Page 14 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 14
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 5–6
attacks that followed 9/11 in the US, such as those in Bali (2002), Madrid
(2004) and London (2005), to name but a few. Here – somewhat unlike
the situation in 9/11 – the attackers were not radicals from overseas who
had breached the borders and brought in a foreign radicalism; but citizens
of the very states themselves under attack in which the perpetrators had
been born and brought up.
A number of paradoxes unfolded. In the London attacks, for exam-
ple, the leader of the bombing cell, Muhammad Siddique Khan, had not
only been born and brought-up in the UK, but had been relatively success-
ful in the sense that he had achieved a university degree and landed a solid
job. His occupation, furthermore, had been in the healthcare profession.
How, asked the state and its citizenry, could an individual move from car-
ing for his fellow citizens to murdering and maiming them in the most
dramatic fashion? A depressingly substantial number of other cases have
subsequently followed in many nations.
Insofar as answers could be established (and it is worth noting that
we are still some way from doing so at the time of writing), the obvious ex-
planation seemed to be that something had happened to these individu-
als whereby their conceptualisation of their own identity and role in soci-
ety had undergone some sort of transformative process, taking them away
from a “normal” member of society to one with the most violent intent.
Furthermore, in the normative sociological language of rational-choice
which has largely held sway since the latter part of the twentieth centu-
ry, such individuals were not mentally disturbed, but had each made some
sort of rational calculation about the best way forward for themselves and
others in society.
The advent of such developments led to a growing bureaucratic in-
terest not only in the fire-fighting of terrorist attacks on the streets (which
involves such actions as police and military action, and gathering intelli-
gence on those involved) but also in the “fire prevention” activities, where-
by the circumstances in which individuals find themselves being drawn
towards violently extreme actions are examined at a deeper and longer-
term level of societal development and intervention. A whole range of pol-
icies and strategies have subsequently been instituted, known as “CVE”,
or Countering Violent Extremism strategies. Here, the key word – ex-
tremism – suggests something ideological and societal, rather than the
black-and-white legalistic notion of a violent criminal act.
It should be noted that, while 9/11 set in motion the bureaucratic
and academic thinking in these directions, an awareness has grown that
the “extreme” ideology in question may not be confined to the violent ji-
hadist ideologies of the likes of Al Qaeda and Daesh, but could equally
12
attacks that followed 9/11 in the US, such as those in Bali (2002), Madrid
(2004) and London (2005), to name but a few. Here – somewhat unlike
the situation in 9/11 – the attackers were not radicals from overseas who
had breached the borders and brought in a foreign radicalism; but citizens
of the very states themselves under attack in which the perpetrators had
been born and brought up.
A number of paradoxes unfolded. In the London attacks, for exam-
ple, the leader of the bombing cell, Muhammad Siddique Khan, had not
only been born and brought-up in the UK, but had been relatively success-
ful in the sense that he had achieved a university degree and landed a solid
job. His occupation, furthermore, had been in the healthcare profession.
How, asked the state and its citizenry, could an individual move from car-
ing for his fellow citizens to murdering and maiming them in the most
dramatic fashion? A depressingly substantial number of other cases have
subsequently followed in many nations.
Insofar as answers could be established (and it is worth noting that
we are still some way from doing so at the time of writing), the obvious ex-
planation seemed to be that something had happened to these individu-
als whereby their conceptualisation of their own identity and role in soci-
ety had undergone some sort of transformative process, taking them away
from a “normal” member of society to one with the most violent intent.
Furthermore, in the normative sociological language of rational-choice
which has largely held sway since the latter part of the twentieth centu-
ry, such individuals were not mentally disturbed, but had each made some
sort of rational calculation about the best way forward for themselves and
others in society.
The advent of such developments led to a growing bureaucratic in-
terest not only in the fire-fighting of terrorist attacks on the streets (which
involves such actions as police and military action, and gathering intelli-
gence on those involved) but also in the “fire prevention” activities, where-
by the circumstances in which individuals find themselves being drawn
towards violently extreme actions are examined at a deeper and longer-
term level of societal development and intervention. A whole range of pol-
icies and strategies have subsequently been instituted, known as “CVE”,
or Countering Violent Extremism strategies. Here, the key word – ex-
tremism – suggests something ideological and societal, rather than the
black-and-white legalistic notion of a violent criminal act.
It should be noted that, while 9/11 set in motion the bureaucratic
and academic thinking in these directions, an awareness has grown that
the “extreme” ideology in question may not be confined to the violent ji-
hadist ideologies of the likes of Al Qaeda and Daesh, but could equally
12
