Page 43 - Žagar, Igor Ž. 2021. Four Critical Essays on Argumentation. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut.
P. 43
fallacies: do we ‘use’ them or ‘commit’ them? ...
aimed at—the person for whom the argument is an argument—is
the appropriate basis of a set of criteria. (Hamblin ibid.: 242)
There are no universal arguments or universal criteria for what an ar-
gument should look like to be (seen as) an argument. An argument should
be adopted and/or constructed relative to the (particular) circumstances
and the (particular) audience, as well as to the purposes and intentions we,
as arguers, have. Consequently, there can be no universal fallacies or uni-
versal criteria for what is a fallacy in everyday communication (persuasion
and argumentation).
Arguments and truth-conditions? Whose truth conditions?
(4) Argumentation/persuasion has no necessary link with truth or falsity.
We must distinguish the different possible purposes a practi-
cal argument may have. Let us suppose, first, that A wishes to
convince B of T, and discovers that B already accepts S: A can ar-
gue ‘S, therefore T’ independently of whether S and T are really
true. Judged by B’s standards, this is a good argument and, if A is
arguing with B and has any notion at all of winning, he will have to
start from something B will accept. The same point applies to the
inference-procedure. One of the purposes of argument, whether
we like it or not, is to convince, and our criteria would be less than
adequate if they had nothing to say about how well an argument
may meet this purpose. (Hamblin ibid.: 241)
This is a kind of a corollary to the previous point (point 3): not only
do we have to rely on arguments that are acceptable by the person the ar-
gument is aimed at, we have to use these arguments (at least as our start-
ing points), even if we are not sure whether they are true or false, good or
bad.
Rational arguments or/and rational choice of arguments?
This quote also openly exposes and emphasizes one of the facets of argu-
ments that is too often timidly held in the shade by (some) argumentation
theorists: one of the purposes of argument is to convince, not just to pres-
ent a good, solid, valid ‘evidence’. And in his plea for conviction, Hamblin
even goes a step further, for some argumentation theorists maybe even over
the edge:
43
aimed at—the person for whom the argument is an argument—is
the appropriate basis of a set of criteria. (Hamblin ibid.: 242)
There are no universal arguments or universal criteria for what an ar-
gument should look like to be (seen as) an argument. An argument should
be adopted and/or constructed relative to the (particular) circumstances
and the (particular) audience, as well as to the purposes and intentions we,
as arguers, have. Consequently, there can be no universal fallacies or uni-
versal criteria for what is a fallacy in everyday communication (persuasion
and argumentation).
Arguments and truth-conditions? Whose truth conditions?
(4) Argumentation/persuasion has no necessary link with truth or falsity.
We must distinguish the different possible purposes a practi-
cal argument may have. Let us suppose, first, that A wishes to
convince B of T, and discovers that B already accepts S: A can ar-
gue ‘S, therefore T’ independently of whether S and T are really
true. Judged by B’s standards, this is a good argument and, if A is
arguing with B and has any notion at all of winning, he will have to
start from something B will accept. The same point applies to the
inference-procedure. One of the purposes of argument, whether
we like it or not, is to convince, and our criteria would be less than
adequate if they had nothing to say about how well an argument
may meet this purpose. (Hamblin ibid.: 241)
This is a kind of a corollary to the previous point (point 3): not only
do we have to rely on arguments that are acceptable by the person the ar-
gument is aimed at, we have to use these arguments (at least as our start-
ing points), even if we are not sure whether they are true or false, good or
bad.
Rational arguments or/and rational choice of arguments?
This quote also openly exposes and emphasizes one of the facets of argu-
ments that is too often timidly held in the shade by (some) argumentation
theorists: one of the purposes of argument is to convince, not just to pres-
ent a good, solid, valid ‘evidence’. And in his plea for conviction, Hamblin
even goes a step further, for some argumentation theorists maybe even over
the edge:
43
