Page 38 - Žagar, Igor Ž. 2021. Four Critical Essays on Argumentation. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut.
P. 38
four critical essays on argumentation
that can be (and should be) either true or false (with no gradation in be-
tween), and only serve to describe the extra-linguistic reality (a division
that implies another opposition between saying and doing in language and
with language).
Speech acts, on the other hand, came about as a result of Austin’s dis-
satisfaction with his own performative/constative distinction, a distinc-
tion that placed on the one side the utterances with which we can do (per-
form) something (and are neither true nor false) and the utterances with
which we can only describe what is already there (and can be either true
or false). After a careful consideration of what could be the criteria of per-
formativity in the first part of his lectures (that later became a book), in
the second part Austin comes to a conclusion that not only performatives
do something (with words), but that every utterance does something (with
words). ‘Something’ implying: not just describing reality. But between the
two poles of the lectures, the performative one and the speech acts one,
there is an important (I’ll call it rhetorical) transitional passage that is usu-
ally overlooked, and I would like to start my humble examination of falla-
cies here, with this passage.
Can we be sure that stating truly is a different class of assessment
from arguing soundly, advising well, judging fairly, and blaming
justifiably? Do these not have something to do in complicated way
with facts? [...] Facts come in as well as our knowledge or opinion
about facts. (Austin 1962/1980: 142)
There are two important epistemological innovations in this paragraph:
(1) Statements (stating truly) are given the same status as all other ut-
terances we may produce;
(2) Facts are given the same status as (our, your, their ...) knowledge of
facts.
And here is Austin’s rationale for this:
[...] consider also for a moment whether the question of truth or
falsity is so very objective. We ask: ‘Is it a fair statement?’, and
are the good reasons and good evidence for stating and saying so
very different from the good reasons and evidence for perform-
ative acts like arguing, warning, and judging? Is the constative,
then, always true or false? When a constative is confronted with
the facts, we in fact appraise it in ways involving the employment
38
that can be (and should be) either true or false (with no gradation in be-
tween), and only serve to describe the extra-linguistic reality (a division
that implies another opposition between saying and doing in language and
with language).
Speech acts, on the other hand, came about as a result of Austin’s dis-
satisfaction with his own performative/constative distinction, a distinc-
tion that placed on the one side the utterances with which we can do (per-
form) something (and are neither true nor false) and the utterances with
which we can only describe what is already there (and can be either true
or false). After a careful consideration of what could be the criteria of per-
formativity in the first part of his lectures (that later became a book), in
the second part Austin comes to a conclusion that not only performatives
do something (with words), but that every utterance does something (with
words). ‘Something’ implying: not just describing reality. But between the
two poles of the lectures, the performative one and the speech acts one,
there is an important (I’ll call it rhetorical) transitional passage that is usu-
ally overlooked, and I would like to start my humble examination of falla-
cies here, with this passage.
Can we be sure that stating truly is a different class of assessment
from arguing soundly, advising well, judging fairly, and blaming
justifiably? Do these not have something to do in complicated way
with facts? [...] Facts come in as well as our knowledge or opinion
about facts. (Austin 1962/1980: 142)
There are two important epistemological innovations in this paragraph:
(1) Statements (stating truly) are given the same status as all other ut-
terances we may produce;
(2) Facts are given the same status as (our, your, their ...) knowledge of
facts.
And here is Austin’s rationale for this:
[...] consider also for a moment whether the question of truth or
falsity is so very objective. We ask: ‘Is it a fair statement?’, and
are the good reasons and good evidence for stating and saying so
very different from the good reasons and evidence for perform-
ative acts like arguing, warning, and judging? Is the constative,
then, always true or false? When a constative is confronted with
the facts, we in fact appraise it in ways involving the employment
38
