Page 15 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 15
j. richards ■ a conceptual exploration of radicalisation
involve radical-right ideologies, as Anders Breivik starkly underlined in
2011 when he killed 77 and maimed many more in a terrorist attack in
Oslo, inspired by what Khosrokhavar describes as a “frenzied utopianism”
defined by extreme Islamophobia and ultra-nationalism (Khosrokhavar,
2015: p. 119).
As a result, the concept of radicalisation could be said to have been
approached from two major directions, with intersections between them.
These can be differentiated as macro-, and micro-level approaches; or the
question of extreme ideology set against extremist individuals. The mac-
ro-level approach mirrors much analysis in the realms of Politics and
International Relations, whereby the behaviours of individuals are con-
sidered within the wider context of societal structures and developments.
Here, questions of power-relations in society are significant, and have
driven such thinking that socio-economic marginalisation underpins the
emergence of violent and revolutionary movements. Such an approach
also allows for a notion that discrimination and Islamophobia, which may
be as stressful for conceptions of personal identity as for actual daily phys-
ical experience, may lead whole sections of society to feel dangerously em-
bittered and to turn to violent thoughts as a way of redemption.
Rather like the calculation concerning gun control, however, the au-
thor has noted elsewhere that ideologies are important, but it is the indi-
vidual who becomes violently extreme (Richards, 2017: p. 220). The mi-
cro-level approach is initiated in part by the challenge that bedevils much
political and sociological analysis, namely that: if some people respond to
societal pressures in violent ways, why do so many others – all of whom
are living in exactly the same environment – not do so? There must there-
fore be some level of context-specificity that needs to be considered in the
process of radicalisation.
This has driven much psychological and anthropological work on
radicalisation, which looks not at ideologies per se but at the cognitive
and human processes that may cause one individual to become violently
extreme when another will not. It is intriguing, for example, that the vast
majority of individuals who have carried out violent “jihadist” attacks in
Western countries under the Daesh banner, for example, could not be de-
scribed as religious ideologues in their formative years, but quite the oppo-
site (Sexton, 2017). Indeed, most of them have had histories of criminali-
ty and problems with the vices of secular, Western society. In most cases,
their understanding of Islam could be described as shallow at best. This
must surely mean that the influence of extreme, religiously-inspired ideol-
ogy is rather more complicated than initially presumed.
13
involve radical-right ideologies, as Anders Breivik starkly underlined in
2011 when he killed 77 and maimed many more in a terrorist attack in
Oslo, inspired by what Khosrokhavar describes as a “frenzied utopianism”
defined by extreme Islamophobia and ultra-nationalism (Khosrokhavar,
2015: p. 119).
As a result, the concept of radicalisation could be said to have been
approached from two major directions, with intersections between them.
These can be differentiated as macro-, and micro-level approaches; or the
question of extreme ideology set against extremist individuals. The mac-
ro-level approach mirrors much analysis in the realms of Politics and
International Relations, whereby the behaviours of individuals are con-
sidered within the wider context of societal structures and developments.
Here, questions of power-relations in society are significant, and have
driven such thinking that socio-economic marginalisation underpins the
emergence of violent and revolutionary movements. Such an approach
also allows for a notion that discrimination and Islamophobia, which may
be as stressful for conceptions of personal identity as for actual daily phys-
ical experience, may lead whole sections of society to feel dangerously em-
bittered and to turn to violent thoughts as a way of redemption.
Rather like the calculation concerning gun control, however, the au-
thor has noted elsewhere that ideologies are important, but it is the indi-
vidual who becomes violently extreme (Richards, 2017: p. 220). The mi-
cro-level approach is initiated in part by the challenge that bedevils much
political and sociological analysis, namely that: if some people respond to
societal pressures in violent ways, why do so many others – all of whom
are living in exactly the same environment – not do so? There must there-
fore be some level of context-specificity that needs to be considered in the
process of radicalisation.
This has driven much psychological and anthropological work on
radicalisation, which looks not at ideologies per se but at the cognitive
and human processes that may cause one individual to become violently
extreme when another will not. It is intriguing, for example, that the vast
majority of individuals who have carried out violent “jihadist” attacks in
Western countries under the Daesh banner, for example, could not be de-
scribed as religious ideologues in their formative years, but quite the oppo-
site (Sexton, 2017). Indeed, most of them have had histories of criminali-
ty and problems with the vices of secular, Western society. In most cases,
their understanding of Islam could be described as shallow at best. This
must surely mean that the influence of extreme, religiously-inspired ideol-
ogy is rather more complicated than initially presumed.
13
