Page 26 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
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What Do We Know about the World?
and “assisted” reasoning; and in historical studies of the theories of ar-
gument that characterize different thinkers, times and places.
I propose a view of these developments that understands them as
steps toward a general (“umbrella”) theory of argument that can be used
to analyze, assess and explain arguments as they occur in a broad range
of contexts. I describe the theory as a “thick theory of argument.” Its
goals might be contrasted with the goals of many thin theories that have
a narrower scope and focus. The latter may provide a detailed account of
one kind of argument: say arguments by analogy or the sorites argument.
In other cases, they attempt to explain some specific aspect of argument
(e.g., the role that questions or quantifiers play in argument) or the argu-
ments that occur within a specific kind of context (as instances of “nego-
tiation dialogue,” for example, or a specific variant of such dialogue like
family mediation).
Like its physical counterpart, theoretical thickness and thinness is a
matter of degree. A theory of ad hominem argument is thicker than an
account of guilt by association arguments, which can be understood as a
subspecies of ad hominem, but thinner than a comprehensive account of
fallacies. A theory of argument schemes and their role in argument anal-
ysis is thicker than a theory of causal or deductive schemes, but thin-
ner than a theory which features schemes as one of a series of conceptu-
al tools (fallacies, dialogical considerations, etc.) proposed for argument
analysis. My interest is the construction of a theory that is thick enough
to be the basis of argument analysis and assessment in as broad a range
of contexts as possible. I shall present a way of accomplishing such a the-
ory which proceeds by broadening and enriching (by “thickening”) tra-
ditional and contemporary accounts of argument.
In sketching a thick theory, I do not mean to diminish the signifi-
cance of thinner theories. One misunderstands the thick/thin distinc-
tion if one understands it as a distinction between better and worse ac-
counts of argument. If we imagine argumentation as one kind of com-
munication, then we can think of a thick theory as a general account of
such communication. While it attempts to provide a unifying account
of all arguments that can explain their elements and how they work, it
cannot encompass a detailed account of every aspect of every kind of ar-
gument. When analyzing an argument in law, parliamentary debate or
physics, this may mean that one needs to supplement a thick theory with
a thinner one that elaborates its general principles in this specific con-
text. To the extent that it is possible, a fully complete account of argu-
and “assisted” reasoning; and in historical studies of the theories of ar-
gument that characterize different thinkers, times and places.
I propose a view of these developments that understands them as
steps toward a general (“umbrella”) theory of argument that can be used
to analyze, assess and explain arguments as they occur in a broad range
of contexts. I describe the theory as a “thick theory of argument.” Its
goals might be contrasted with the goals of many thin theories that have
a narrower scope and focus. The latter may provide a detailed account of
one kind of argument: say arguments by analogy or the sorites argument.
In other cases, they attempt to explain some specific aspect of argument
(e.g., the role that questions or quantifiers play in argument) or the argu-
ments that occur within a specific kind of context (as instances of “nego-
tiation dialogue,” for example, or a specific variant of such dialogue like
family mediation).
Like its physical counterpart, theoretical thickness and thinness is a
matter of degree. A theory of ad hominem argument is thicker than an
account of guilt by association arguments, which can be understood as a
subspecies of ad hominem, but thinner than a comprehensive account of
fallacies. A theory of argument schemes and their role in argument anal-
ysis is thicker than a theory of causal or deductive schemes, but thin-
ner than a theory which features schemes as one of a series of conceptu-
al tools (fallacies, dialogical considerations, etc.) proposed for argument
analysis. My interest is the construction of a theory that is thick enough
to be the basis of argument analysis and assessment in as broad a range
of contexts as possible. I shall present a way of accomplishing such a the-
ory which proceeds by broadening and enriching (by “thickening”) tra-
ditional and contemporary accounts of argument.
In sketching a thick theory, I do not mean to diminish the signifi-
cance of thinner theories. One misunderstands the thick/thin distinc-
tion if one understands it as a distinction between better and worse ac-
counts of argument. If we imagine argumentation as one kind of com-
munication, then we can think of a thick theory as a general account of
such communication. While it attempts to provide a unifying account
of all arguments that can explain their elements and how they work, it
cannot encompass a detailed account of every aspect of every kind of ar-
gument. When analyzing an argument in law, parliamentary debate or
physics, this may mean that one needs to supplement a thick theory with
a thinner one that elaborates its general principles in this specific con-
text. To the extent that it is possible, a fully complete account of argu-
