Page 136 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 136
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 5–6
dilemma: how very seriously should online flirting with fascism be tak-
en and considered to represent radical hate speech, while avoiding hasty
generalizations? The textual evidence is unequivocal: social networks in
Slovenia were flooded by markedly homogenous hate speech of intoler-
ance, hatred, xenophobia and islamophobia after the outbreak of the ref-
ugee crisis, in particular after August 2015, which was continuously made
legitimate by Slovenian politicians and their parties. At the same time, a
large part of the mass media leaning towards or even financed by those
same political parties saw a new political and marketing niche for self-pro-
motion in the dissemination of fear, racism, intolerance and a negative at-
titude towards the refugees. In its most extreme form, the discourse occa-
sionally resorted to direct approval of the worst crimes against humanity
that were committed by fascist forces during WWII, including a fascina-
tion with Hitler, the Third Reich, and concentration camps as a freshly-
discovered historical “solution” to the refugee problem. There can be no
other explanation for the numerous calls for the Furner’s intervention,
and the seeming disposition towards concentration camps and the use of
gas chambers.
Is the fascination with Hitler on social networks, then, a de facto
manifestation of oncoming fascism in Europe; and how to epistemolog-
ically explain it without arriving at (erroneous) conclusions? Can the en-
thusiasm over former fascist leaders alone constitute fascism; or, are refer-
ences to Hitler to be taken at some other plane? Stanley (2018: pp. 9–10)
lists common traits shared by fascist politicians as follows: a) emphasis on
a common sense of history through the creation of a mythic past; b) re-
writing the people’s understanding of reality through the establishment
of the language of ideals, achieved in turn through propaganda and pro-
moting anti-intellectualism; c) attacking universities and educational sys-
tems, when these challenge their ideas; d) creating a state of »unreality«
through conspiracy theories and fake news replacing reasoned debate; e)
the introduction of dangerous and false beliefs replacing the established
understanding of reality; f) the naturalization of group differences, es-
tablished through a seemingly natural and scientifically supported hier-
archy of values; g) the solidification of social differences by using fear; h) a
feeling of victimhood, developed in the dominant population every time
progress of a minority group is detected; i) the appeal of the law and order
policy, casting »us« as law-abiding citizens and »them« as criminals rep-
resenting an existential threat to the nation; j) sexual anxiety that threat-
ens the patriarchal hierarchy by growing gender equality.
It is impossible to deny that the evocations of Hitler and the Third
Reich represent a form of promotion of fascism. Three public discourses on
134
dilemma: how very seriously should online flirting with fascism be tak-
en and considered to represent radical hate speech, while avoiding hasty
generalizations? The textual evidence is unequivocal: social networks in
Slovenia were flooded by markedly homogenous hate speech of intoler-
ance, hatred, xenophobia and islamophobia after the outbreak of the ref-
ugee crisis, in particular after August 2015, which was continuously made
legitimate by Slovenian politicians and their parties. At the same time, a
large part of the mass media leaning towards or even financed by those
same political parties saw a new political and marketing niche for self-pro-
motion in the dissemination of fear, racism, intolerance and a negative at-
titude towards the refugees. In its most extreme form, the discourse occa-
sionally resorted to direct approval of the worst crimes against humanity
that were committed by fascist forces during WWII, including a fascina-
tion with Hitler, the Third Reich, and concentration camps as a freshly-
discovered historical “solution” to the refugee problem. There can be no
other explanation for the numerous calls for the Furner’s intervention,
and the seeming disposition towards concentration camps and the use of
gas chambers.
Is the fascination with Hitler on social networks, then, a de facto
manifestation of oncoming fascism in Europe; and how to epistemolog-
ically explain it without arriving at (erroneous) conclusions? Can the en-
thusiasm over former fascist leaders alone constitute fascism; or, are refer-
ences to Hitler to be taken at some other plane? Stanley (2018: pp. 9–10)
lists common traits shared by fascist politicians as follows: a) emphasis on
a common sense of history through the creation of a mythic past; b) re-
writing the people’s understanding of reality through the establishment
of the language of ideals, achieved in turn through propaganda and pro-
moting anti-intellectualism; c) attacking universities and educational sys-
tems, when these challenge their ideas; d) creating a state of »unreality«
through conspiracy theories and fake news replacing reasoned debate; e)
the introduction of dangerous and false beliefs replacing the established
understanding of reality; f) the naturalization of group differences, es-
tablished through a seemingly natural and scientifically supported hier-
archy of values; g) the solidification of social differences by using fear; h) a
feeling of victimhood, developed in the dominant population every time
progress of a minority group is detected; i) the appeal of the law and order
policy, casting »us« as law-abiding citizens and »them« as criminals rep-
resenting an existential threat to the nation; j) sexual anxiety that threat-
ens the patriarchal hierarchy by growing gender equality.
It is impossible to deny that the evocations of Hitler and the Third
Reich represent a form of promotion of fascism. Three public discourses on
134
