Page 54 - Darko Štrajn, From Walter Benjamin to the End of Cinema: Identities, Illusion and Signification. Ljubljana: Educational Research Institute, 2017. Digital Library, Dissertationes, 29.
P. 54
from walter benjamin to the end of cinema
the “iron law” is self-propelled as it is reinforced by theories such as Gae-
tano Mosca‘s.
Bolshevism and fascism were both very much aware of the paradox-
es of democracy and both took advantage of its weakness – very much ex-
posed in the times after the World War I and the economic crisis – using
the persuasive powers of their ideology. Joseph Stalin clearly explained the
strategy of bolshevism, saying: “When Lenin fought for the victory of bour-
geois revolution and for a democratic republic, he didn’t intend to be stuck
in the democratic phase, and so to limit the wide-spreading of revolution-
ary movement by accomplishing bourgeois democratic goals” (“History”,
1946: 74). As the story goes, Stalin says that what Lenin really had in mind
was the success of socialist revolution brought about by the exploited mass-
es. On the other hand, Nazis justified their upsurge on power in structur-
ally similar terms: “The state is no longer an entity which, be it close to the
party and the movement, or be it a mechanical apparatus is a ruling instru-
ment; rather it is an instrument of the National Socialist Weltanschauung”
(Rosenberg, 1970: p. 191).
A quite visible structural similarity between both types of discourse
should not be disregarded. In both cases democracy is perceived as a wheel
to power and at the same time as an insufficient instrument for the accom-
plishment of goals, set by the respective ideologies: the rule of the prole-
tariat in the first case, and the fulfilment of the German Volk in the other
one. In both cases the ideology representing the “content” – people’s needs
and will – otherwise alienated from the state, serves as a persuasive reason
for the eradication of democracy. As simple as this may seem, it is apparent
that the ideology brought to the extreme enabled both movements to insti-
tutionalise extremism in the shape of the totalitarian state. Both ideologies
– as also Furet pointed out quite frequently in his book – could be classified
as ideologies of the emancipation, apparently aiming at liberation of work-
ing masses, but with differing accents concerning especially the notion of
nationhood. So fascism and bolshevism, each in its own way, remain to be
a historical proof that the extremist ideology stands a chance to acquire
and even keep for a prolonged period the power of the state. Historic facts
prove beyond any doubt that a development of the extreme ideology does
not dwindle after the conquering of power. On the contrary, it actually in-
creases out of proportions.
One may argue that both successes of the extreme ideologies happened
in rather special situations, in the circumstances of weak democracies, or
52
the “iron law” is self-propelled as it is reinforced by theories such as Gae-
tano Mosca‘s.
Bolshevism and fascism were both very much aware of the paradox-
es of democracy and both took advantage of its weakness – very much ex-
posed in the times after the World War I and the economic crisis – using
the persuasive powers of their ideology. Joseph Stalin clearly explained the
strategy of bolshevism, saying: “When Lenin fought for the victory of bour-
geois revolution and for a democratic republic, he didn’t intend to be stuck
in the democratic phase, and so to limit the wide-spreading of revolution-
ary movement by accomplishing bourgeois democratic goals” (“History”,
1946: 74). As the story goes, Stalin says that what Lenin really had in mind
was the success of socialist revolution brought about by the exploited mass-
es. On the other hand, Nazis justified their upsurge on power in structur-
ally similar terms: “The state is no longer an entity which, be it close to the
party and the movement, or be it a mechanical apparatus is a ruling instru-
ment; rather it is an instrument of the National Socialist Weltanschauung”
(Rosenberg, 1970: p. 191).
A quite visible structural similarity between both types of discourse
should not be disregarded. In both cases democracy is perceived as a wheel
to power and at the same time as an insufficient instrument for the accom-
plishment of goals, set by the respective ideologies: the rule of the prole-
tariat in the first case, and the fulfilment of the German Volk in the other
one. In both cases the ideology representing the “content” – people’s needs
and will – otherwise alienated from the state, serves as a persuasive reason
for the eradication of democracy. As simple as this may seem, it is apparent
that the ideology brought to the extreme enabled both movements to insti-
tutionalise extremism in the shape of the totalitarian state. Both ideologies
– as also Furet pointed out quite frequently in his book – could be classified
as ideologies of the emancipation, apparently aiming at liberation of work-
ing masses, but with differing accents concerning especially the notion of
nationhood. So fascism and bolshevism, each in its own way, remain to be
a historical proof that the extremist ideology stands a chance to acquire
and even keep for a prolonged period the power of the state. Historic facts
prove beyond any doubt that a development of the extreme ideology does
not dwindle after the conquering of power. On the contrary, it actually in-
creases out of proportions.
One may argue that both successes of the extreme ideologies happened
in rather special situations, in the circumstances of weak democracies, or
52
