Page 42 - Žagar, Igor Ž. 2021. Four Critical Essays on Argumentation. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut.
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four critical essays on argumentation
validity in natural languages, which wouldn’t involve only la langue (lan-
guage) in de Saussure’s conceptualization, but also his la parole (speech,
(everyday) communication)—we need to bring it into relation with a for-
mal language of a formal (logical) system. This ‘bringing into relation’ usu-
ally means: translating the very vast vocabulary (lexicon) of ordinary lan-
guage, with its extremely ramified semantics and pragmatics, into a very
limited vocabulary of logic with its even more limited semantics.
And we can do so, Hamblin argues, ‘only at the expense of features es-
sential to natural language’. (Hamblin ibid.: 213)
Arguments are meant to interpret, not describe ‘reality’
(2) Reference depending on knowledge at the time of utterance.
If the arguments we are discussing are arguments that John Smith
produces within his own head and for his own edification, the
appraisal-criteria will refer exclusively to what is known to John
Smith, in doubt to John Smith, and so on. However, the paradigm
case of an argument is that in which it is produced by one person
to convince another.’ (Hamblin ibid.: 239)
My interpretation of the above passage would be that there is no per-
ennial and universal truth, and consequently, no perennial and univer-
sal truth-conditions or criteria. The truth is relative, but we shouldn’t un-
derstand ‘relative’ as a trivial stereotype that everything changes and
everything can be different. ‘Relative’ should be understood more in its et-
ymological sense (relativus = having reference or relation to; from relatus =
to refer (perf. pass. part.)), as a thing (concept, thought) having a relation to
or being in a relation to another thing (concept, thought). In this particu-
lar relation, the truth is seen as such and such; in some other relation, the
truth may be seen differently.
Arguments and acceptance: the role of the audience
(3) Right or proper things to say in these circumstances, to this audience,
for these purposes and with these intentions.
What good reasons various people may have for accepting various
statements and procedures are, no doubt, themselves sometimes
relevant to the worth of argument erected on them; but, if we are
to draw the line anywhere, acceptance by person the argument is
42
validity in natural languages, which wouldn’t involve only la langue (lan-
guage) in de Saussure’s conceptualization, but also his la parole (speech,
(everyday) communication)—we need to bring it into relation with a for-
mal language of a formal (logical) system. This ‘bringing into relation’ usu-
ally means: translating the very vast vocabulary (lexicon) of ordinary lan-
guage, with its extremely ramified semantics and pragmatics, into a very
limited vocabulary of logic with its even more limited semantics.
And we can do so, Hamblin argues, ‘only at the expense of features es-
sential to natural language’. (Hamblin ibid.: 213)
Arguments are meant to interpret, not describe ‘reality’
(2) Reference depending on knowledge at the time of utterance.
If the arguments we are discussing are arguments that John Smith
produces within his own head and for his own edification, the
appraisal-criteria will refer exclusively to what is known to John
Smith, in doubt to John Smith, and so on. However, the paradigm
case of an argument is that in which it is produced by one person
to convince another.’ (Hamblin ibid.: 239)
My interpretation of the above passage would be that there is no per-
ennial and universal truth, and consequently, no perennial and univer-
sal truth-conditions or criteria. The truth is relative, but we shouldn’t un-
derstand ‘relative’ as a trivial stereotype that everything changes and
everything can be different. ‘Relative’ should be understood more in its et-
ymological sense (relativus = having reference or relation to; from relatus =
to refer (perf. pass. part.)), as a thing (concept, thought) having a relation to
or being in a relation to another thing (concept, thought). In this particu-
lar relation, the truth is seen as such and such; in some other relation, the
truth may be seen differently.
Arguments and acceptance: the role of the audience
(3) Right or proper things to say in these circumstances, to this audience,
for these purposes and with these intentions.
What good reasons various people may have for accepting various
statements and procedures are, no doubt, themselves sometimes
relevant to the worth of argument erected on them; but, if we are
to draw the line anywhere, acceptance by person the argument is
42
