Page 302 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
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What Do We Know about the World?
2. Historic Roots of Imitatio in Rhetorical Pedagogy
2.1. The Ancient Theoretical Pedigree
Sophistic rhetoric identifies imitation as a necessary factor of the de-
velopment of successful orators. Besides, sophists are considered the first
imitators of oral rhapsodies (Schiappa, 1999: 6).
As regards Plato and Aristotle, they both accept the contribution of
imitation to learning even if they don’t perceive it as an emulating prac-
tice (Corbett, 1971: 243). For Plato, the positive or negative evaluation
of imitation depends on its role in the acquisition of the ideal truth. Fi-
nally, he approves its use as a medium capable of educating the Republic’s
future, ideal citizens (Plato, 1937; Tate, 1932: 161).
In Phaedrus Socrates presents an analogous bilateral attitude to-
wards it. On the one hand, he applies the art of imitation by offer-
ing a more accurate version of Lysias’ speech and he accepts, explicit-
ly, the existence of ideal models of orators. On the other hand, he ad-
vises Phaedrus not to imitate entirely a speech which contains bad ex-
amples of what he considers as true rhetoric (Plato, 1993, 278b 4–5: 201,
264e 5–7).
As with Aristotle, he recognizes that through imitation, as an in-
herent impulse, “a kind’ of learning is realized (μανθάνειν τί συμβαίνει/
manthanein ti symvainei), accompanied with a certain feeling of pleas-
ure which derives from the syllogism that the object of imitation is
identified with the prototype (Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, x–xi, 1371b: 176).
McKeon holds the opinion that Aristotle doesn’t invoke the imitation
of prior orators (1936: 27) despite Aristotle’s lessons about arguments
from example and about exemplar heros – both as models praiseworthy
to be imitated.
The history of the vigorous support of imitation as a method of ac-
quiring rhetorical excellence has begun. It is accepted that Isocrates
first highlighted its guaranteed role in the successful practice of philos-
ophy. In his Against the Sophists, he attributes to the teacher – conse-
quently to himself – the obligation to function as a model for his stu-
dents in order to help them “appear more florid and graceful” (Cagarin,
2000: 65). Also, in the theoretical framework of Isocrates’ paideia, imi-
tation should be practiced, equally, at three levels; at the level of action,
of thought and of speech (Haskins, 2000: 18, 22). It is due to imitative
exercises of various kinds of discourse that Isocrates inserted imitation
in the field of writing because of its close relation to exercitatio (practice)
(Fleming, 2003: 109; Kinneavy, 1984: 74).
2. Historic Roots of Imitatio in Rhetorical Pedagogy
2.1. The Ancient Theoretical Pedigree
Sophistic rhetoric identifies imitation as a necessary factor of the de-
velopment of successful orators. Besides, sophists are considered the first
imitators of oral rhapsodies (Schiappa, 1999: 6).
As regards Plato and Aristotle, they both accept the contribution of
imitation to learning even if they don’t perceive it as an emulating prac-
tice (Corbett, 1971: 243). For Plato, the positive or negative evaluation
of imitation depends on its role in the acquisition of the ideal truth. Fi-
nally, he approves its use as a medium capable of educating the Republic’s
future, ideal citizens (Plato, 1937; Tate, 1932: 161).
In Phaedrus Socrates presents an analogous bilateral attitude to-
wards it. On the one hand, he applies the art of imitation by offer-
ing a more accurate version of Lysias’ speech and he accepts, explicit-
ly, the existence of ideal models of orators. On the other hand, he ad-
vises Phaedrus not to imitate entirely a speech which contains bad ex-
amples of what he considers as true rhetoric (Plato, 1993, 278b 4–5: 201,
264e 5–7).
As with Aristotle, he recognizes that through imitation, as an in-
herent impulse, “a kind’ of learning is realized (μανθάνειν τί συμβαίνει/
manthanein ti symvainei), accompanied with a certain feeling of pleas-
ure which derives from the syllogism that the object of imitation is
identified with the prototype (Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, x–xi, 1371b: 176).
McKeon holds the opinion that Aristotle doesn’t invoke the imitation
of prior orators (1936: 27) despite Aristotle’s lessons about arguments
from example and about exemplar heros – both as models praiseworthy
to be imitated.
The history of the vigorous support of imitation as a method of ac-
quiring rhetorical excellence has begun. It is accepted that Isocrates
first highlighted its guaranteed role in the successful practice of philos-
ophy. In his Against the Sophists, he attributes to the teacher – conse-
quently to himself – the obligation to function as a model for his stu-
dents in order to help them “appear more florid and graceful” (Cagarin,
2000: 65). Also, in the theoretical framework of Isocrates’ paideia, imi-
tation should be practiced, equally, at three levels; at the level of action,
of thought and of speech (Haskins, 2000: 18, 22). It is due to imitative
exercises of various kinds of discourse that Isocrates inserted imitation
in the field of writing because of its close relation to exercitatio (practice)
(Fleming, 2003: 109; Kinneavy, 1984: 74).
