Page 136 - Žagar, Igor Ž. 2021. Four Critical Essays on Argumentation. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut.
P. 136
four critical essays on argumentation
understood more in its etymological sense (relativus = having reference or
relation to, from relatus = to refer), as a thing (concept, thought) having a
relation to or being in a relation to another thing (concept, thought). In this
particular relation, the truth is seen as such and such; in some other rela-
tion, the truth may be seen differently.
There are therefore no universal arguments or universal criteria for
what an argument should look like to be (seen as) an argument. An argu-
ment should be adopted and/or constructed relative to the (particular) cir-
cumstances and the (particular) audience, as well as to the purposes and
intentions we, as arguers, have. Consequently, there can be no universal fal-
lacies or universal criteria for what is a fallacy in everyday communication
(persuasion and argumentation).
In this light, Hamblin’s claim from the beginning of his book that
there has never yet been a book on fallacies becomes more understanda-
ble: Arthur Schopenhauer’s Art of Controversy is, in his opinion, too short,
Jeremy Bentham’s Book of Fallacies is too specialized, the medieval trea-
tises are mostly commentaries on Aristotle, and Aristotle’s Sophistical
Refutations are, in Hamblin’s view, ‘just the ninth book of his Topics’
(Hamblin ibid.: 11).
So, the state of the art would be that nobody is particularly satisfied
with this corner of logic, concludes Hamblin.
And, there may be a reason for that. Even if in almost every account
from Aristotle onwards we can read that a fallacious argument is one that
seems to be valid, but it is not, it is rather often argued that it is impossible
to classify fallacies at all.
On the other hand, it seems that certain fallacies are unavoidable,
which raises the question whether they are fallacies at all (and even much
more important ones: How to classify fallacies? Are there any stable crite-
ria for detecting fallacies? All the way to the obvious one: do fallacies ex-
ist at all?).
Hamblin, 200 years later, opens a new perspective on this problem: if
some fallacies seem to be omnipresent and unavoidable, maybe we shouldn’t
treat them as fallacies: ‘Fallacy of Secundum Quid [hasty generalization] is
an ever-present and unavoidable possibility in practical situations, and any
formal system that avoids it can do so only at the expense of features essen-
tial to natural language.’ (Hamblin ibid.: 213) Ignoratio Elenchi [ignoring
the issue, irrelevant conclusion] is another fallacy of this unavoidable kind.
136
understood more in its etymological sense (relativus = having reference or
relation to, from relatus = to refer), as a thing (concept, thought) having a
relation to or being in a relation to another thing (concept, thought). In this
particular relation, the truth is seen as such and such; in some other rela-
tion, the truth may be seen differently.
There are therefore no universal arguments or universal criteria for
what an argument should look like to be (seen as) an argument. An argu-
ment should be adopted and/or constructed relative to the (particular) cir-
cumstances and the (particular) audience, as well as to the purposes and
intentions we, as arguers, have. Consequently, there can be no universal fal-
lacies or universal criteria for what is a fallacy in everyday communication
(persuasion and argumentation).
In this light, Hamblin’s claim from the beginning of his book that
there has never yet been a book on fallacies becomes more understanda-
ble: Arthur Schopenhauer’s Art of Controversy is, in his opinion, too short,
Jeremy Bentham’s Book of Fallacies is too specialized, the medieval trea-
tises are mostly commentaries on Aristotle, and Aristotle’s Sophistical
Refutations are, in Hamblin’s view, ‘just the ninth book of his Topics’
(Hamblin ibid.: 11).
So, the state of the art would be that nobody is particularly satisfied
with this corner of logic, concludes Hamblin.
And, there may be a reason for that. Even if in almost every account
from Aristotle onwards we can read that a fallacious argument is one that
seems to be valid, but it is not, it is rather often argued that it is impossible
to classify fallacies at all.
On the other hand, it seems that certain fallacies are unavoidable,
which raises the question whether they are fallacies at all (and even much
more important ones: How to classify fallacies? Are there any stable crite-
ria for detecting fallacies? All the way to the obvious one: do fallacies ex-
ist at all?).
Hamblin, 200 years later, opens a new perspective on this problem: if
some fallacies seem to be omnipresent and unavoidable, maybe we shouldn’t
treat them as fallacies: ‘Fallacy of Secundum Quid [hasty generalization] is
an ever-present and unavoidable possibility in practical situations, and any
formal system that avoids it can do so only at the expense of features essen-
tial to natural language.’ (Hamblin ibid.: 213) Ignoratio Elenchi [ignoring
the issue, irrelevant conclusion] is another fallacy of this unavoidable kind.
136
