Page 134 - Žagar, Igor Ž. 2021. Four Critical Essays on Argumentation. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut.
P. 134
four critical essays on argumentation
and live (in) fallacies? And, is it methodologically acceptable to use prefab-
ricated lists of fallacies (constructed by DHA) as an analytical tool in such
a dynamical enterprise as (critical) discourse analysis?
J. L. Austin is usually considered to be the ‘father’ of speech act the-
ory, and the ‘inventor’ of performativity. In a very general framework this
is both true, but historically and epistemologically speaking there is a nar-
row and intricate correlation, as well as a deep rupture between the two
theories.
Performativity came about as a result of Austin’s deep dissatisfaction
with classical philosophical (logical) division between statements/utter-
ances that can be (and should be) either true or false (with no gradation in
between), and only serve to describe the extra-linguistic reality.
Speech acts, on the other hand, came about as a result of Austin’s dis-
satisfaction with his own performative/constative distinction, a distinction
that placed on the one side the utterances with which we can do (perform)
something (and are neither true nor false), and the utterances with which
we can only describe what is already there (and can be either true or false).
After a careful consideration of what could be the criteria of performativity
in the first part of his lectures, in the second part Austin comes to a conclu-
sion that not only performatives do something (with words), but that every
utterance does something (with words). ‘Something’ implying: not just de-
scribing reality. But between the two poles of the lectures, the performative
one and the speech acts one, there is an important (I call it rhetorical) tran-
sitional passage that is usually overlooked, and in my examination of falla-
cies, I concentrate on this passage.
For Austin, in this passage, truth and falsity don’t have objective cri-
teria, but depend on ‘good reasons and good evidence’ we have for stating
something. And Austin’s conclusion concurs with Hamblin’s: it is easy to
say what is true or false in logic, it is much more complicated and less evi-
dent in everyday life and in everyday language use.
Statements/utterances cannot just be either true or false, there is (or at
least should be) a gradation between what is false and what is true, between
0 and 1. What we say can be more or less true, true up to a (certain) point,
or more precisely: true for certain intents and purposes.
What we say can therefore not only be more or less true, true up to a
point, or true for certain intents and purposes, it can also be true only in
some contexts, but not in others.
If we sum up all Austin’s hedgings, we get the following:
134
and live (in) fallacies? And, is it methodologically acceptable to use prefab-
ricated lists of fallacies (constructed by DHA) as an analytical tool in such
a dynamical enterprise as (critical) discourse analysis?
J. L. Austin is usually considered to be the ‘father’ of speech act the-
ory, and the ‘inventor’ of performativity. In a very general framework this
is both true, but historically and epistemologically speaking there is a nar-
row and intricate correlation, as well as a deep rupture between the two
theories.
Performativity came about as a result of Austin’s deep dissatisfaction
with classical philosophical (logical) division between statements/utter-
ances that can be (and should be) either true or false (with no gradation in
between), and only serve to describe the extra-linguistic reality.
Speech acts, on the other hand, came about as a result of Austin’s dis-
satisfaction with his own performative/constative distinction, a distinction
that placed on the one side the utterances with which we can do (perform)
something (and are neither true nor false), and the utterances with which
we can only describe what is already there (and can be either true or false).
After a careful consideration of what could be the criteria of performativity
in the first part of his lectures, in the second part Austin comes to a conclu-
sion that not only performatives do something (with words), but that every
utterance does something (with words). ‘Something’ implying: not just de-
scribing reality. But between the two poles of the lectures, the performative
one and the speech acts one, there is an important (I call it rhetorical) tran-
sitional passage that is usually overlooked, and in my examination of falla-
cies, I concentrate on this passage.
For Austin, in this passage, truth and falsity don’t have objective cri-
teria, but depend on ‘good reasons and good evidence’ we have for stating
something. And Austin’s conclusion concurs with Hamblin’s: it is easy to
say what is true or false in logic, it is much more complicated and less evi-
dent in everyday life and in everyday language use.
Statements/utterances cannot just be either true or false, there is (or at
least should be) a gradation between what is false and what is true, between
0 and 1. What we say can be more or less true, true up to a (certain) point,
or more precisely: true for certain intents and purposes.
What we say can therefore not only be more or less true, true up to a
point, or true for certain intents and purposes, it can also be true only in
some contexts, but not in others.
If we sum up all Austin’s hedgings, we get the following:
134
