Page 27 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 27
the elements of argument: six steps to a thick theory 27
ment analysis and evaluation would have to combine a thick theory with
thin theories that provide a more detailed account of the kinds (and as-
pects) of argument it identifies.
In this essay, my interest is a thick theory. To that end, I propose six
steps that culminate in such a theory. I think the time is ripe for such de-
velopment, primarily because of the emergence of “argumentation the-
ory,” a contemporary amalgam of disciplines that aims to better under-
stand argument as it naturally occurs in a great variety of contexts. I
shall argue that the standard approaches to argument that characterize
different branches of argumentation theory successfully illuminate key
components of argument, but fall short when they are proposed as a gen-
eral account of argument. I will try to thicken them by weaving together
some of the disparate and contrary threads that they contain. In sketch-
ing six steps to a thick theory I aim to push the development of argumen-
tation theory in this direction.
2. Step One: Beginning with Logic
One could root a thick theory in the approaches to argument that
characterize logic, rhetoric or dialectics. I begin with classical logic’s
account of argument for autobiographical reasons – because my own
interest in argument is rooted in philosophy and logic. Logic under-
stands an argument as a set of propositions (a set of claims about what
is true) which contains a proposition which is proposed as a conclu-
sion and others which function as premises that offer evidence in sup-
port of it. A standard (if hackneyed) example is the Barbara syllogism:
“All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. So Socrates is mortal.” Tradi-
tionally, a good argument is understood as a “sound” argument which
has true premises and a conclusion that necessarily (deductively) fol-
lows from them.
Aristotle offers an account of demonstration along these lines in
his Prior Analytics, where he defines a syllogism, the basis of demonstra-
tion, as a “discourse (logos) in which, certain things being stated, some-
thing other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so.”
(2000a, 1.2). Here each of the “certain things being stated” is a premise
(protasis) of the argument, and the “something other than what is stat-
ed” which “follows of necessity” is its conclusion (sumperasma).
Logic’s premise/conclusion account of argument is a common one
that has been featured in thousands of introductions to logic and phi-
losophy. One of its strengths is its normative dimension – its commit-
ment analysis and evaluation would have to combine a thick theory with
thin theories that provide a more detailed account of the kinds (and as-
pects) of argument it identifies.
In this essay, my interest is a thick theory. To that end, I propose six
steps that culminate in such a theory. I think the time is ripe for such de-
velopment, primarily because of the emergence of “argumentation the-
ory,” a contemporary amalgam of disciplines that aims to better under-
stand argument as it naturally occurs in a great variety of contexts. I
shall argue that the standard approaches to argument that characterize
different branches of argumentation theory successfully illuminate key
components of argument, but fall short when they are proposed as a gen-
eral account of argument. I will try to thicken them by weaving together
some of the disparate and contrary threads that they contain. In sketch-
ing six steps to a thick theory I aim to push the development of argumen-
tation theory in this direction.
2. Step One: Beginning with Logic
One could root a thick theory in the approaches to argument that
characterize logic, rhetoric or dialectics. I begin with classical logic’s
account of argument for autobiographical reasons – because my own
interest in argument is rooted in philosophy and logic. Logic under-
stands an argument as a set of propositions (a set of claims about what
is true) which contains a proposition which is proposed as a conclu-
sion and others which function as premises that offer evidence in sup-
port of it. A standard (if hackneyed) example is the Barbara syllogism:
“All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. So Socrates is mortal.” Tradi-
tionally, a good argument is understood as a “sound” argument which
has true premises and a conclusion that necessarily (deductively) fol-
lows from them.
Aristotle offers an account of demonstration along these lines in
his Prior Analytics, where he defines a syllogism, the basis of demonstra-
tion, as a “discourse (logos) in which, certain things being stated, some-
thing other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so.”
(2000a, 1.2). Here each of the “certain things being stated” is a premise
(protasis) of the argument, and the “something other than what is stat-
ed” which “follows of necessity” is its conclusion (sumperasma).
Logic’s premise/conclusion account of argument is a common one
that has been featured in thousands of introductions to logic and phi-
losophy. One of its strengths is its normative dimension – its commit-
