Page 45 - Žagar, Igor Ž. 2021. Four Critical Essays on Argumentation. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut.
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fallacies: do we ‘use’ them or ‘commit’ them? ...
Impossibility to avoid fallacies
On the other hand, it seems that certain fallacies are unavoidable, which
raises the question whether they are fallacies at all (and even much more
important ones: how to classify fallacies? Are there any stable criteria for
detecting fallacies? All the way to the obvious one: do fallacies exist at all?).
Port Royal Logic warns:
Finally, we reason sophistically when we draw a general conclu-
sion from an incomplete induction. When from the examination
of many particular instances we conclude to a general statement,
we have made an induction. After the waters of many seas have
been found salty and the waters of many rivers found fresh, we
can conclude that sea water is salty but river water is fresh ... It is
enough to say here that imperfect inductions—that is inductions
based on examination of fewer than all instances—often lead us to
error. (Arnauld and Nicole 1662/1964: 264, in Hamblin ibid.: 46)
While David Hume (1748/1963, in Hamblin ibid.: 29) is quite unam-
biguous: every argument from particular cases to a general rule must be
fallacious.
Are all fallacies fallacious?
Hamblin, 200 years later, opens a new perspective on this problem: if some
fallacies seem to be omnipresent and unavoidable, maybe we shouldn’t
treat them as fallacies: ‘Fallacy of Secundum Quid [hasty generalization] is
an ever-present and unavoidable possibility in practical situations, and any
formal system that avoids it can do so only at the expense of features essen-
tial to natural language.’ (Hamblin ibid.: 213) Ignoratio Elenchi [ignoring
the issue, irrelevant conclusion] is another fallacy of this unavoidable kind.
Hamblin argues:
This category can be stretched to cover virtually every kind of
fallacy. If an arguer argues for a certain conclusion while falsely
believing or suggesting that a different conclusion is established,
one for which the first conclusion is irrelevant, then the arguer
commits the fallacy of irrelevant conclusion. The premises miss
the point. (Hamblin ibid.: 31)
Secundum Quid, for example, could thus be interpreted just as an in-
stance of Ignoratio Elenchi.
45
Impossibility to avoid fallacies
On the other hand, it seems that certain fallacies are unavoidable, which
raises the question whether they are fallacies at all (and even much more
important ones: how to classify fallacies? Are there any stable criteria for
detecting fallacies? All the way to the obvious one: do fallacies exist at all?).
Port Royal Logic warns:
Finally, we reason sophistically when we draw a general conclu-
sion from an incomplete induction. When from the examination
of many particular instances we conclude to a general statement,
we have made an induction. After the waters of many seas have
been found salty and the waters of many rivers found fresh, we
can conclude that sea water is salty but river water is fresh ... It is
enough to say here that imperfect inductions—that is inductions
based on examination of fewer than all instances—often lead us to
error. (Arnauld and Nicole 1662/1964: 264, in Hamblin ibid.: 46)
While David Hume (1748/1963, in Hamblin ibid.: 29) is quite unam-
biguous: every argument from particular cases to a general rule must be
fallacious.
Are all fallacies fallacious?
Hamblin, 200 years later, opens a new perspective on this problem: if some
fallacies seem to be omnipresent and unavoidable, maybe we shouldn’t
treat them as fallacies: ‘Fallacy of Secundum Quid [hasty generalization] is
an ever-present and unavoidable possibility in practical situations, and any
formal system that avoids it can do so only at the expense of features essen-
tial to natural language.’ (Hamblin ibid.: 213) Ignoratio Elenchi [ignoring
the issue, irrelevant conclusion] is another fallacy of this unavoidable kind.
Hamblin argues:
This category can be stretched to cover virtually every kind of
fallacy. If an arguer argues for a certain conclusion while falsely
believing or suggesting that a different conclusion is established,
one for which the first conclusion is irrelevant, then the arguer
commits the fallacy of irrelevant conclusion. The premises miss
the point. (Hamblin ibid.: 31)
Secundum Quid, for example, could thus be interpreted just as an in-
stance of Ignoratio Elenchi.
45
