Page 137 - Žagar, Igor Ž. 2021. Four Critical Essays on Argumentation. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut.
P. 137
summary
And begging the question [Petitio Principii, circular reasoning] fits in
the same category; already J.S. Mill (in his System of Logic, 1843) claims that
all valid reasoning commits this fallacy. While Cohen and Nagel’s affirm:
There is a sense in which all science is circular, for all proof rests
upon assumptions which are not derived from others but are jus-
tified by the set of consequences which are deduced from them
... But there is a difference between a circle consisting of a small
number of propositions, from which we can escape by denying
them all, or setting up their contradictories, and the circle of the-
oretical science and human observation, which is so wide that
we cannot set up any alternative to it. (Cohen, Nagel 1934: 379, in
Hamblin ibid.: 35)
A possible conclusion we could draw from this observation: on the mi-
cro level, we can fuss about small things, everyday conversation and every-
day reasoning, and pass our time in inventing numerous fallacies, but when
it comes to the macro level, to big things (the big picture), fallacies are not
objectionable any more—because there is no alternative.
All these epistemological and methodological objections, ambiguities
and caveats on one side, as well as the practical, empirical multiplications
of fallacies and their overlapping on the other, make the study of fallacies a
thriving enterprise, a field of its own and in its own right. But, can we use
fallacies or even a ‘theory of fallacies’ (singular) as an analytical tool (as one
of the analytical tools) in another theoretical enterprise, within another
theory, like DHA is doing it?
Here is the passage that introduces fallacies in Discourse and
Discrimination:
If one wants to analyse the persuasive, manipulative, discur-
sive legitimation of racist, ethnicist, nationalist, sexist and oth-
er forms of discrimination and the pseudo-argumentative back-
ing and strengthening of negative, discriminatory prejudices, one
encounters many violations of these ten rules. In rhetoric and ar-
gumentation theory, these violations are called ‘fallacies’ (among
many others see Kienpointner 1996; van Eemeren, Grootendorst,
Kruiger 1987: 78–94; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992;
Lamham 1991: 77ff.; Ulrich 1992). (Reisigl, Wodak 2001: 71)
137
And begging the question [Petitio Principii, circular reasoning] fits in
the same category; already J.S. Mill (in his System of Logic, 1843) claims that
all valid reasoning commits this fallacy. While Cohen and Nagel’s affirm:
There is a sense in which all science is circular, for all proof rests
upon assumptions which are not derived from others but are jus-
tified by the set of consequences which are deduced from them
... But there is a difference between a circle consisting of a small
number of propositions, from which we can escape by denying
them all, or setting up their contradictories, and the circle of the-
oretical science and human observation, which is so wide that
we cannot set up any alternative to it. (Cohen, Nagel 1934: 379, in
Hamblin ibid.: 35)
A possible conclusion we could draw from this observation: on the mi-
cro level, we can fuss about small things, everyday conversation and every-
day reasoning, and pass our time in inventing numerous fallacies, but when
it comes to the macro level, to big things (the big picture), fallacies are not
objectionable any more—because there is no alternative.
All these epistemological and methodological objections, ambiguities
and caveats on one side, as well as the practical, empirical multiplications
of fallacies and their overlapping on the other, make the study of fallacies a
thriving enterprise, a field of its own and in its own right. But, can we use
fallacies or even a ‘theory of fallacies’ (singular) as an analytical tool (as one
of the analytical tools) in another theoretical enterprise, within another
theory, like DHA is doing it?
Here is the passage that introduces fallacies in Discourse and
Discrimination:
If one wants to analyse the persuasive, manipulative, discur-
sive legitimation of racist, ethnicist, nationalist, sexist and oth-
er forms of discrimination and the pseudo-argumentative back-
ing and strengthening of negative, discriminatory prejudices, one
encounters many violations of these ten rules. In rhetoric and ar-
gumentation theory, these violations are called ‘fallacies’ (among
many others see Kienpointner 1996; van Eemeren, Grootendorst,
Kruiger 1987: 78–94; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992;
Lamham 1991: 77ff.; Ulrich 1992). (Reisigl, Wodak 2001: 71)
137
