govern the descrip-
tive theory claims that are much more familiar to students – for many stu-
dents, the clash between critical norms on one hand and common-sense
“facts” and descriptive norms on the other is inevitable, not to mention
the effects of this clash such as scepticism and different forms of resistance
(see our discussion).
Neoliberal ideology (including neoliberal feminism), policies, com-
mon-sense representations and descriptions of the world and the iden-
tifications they impose are a constant source of these types of clashes.
Neoliberal ideology interprets individual women as those who can do it
by themselves, as autonomous individuals; it compels them to focus on
themselves and their own aspirations. By interpreting women as those
who can do everything (in the brave new world where we can all win), it is
seemingly speaking from a feminist position. This (neo)liberal interpreta-
tion is fully problematic because it ignores the cultural, economic and po-
litical obstacles to do or to achieve everything. Unfortunately, some femi-
nist movements and politics are much closer to this view than they might
be willing to admit. Gender mainstreaming policies, for example, create
the impression that nation states and supranational institutions have as-
sumed responsibility for realising gender equity: the EU, for example, en-
courages national legislatives to take gender perspective into account, al-
though the criteria of effectiveness – gender balance statistics – are highly
4 One of the most pressing tensions is present between so called trans-exclusionary fem-
inism and (trans) feminism: the first attempts to draw the boundaries of who counts
as women and as a minority oppressed on the grounds of gender, and thus repeats al-
ready-known struggles, stemming from the lack of an intersectional approach towards
feminist issues (e.g. race, class, sexual identity …) (Ahmed, 2016a; see also Bettcher, 2017).
16
2002, p. 19).4 Yet, although they evoke uneasiness, all of these differenc-
es/discrepancies/divergences/splits and conflicts prove the field’s virility
– as long as the field keeps the basic feature and goals of feminist episte-
mology and the feminist movement, e.g. challenging the assumptions of
neutrality of knowledge and scientific objectivity (i.e. the assumption of
knowledge unmarked by power relations, and demands for gender equi-
ty). This is exactly what is threatened by the changing power relations in
the Academy in neoliberal times, when the governing neoliberal ideology
is making deals with (extreme) right-wing political movements.
Teaching and learning about feminism can be difficult for all of
these reasons. First, feminist theory claims, as Stopford (2020) notes, of-
ten challenge familiar norms, the very foundations of students’ under-
standing of themselves, and the world around them. Namely, as Stopford
analyses, feminist theory operates with critical norms that destabilise not
only common-sense knowledge, but also the norms that govern the descrip-
tive theory claims that are much more familiar to students – for many stu-
dents, the clash between critical norms on one hand and common-sense
“facts” and descriptive norms on the other is inevitable, not to mention
the effects of this clash such as scepticism and different forms of resistance
(see our discussion).
Neoliberal ideology (including neoliberal feminism), policies, com-
mon-sense representations and descriptions of the world and the iden-
tifications they impose are a constant source of these types of clashes.
Neoliberal ideology interprets individual women as those who can do it
by themselves, as autonomous individuals; it compels them to focus on
themselves and their own aspirations. By interpreting women as those
who can do everything (in the brave new world where we can all win), it is
seemingly speaking from a feminist position. This (neo)liberal interpreta-
tion is fully problematic because it ignores the cultural, economic and po-
litical obstacles to do or to achieve everything. Unfortunately, some femi-
nist movements and politics are much closer to this view than they might
be willing to admit. Gender mainstreaming policies, for example, create
the impression that nation states and supranational institutions have as-
sumed responsibility for realising gender equity: the EU, for example, en-
courages national legislatives to take gender perspective into account, al-
though the criteria of effectiveness – gender balance statistics – are highly
4 One of the most pressing tensions is present between so called trans-exclusionary fem-
inism and (trans) feminism: the first attempts to draw the boundaries of who counts
as women and as a minority oppressed on the grounds of gender, and thus repeats al-
ready-known struggles, stemming from the lack of an intersectional approach towards
feminist issues (e.g. race, class, sexual identity …) (Ahmed, 2016a; see also Bettcher, 2017).
16
