Page 58 - Darko Štrajn, From Walter Benjamin to the End of Cinema: Identities, Illusion and Signification. Ljubljana: Educational Research Institute, 2017. Digital Library, Dissertationes, 29.
P. 58
from walter benjamin to the end of cinema
cess. Even though Fukuyama sees the problem through his notion of thy-
mos, one may agree with the criticism that points out the relevance of re-
ality, within which the concept of activity should be taken more seriously,
instead of in fact projecting a bridge between the ideal and actuality. What
Hegel, for example, elaborates in the chapter on morality in the Phenome-
nology of Mind, imparts in its philosophical articulation the contours of a
playground of ideology5 related to activity. “The moral consciousness is, as
a simple knowledge and Will of pure duty that has in its simplicity the ob-
ject against itself, related in activity to the reality of the manifold cases, and
so it gains manifold moral relationships” (Hegel, 1970: p. 339)
Speaking of extremism of today and its ideology, we can certainly as-
sume that any kind of discourse of extreme ideology will respond to the
state of affairs in the global society and to its effects in a local environ-
ment. Therefore, it will be addressed to the subjectivity, which is becoming
moulded in the process: not only – sociologically speaking – to all kinds of
threatened layers of a society (such as the unemployed, uneducated, youth,
etc.), but to a larger society envisioned in a scope of separate identity. To
understand this better, we can use terminology introduced by Martin Se-
liger, who may help us to avoid the sophisticated theoretical controversy
concerning the definition of the notion of ideology in general. “/.../to what-
ever degree policies conform to fundamental principles, ‘operative ideolo-
gy’ denotes the argumentation in favour of the policies actually adopted by
a party. It is ‘ideology’ because it devises, explains and justifies action. It is
‘operative’ inasmuch as it is predicated on what is actually done or recom-
mended for immediate action” (Seliger, 1976: p. 175).
Seliger‘s book presents a quite formidable effort to delimit the mean-
ing of the political ideology as well as to elaborate theoretical tools for the
analysis of it. Seliger’s differentiating between fundamental and operative
ideology makes it possible to place the extremism, as it develops within
the ideology in general, in the context of antagonisms, which I attempt-
ed to explain through the controversy between Fukuyama and Derrida.
These antagonisms might not be seen as simply objective situation, which
would represent a clear ideological view, but they are as a rule mediated
through ideologies themselves. The recent political changes, which trans-
5 Since Hegel‘s language is dated, and the category of ideology had not been so apparent
in the realm of philosophy at the time, we may attempt to construct inter-sections
of older and later meanings. At the same time, no matter how narrow or wide our
understanding of the notion of ideology may be, it quite indisputably comprises of
signifiers of morality.
56
cess. Even though Fukuyama sees the problem through his notion of thy-
mos, one may agree with the criticism that points out the relevance of re-
ality, within which the concept of activity should be taken more seriously,
instead of in fact projecting a bridge between the ideal and actuality. What
Hegel, for example, elaborates in the chapter on morality in the Phenome-
nology of Mind, imparts in its philosophical articulation the contours of a
playground of ideology5 related to activity. “The moral consciousness is, as
a simple knowledge and Will of pure duty that has in its simplicity the ob-
ject against itself, related in activity to the reality of the manifold cases, and
so it gains manifold moral relationships” (Hegel, 1970: p. 339)
Speaking of extremism of today and its ideology, we can certainly as-
sume that any kind of discourse of extreme ideology will respond to the
state of affairs in the global society and to its effects in a local environ-
ment. Therefore, it will be addressed to the subjectivity, which is becoming
moulded in the process: not only – sociologically speaking – to all kinds of
threatened layers of a society (such as the unemployed, uneducated, youth,
etc.), but to a larger society envisioned in a scope of separate identity. To
understand this better, we can use terminology introduced by Martin Se-
liger, who may help us to avoid the sophisticated theoretical controversy
concerning the definition of the notion of ideology in general. “/.../to what-
ever degree policies conform to fundamental principles, ‘operative ideolo-
gy’ denotes the argumentation in favour of the policies actually adopted by
a party. It is ‘ideology’ because it devises, explains and justifies action. It is
‘operative’ inasmuch as it is predicated on what is actually done or recom-
mended for immediate action” (Seliger, 1976: p. 175).
Seliger‘s book presents a quite formidable effort to delimit the mean-
ing of the political ideology as well as to elaborate theoretical tools for the
analysis of it. Seliger’s differentiating between fundamental and operative
ideology makes it possible to place the extremism, as it develops within
the ideology in general, in the context of antagonisms, which I attempt-
ed to explain through the controversy between Fukuyama and Derrida.
These antagonisms might not be seen as simply objective situation, which
would represent a clear ideological view, but they are as a rule mediated
through ideologies themselves. The recent political changes, which trans-
5 Since Hegel‘s language is dated, and the category of ideology had not been so apparent
in the realm of philosophy at the time, we may attempt to construct inter-sections
of older and later meanings. At the same time, no matter how narrow or wide our
understanding of the notion of ideology may be, it quite indisputably comprises of
signifiers of morality.
56
