Page 28 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
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What Do We Know about the World?
ment to techniques that can be used to assess the arguments it consid-
ers. This side of formal logic is elaborated and used to analyze, con-
struct, and assess particular instances of argument. In systems of formal
logic they incorporate truth tables and trees as methods for testing valid
inferences, and rules of inference (modus ponens, the “Rule of Necessi-
tation”, etc.) which allow the step by step construction of proofs which
lead from given premises to conclusions that follow from them. The de-
velopment of formal systems has given rise to sophisticated accounts of
argument which play a practical role in computing and computation-
al modeling.
“Informal” logic is an offshoot of classical logic that has focused on
the informal arguments that characterize day to day contexts (in social
and political controversy, personal exchange, public discourse, news cov-
erage, advocacy and advertising, and so on). Because judgments of truth
and falsity may be difficult to make in such contexts, it may assess prem-
ises in terms of their plausibility, probability, or “acceptability.” The lat-
ter leaves open the possibility of truth understood as one kind of ac-
ceptability but introduces the possibility of others. In judging the me-
chanics of argument, one might compare formal logic’s rules of infer-
ence to informal logic’s attempt to identify and elaborate different kinds
of argument schemes (argument by authority, causal generalizations, ar-
guments by analogy, etc.) which infer particular kinds of conclusions
from premises that answer “critical questions” in each case. An alterna-
tive method of judging arguments is fallacy theory, which diagnoses the
problems with weak arguments by identifying common mistakes that
they commit. Traditional lists of fallacies include problems with deduc-
tive reasoning (e.g., affirming the consequent), issues with premises (as
in false dilemma and begging the question) and weak inferences (e.g., ad
populum, ad baculum, and ad misercordiam).
In the present context, it is notable that informal logic is an attempt
to create a thicker theory of argument than that which characteriz-
es classical logic. In its attempt to encompass a broader range of argu-
ment, it proposes more broadly applicable accounts of premise accepta-
bility and valid (and invalid) inference. In the process, it provides a gen-
eral theory of argument that can be applied to everyday arguments that
are not easily analyzed or assessed using formal logic’s classical account
of argument. This expands the scope of logic, but informal logic (at least
as it was initially conceived) still has shortcomings when it is proposed
as a thick theory. To better understand these limits and how they can be
ment to techniques that can be used to assess the arguments it consid-
ers. This side of formal logic is elaborated and used to analyze, con-
struct, and assess particular instances of argument. In systems of formal
logic they incorporate truth tables and trees as methods for testing valid
inferences, and rules of inference (modus ponens, the “Rule of Necessi-
tation”, etc.) which allow the step by step construction of proofs which
lead from given premises to conclusions that follow from them. The de-
velopment of formal systems has given rise to sophisticated accounts of
argument which play a practical role in computing and computation-
al modeling.
“Informal” logic is an offshoot of classical logic that has focused on
the informal arguments that characterize day to day contexts (in social
and political controversy, personal exchange, public discourse, news cov-
erage, advocacy and advertising, and so on). Because judgments of truth
and falsity may be difficult to make in such contexts, it may assess prem-
ises in terms of their plausibility, probability, or “acceptability.” The lat-
ter leaves open the possibility of truth understood as one kind of ac-
ceptability but introduces the possibility of others. In judging the me-
chanics of argument, one might compare formal logic’s rules of infer-
ence to informal logic’s attempt to identify and elaborate different kinds
of argument schemes (argument by authority, causal generalizations, ar-
guments by analogy, etc.) which infer particular kinds of conclusions
from premises that answer “critical questions” in each case. An alterna-
tive method of judging arguments is fallacy theory, which diagnoses the
problems with weak arguments by identifying common mistakes that
they commit. Traditional lists of fallacies include problems with deduc-
tive reasoning (e.g., affirming the consequent), issues with premises (as
in false dilemma and begging the question) and weak inferences (e.g., ad
populum, ad baculum, and ad misercordiam).
In the present context, it is notable that informal logic is an attempt
to create a thicker theory of argument than that which characteriz-
es classical logic. In its attempt to encompass a broader range of argu-
ment, it proposes more broadly applicable accounts of premise accepta-
bility and valid (and invalid) inference. In the process, it provides a gen-
eral theory of argument that can be applied to everyday arguments that
are not easily analyzed or assessed using formal logic’s classical account
of argument. This expands the scope of logic, but informal logic (at least
as it was initially conceived) still has shortcomings when it is proposed
as a thick theory. To better understand these limits and how they can be
