Page 290 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 290
What Do We Know about the World?
not mean that the debate is or should be performed as an eristic dialogue,
as Walton seems to suggest (1994; 2008). Instead, in competitive debate
the judge is in a position to reward effective argumentative techniques
and to discourage the use of poor arguments (Ulrich, 1986a). In addi-
tion, the purposes often cited as overall goals of judging are to promote
the educational aspects of academic debate, to promote fairness in the
activity and to establish a favourable atmosphere for quality competition
in debates (ibidem: 2). The achievement of these goals cannot be com-
pared with allowing poor or fallacious arguments to flourish. Moreo-
ver, even if a debate team could win a match using fallacious arguments,
reaching an agreement in a critical discussion type of dialogue does not
avoid the same critique. It is always possible that, in a critical discussion,
an agreement or persuasion is reached based on fallacious arguments if
parties do not recognize such arguments as fallacious. Nonetheless, crit-
ical discussions are not considered eristic.
The last mistake emphasized seems to imply another conceptual
confusion: debate format’s theoretical implications are often confused
with educational impact. Andrews (1995) and Tumposky (2004) sug-
gest that considering the dialectic structure of debate a simplification
seems to imply that debaters simplify issues. However, this is a mis-
take. As we have seen before, debaters understand issues better, and
when they are preparing for debates, they acknowledge problematic is-
sues. Therefore, it is likely that, this kind of mistake ensues from a re-
current misconception, which is considering competitive debate only
as a strictly ruled type of competitive dialogue (Wood and Good-
night, 1994). Even if this definition is correct from a strictly theoret-
ical point of view, from a pedagogical and practical perspective it is
not exhaustive. In fact, debate also encompasses information seeking
dialogue, where each debater looks for and shares information with
teammates; critical discussion, where teammates explore issues togeth-
er; negotiation, where teammates try to reach an agreement on organi-
zational matters; and deliberation, where, for example, teammates have
to decide which arguments to bring into the debate (Cf. Backer, 2010).
Recognizing the need for a wider set of skills for debating than those
strictly related to the match reveals how complete a tool debate is and
how important cultivating all the skills associated with debate is for ar-
gumentation education. Additionally, promoting this idea of academ-
ic debate will help scholars to give a clearer idea of debate itself and its
impacts. This will strengthen debate from oversimplification by those
not mean that the debate is or should be performed as an eristic dialogue,
as Walton seems to suggest (1994; 2008). Instead, in competitive debate
the judge is in a position to reward effective argumentative techniques
and to discourage the use of poor arguments (Ulrich, 1986a). In addi-
tion, the purposes often cited as overall goals of judging are to promote
the educational aspects of academic debate, to promote fairness in the
activity and to establish a favourable atmosphere for quality competition
in debates (ibidem: 2). The achievement of these goals cannot be com-
pared with allowing poor or fallacious arguments to flourish. Moreo-
ver, even if a debate team could win a match using fallacious arguments,
reaching an agreement in a critical discussion type of dialogue does not
avoid the same critique. It is always possible that, in a critical discussion,
an agreement or persuasion is reached based on fallacious arguments if
parties do not recognize such arguments as fallacious. Nonetheless, crit-
ical discussions are not considered eristic.
The last mistake emphasized seems to imply another conceptual
confusion: debate format’s theoretical implications are often confused
with educational impact. Andrews (1995) and Tumposky (2004) sug-
gest that considering the dialectic structure of debate a simplification
seems to imply that debaters simplify issues. However, this is a mis-
take. As we have seen before, debaters understand issues better, and
when they are preparing for debates, they acknowledge problematic is-
sues. Therefore, it is likely that, this kind of mistake ensues from a re-
current misconception, which is considering competitive debate only
as a strictly ruled type of competitive dialogue (Wood and Good-
night, 1994). Even if this definition is correct from a strictly theoret-
ical point of view, from a pedagogical and practical perspective it is
not exhaustive. In fact, debate also encompasses information seeking
dialogue, where each debater looks for and shares information with
teammates; critical discussion, where teammates explore issues togeth-
er; negotiation, where teammates try to reach an agreement on organi-
zational matters; and deliberation, where, for example, teammates have
to decide which arguments to bring into the debate (Cf. Backer, 2010).
Recognizing the need for a wider set of skills for debating than those
strictly related to the match reveals how complete a tool debate is and
how important cultivating all the skills associated with debate is for ar-
gumentation education. Additionally, promoting this idea of academ-
ic debate will help scholars to give a clearer idea of debate itself and its
impacts. This will strengthen debate from oversimplification by those
